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ABSTRACT 
 
In October 2008, Petrohawk Energy drilled the first modern fracking well into the Eagle 
Ford Shale, sparking an oil and gas boom in what is now one of the world’s most 
productive shale plays, responsible for 1.087 million barrels of oil per day. Large 
investments in production infrastructure and commercial developments have brought 
economic opportunities to one of the poorest areas in Texas. Notwithstanding multiple 
reports on economic activity, there have not been any studies examining how this 
development is experienced on the Eagle Ford Shale and the amount of local 
policymaker economic governance. I therefore ask: Does a resource curse exist on the 
Eagle Ford Shale? In framing this question, this study evaluates if social disruption and 
worsening economic inequality are present on the shale play. This thesis employs two 
methods: semi-structured interviews with 15 economic development officials from 
August 2014 to March 2015 and a spatial assessment of relative mineral wealth using 
2010-2015 public tax data as a proxy for actual mineral wealth from Live Oak County, a 
core Eagle Ford oil and gas production county.  
 The interviews indicated that economic development officials are most concerned 
about the deterioration of roads, the high demand for housing, and ramifications of 
skyrocketing wages. Findings from the Live Oak County mineral wealth analysis 
demonstrate that only 1.95% remains local to the county. This absentee mineral wealth is 
concentrated with major energy firms in the Texas metropolitan regions. The 
implications from these results indicate that a traditional core-periphery relationship has 
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developed on the Eagle Ford Shale, economic development officials remain optimistic 
about development despite receiving few benefits in an apparent royalty paradox, and 
social relations are changing possibly due to absentee mineral ownership. I answer the 
research question by noting that there are indications that the resource curse is present. 
As one respondent describes it, Eagle Ford “[economic development] all depends on the 
price of oil!” and not on policymaker actions. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
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RRC Texas Railroad Commission 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis advances the knowledge and understanding of resource-extraction driven 
economic development practices in midst of a dynamic boomtown setting. As one 
stakeholder put it, economic development “depends on the price of oil!” (EFS004). This 
thesis explores some of the many intricate and subtle aspects associated with that 
argument: specifically, the range of stakeholder views and trends in the distribution of 
mineral wealth that sustains economic development. Some of the major findings from 
this research demonstrate that economic development officials are most concerned about 
the degradation of local roads, the unavailability of permanent housing concurrent with 
the over abundance of non-permanent housing, and the spike in wages leading to non-
energy industry workforce failures. Furthermore, my research determined that mineral 
interests are largely held and owned by absentee firms and individuals. Therefore, the 
limitations in power and the size of their jurisdictions in comparison to the spatial 
breadth of the resource determine that municipal and county economic officials are only 
able to peripherally manage a few of the ramifications of the play. Based on the findings, 
this thesis demonstrates that there are indications that the resource curse is present 
through the social disruption of economic livelihoods and worsening economic 
inequality through concentrating mineral wealth. 
Some findings of this thesis have already been shared with stakeholders through 
popular opinion pieces (Murphy 2015a, 2015b, 2016). I will also share more results with 
study participants in 2016. The information gained from this research has already been 
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leveraged into lessons on boomtown development in Planet Earth Laboratory 
(Geography 213), Economic Geography (Geography 304), and the Geography of Energy 
(Geography 309).  
This section outlines the study area and states the research question as “does a 
resource curse exist on the Eagle Ford Shale?” I also outline the two main research 
objectives of this thesis. Section 2 reviews the literature, providing a foundation for the 
research. Section 3 describes the methods used in this thesis, while Sections 4 and 5 
examine economic development stakeholder views and an analysis of public county tax 
appraisal data; Sections 6 and 7 return to the literature, providing context for the findings 
and offering some concluding thoughts.  
 
1.2 The Preconditions for the Eagle Ford 
In October 2008, Petrohawk Energy—now a subsidiary of BHP Billiton—drilled the 
first two exploration wells, STS-241 #1H and Dora Martin #1H, into the Eagle Ford 
Shale in La Salle County, Texas, to little fanfare. The Eagle Ford is an oil and gas 
bearing shale deposit that stretches in a crescent from Laredo to Madisonville, Texas, 
and had been recognized by geologists since the 1950s. The depth and materiality of the 
formation (tight shale) precluded any development of the play—an industry term that 
entered into the popular lexicon to refer to an area of oil and gas exploration. Despite the 
significant advancements in hydraulic fracturing (hereafter “fracking”) techniques on the 
Barnett Shale in North Texas, few companies recognized the opportunities in south 
Texas. Nevertheless, throughout 2008 Petrohawk mobilized assets from east Texas basin 
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to south Texas to start construction on the first wells into the Eagle Ford Shale (Francis 
2008; Durham 2010). Previous forays into the area had been quite profitable, as 
companies had invested in the shallower Austin Chalk formation in the 1970s-1990s 
(Pearson 2012). Notwithstanding the strong positive returns from these first wells in both 
monetary and hydrocarbon terms, few were aware of the company’s discovery. 
Geologists both at Petrohawk and in other hydrocarbon firms were quick to downplay 
the possible profitability of the Eagle Ford Shale (Francis 2008; Durham 2010). Few 
energy experts would have imagined that this these wells would spark the largest (by 
some accounts) present-day oil play in the U.S. only in the course of six years (EIA 
2015c). 
Touted to bring energy independence by policymakers to a country that had been 
importing increasingly greater volumes of oil since the 1970s, late 20th and early 21st 
century advancements in shale hydrocarbon extraction techniques offer rejuvenation to 
American regions that had been in severe decline due to rural-to-urban migration (Lave 
and Lutz 2014). Associated with tar sands and coalbed methane under the term 
“unconventional hydrocarbons,” shale oil and gas exploration has been lauded as a 
potential source for U.S. energy independence (Chew 2014). The political, 
environmental, and economic consequences of shale plays have been manifest across the 
U.S., where these techniques are now coaxing unprecedented amounts of hydrocarbons 
from deposits that were deemed unattainable as few as twenty years ago. Some of the 
most active plays are found in the Northeast (Marcellus and Haynesville shales), North 
Dakota (Bakken Shale) and Texas (Barnett, Permian, and Eagle Ford shales) with many 
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lesser-explored deposits scattered across the United States and beyond. Each shale 
deposit has a unique combination of oil and gas available to producers, with some 
formations more associated with oil exploration (Bakken and Permian) while others with 
gas (Barnett and Marcellus).  
Hydraulic fracturing, perfected on the Barnett Shale near the Dallas-Fort Worth 
Metroplex, is the most significant innovation leading to the boom in oil and gas 
exploration. Fracking uses a combination of water, sand, and chemical lubricants 
injected under high-pressure to pry open deep subsurface deposits. The oil and gas then 
returns to the surface where it is harnessed and transported via pipelines, semi-trucks, or 
trains. Since 2008, because of sustained levels of lowered natural gas prices, firms have 
been selectively targeting oil deposits while any associated natural gas is usually flared 
at the well site.  
Shale, while expansive in land area, is generally relatively thin, with many 
deposits only a few hundred feet thick. As a reference, the western part of the lower 
Eagle Ford Shale is up to 600 feet thick, while the eastern part of the play averages about 
100 feet (EIA 2014). Oil and gas producers surmounted this problem by horizontally 
drilling into the shale play. As the drill bit is lowered into the well, it turns at slight 
angles so that the bit is traveling laterally through the deposit. This enables a single well 
to tap into thousands of horizontal feet of the play. Furthermore, since there is no 
competition for the resources directly below the well, the exploration firm can drill 
multiple wells from the same five to ten acre pad site. Some locations are comprised of 
20 or more wells extending radially. The term “fracking” collectively describes 
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hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, and improved pre-drilling technologies (i.e., 
three dimensional seismic testing) (Martineau 2007).  
 
1.3 The Eagle Ford Shale 
The Eagle Ford Shale, an oil and gas bearing shale deposit that extends in a crescent 
from the Río Grande north of Laredo to the I-45 corridor near Madisonville, Texas 
(Figure 1), provides the focus of the study. Many areas along the Eagle Ford have 
previously experienced hydrocarbon exploration, with several wells dating back to the 
1930s (Pope and Handren 1992). Indeed, there are particular regions of the Eagle Ford 
that have previously experienced the throes of oil-related price volatility, such as the 
Pearsall and Giddings plays on the Austin Chalk—an oil bearing formation above the 
Eagle Ford Shale. One particular seven-county region in Central Texas gained 
international notoriety when major oil companies began to explore the Austin Chalk in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. This led to shortages in housing and civic services as the 
county was transformed from one of the 10 poorest in Texas to one of the richest in a 
few years (Hurt III 1981; Pirtle 2011). However, there were no assurances that the boom 
would last. In fact, a 1981 Texas Monthly article questioned whether the Giddings play 
would be “the last boom” because of the disappearance of the wildcatter—independent 
oilmen who are more likely to gamble on marginal or potential plays—and the belief 
that all the major U.S. onshore oil fields had been discovered and exploited (Hurt III 
1981).  
 
  6 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Eagle Ford Shale (EIA 2013). 
 
Expanding from two wells in October 2008, drilling activity in the Eagle Ford 
Shale (as of December 2015) includes 9,887 completed oil wells, 4,835 gas wells, with 
another 4,800 wells permitted for eventual drilling (Railroad Commission 2015a). Oil 
production has ballooned to 1.087 million (11.6% of total U.S. production), while 
natural gas production has risen 5,348 million cubic feet (MMcf) per day. Furthermore, 
275,939 barrels of natural gas condensates (Railroad Commission 2015a)—a liquefied 
hydrocarbon that exists in a state between natural gas and crude oil—are produced daily. 
Condensates require minimal field processing to be turned into diesel, kerosene, and 
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naphtha. Moreover, condensates can be exported without congressional sanctioning 
(Sider 2014) and, as a result, were sought by the oil and gas industry, especially prior to 
the lifting of the U.S. export ban in December 2015. Petroleum firms target a subsection 
of the Eagle Ford Shale, the Lower Eagle Ford Shale, which is found between 3,000 and 
13,000 feet below the surface depending on the location of the well.  
Across the 21 counties that make up the play, the Eagle Ford provides “over $87 
billion in economic output” and supports 155,000 full-time equivalent jobs (Tunstall et 
al. 2014, 5). Reminiscent of Gilmore’s (1976) hypothetical town, Pistol Shot, small 
communities across the Eagle Ford—once isolated geographically and metaphorically—
are now intricately linked into the global economy. Although the Eagle Ford Shale is the 
primary target of present-day drilling, south Texas is host to several other 
unconventional plays, not the least of which are the Pearsall Shale, Eaglebine, and 
Olmos Sand; however, the economic viability of these plays is unknown. Energy 
companies are evaluating theses plays, with some having already drilled exploration 
wells into them. In media reports, these shale plays are undifferentiated and grouped into 
the Eagle Ford Shale.  
 
1.4 Research Question and Objectives 
Despite the importance of petroleum-based energy exploration to the future of the U.S. 
energy and development landscape, geographers and other social scientists have so far 
failed to critically examine the economic development shocks of shale (Willow and 
Wylie 2014; Calvert 2015). Furthermore, very few shale energy studies engage with the 
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spatial distribution of energy geography phenomena and instead treat the region as a 
whole (Pasqualetti and Brown 2014). Rather, broad generalizations about entire regions 
or countries cloud local realities. This offers an opportunity for geographers to engage 
with the “local” and learn how these processes are registering with individuals 
differentially across a play. In these circumstances, I offer two approaches to explore 
local economic development drivers: semi structured interviews with key economic 
actors and the distribution of one Eagle Ford county’s mineral wealth.  
 
Research Question: Does a resource curse exist on the Eagle Ford Shale? 
 
Tunstall (2015b) notes that the resource curse is not occurring based on an increase in 
per capita income from 2008 to 2011. However, the resource curse has other parameters, 
such as the Dutch Disease (Neary and Van Wijnbergen 1986), lowered investment in 
human capital and the degradation of the physical environment (Gylfason 2001). This 
thesis evaluates social disruption (Gilmore 1976; Haslam Mckenzie 2013) and 
decreasing economic equality (Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001) as indicators of an Eagle Ford 
Shale resource curse. For a full description of the resource curse, refer to Section 2.2. 
 
Objective 1: Discover economic development narratives for energy development. Using 
a semi-structured interview and coding protocol established in Section 3, I assess the 
views of 15 local economic development officials (municipal and county government 
officials, economic development corporation administrators, chambers of commerce 
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presidents and governing bodies) regarding the arrival of oil and gas development. I was 
able to capture their responses to plummeting hydrocarbon prices and examine the main 
ramifications to energy-spurred growth in the midst of boomtown conditions in a place-
based context. The approach is based in a boomtown development literature grounded in 
Gilmore’s (1976) problem triangle. These data are presented in Section 4 and discussed 
in Section 6.  
The seminal modern publication on boomtown development, John Gilmore’s 
1976 Science article, offered a glimpse into economic development in a boomtown- 
milieu. Gilmore noted the four major stages of boomtown development—enthusiasm, 
uncertainty, panic, and acceptance—before offering solutions for improved boomtown 
economic and social development. This aspect of his research has been thoroughly 
examined by the literature, and for the most part, tacitly accepted. He also proposed the 
“problem triangle,” which the boomtown scholarship has yet to critically engage. In this 
conceptualization of the major issues of boomtown development, Gilmore noted that 
degraded quality of life from energy development leads to an unstable labor force that 
causes declining industrial output. This, in turn, causes tax expenditures to decrease 
forcing lowered tax revenues and investment. Finally, these decreased local services 
further decrease the quality of life—a feedback loop. As part of this thesis, I will revisit 
the problem triangle and reconcile it to the modern materiality of oil extraction. I will 
then place it into a conversation on the resource curse.  
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Objective 2: Determine the spatial distribution of relative mineral wealth in Live Oak 
County, Texas. Using publically available data, I map and assess the spatial variability of 
mineral interest holdings in the Live Oak County Appraisal District as a proxy for 
mineral wealth. Live Oak County is a key oil and condensate producer in the Eagle Ford, 
with 752 wells drilled as of the end of 2015. I also determine the main beneficiaries of 
the wealth. The methods are presented in Section 3, then the results are offered in 
Section 5.  
In Section 6, I interpret the quantitative results and demonstrate how they diverge 
from the economic development narratives offered by economic development 
stakeholders on mineral ownership, who believe that “everyone wants an oil well in their 
backyard.” I examine the similarities and divergences between the results of this study 
and other economic development studies of the Eagle Ford Shale and in other shale 
plays. I not only critique previous economic impact studies of energy development, but 
also offer political economy reasoning for why Texas has seen increased support for 
State legislation that decreases the power of local fracking governance. Energy firms 
prefer regulatory guidelines at the state level rather than municipal. As Davis and Hoffer 
(2012) note, this is largely driven by four factors: 1) firms can focus lobbying efforts on 
the hydrocarbon regulatory body; 2) state legislators are more accessible and easily 
swayed by industry discourse due to the smaller constituencies; 3) industry-advocates 
use their positions to demonstrate business transparency and describe economic benefits 
at a local level; and 4) industry officials are able to demonstrate that they can abide by 
state regulations. While Davis and Hoffer (2012) support why fracking regulations have 
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been largely absent from federal intervention, they fail to answer why industry and 
mineral interest holders are equally opposed to municipal or county regulations. This 
study will offer a hypothesis as to why mineral holders and owners are averse to local 
fracking regulations. To conclude Section 6, I will provide an answer to my research 
question.  
 
1.5 Previous Social Science Eagle Ford Shale Studies 
This study analyzes how the Eagle Ford Shale is influencing economic development 
outcomes using local stakeholder narratives and public tax appraisal data as a way to 
query whether elements of the resource curse are present. This project adds to a small 
yet burgeoning literature on the societal externalities of resource development on the 
Eagle Ford Shale. Johnston, Werder, and Sebastian (2016) note how saltwater disposal 
wells on the Eagle Ford Shale are statistically more likely to be sited in locations that 
have a higher percentage of people of color. This creates a potential environmental 
injustice. Schade and Roest (2015) examine how the flaring of natural gas on the Eagle 
Ford is contributing to poor air quality in San Antonio. Besides air pollution, local 
governments have been witness to the energy industry traffic on country roads incapable 
of handling the loads (Rahm et al. 2015), with each well causing $133,000 in damage 
over the life of the well (Naismith Engineering, Inc. 2015) and resulting in decreased 
pavement conditions (Quiroga et al. 2015), as well as an increase in the number of 
commercial vehicle crashes that are frequently fatal (Quiroga and Tsapakis 2015).  
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A group of University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) researchers have 
assessed the Eagle Ford Shale as a $87 billion boost to the Texas economy resulting in 
155,000 full time equivalent jobs as of 2013 (Tunstall et al. 2014). Further economic 
evidence suggests that the Eagle Ford Shale has, so far, avoided decreasing per capita 
incomes, one of the tenants of the resources curse (Tunstall 2015a, 2015b); however it is 
still too early in the development period to draw such a significant conclusion. Brown, 
Fitzgerald, and Weber (2015) estimated that 24.5% of Eagle Ford royalty owners were 
local to the shale play. The average royalty rate was 20.3%, which generates $2.83 
billion in local royalty income and $11.54 billion in total (local and nonlocal) royalties. 
Moreover, they determined an average in-county ownership for mineral properties in 
Texas to be 21.7%. This group of Eagle Ford economic studies will be scrutinized in 
greater detail in Sections 2, 4, 5, and 6.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This investigation contests the assertion that south Texas oil and gas development has 
not led to the resource curse. Rather, I demonstrate that economic inequality is 
increasing and social disruptions are negatively influencing quality of life in south 
Texas. Therefore, there are indications that elements of the resource curse are present. I 
also illustrate the differences between views held by economic development officials and 
quantitative data on mineral ownership. I shed light on the development decisions that 
stakeholders must consider when presented with a resource extraction situation. I 
critique oil and gas economic impact studies that fail to examine the spatial variability of 
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hydrocarbon wealth and ownership and offer an interpretation for why energy firms 
prefer state-level scalar politics as opposed to local politics. I conclude this thesis by 
summarizing my arguments and suggesting avenues for future research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This section explores the main literatures to which the thesis makes contributions. I will 
survey and provide commentary on the regional development of extractive resource 
economies through quantitative and qualitative perspectives. This is accomplished by 
examining the resource curse and the staple economy. Next, I will describe the literature 
on boomtowns, tracing its evolution from the 1970s to present. I will note who is 
responsible for the development of economic policies in extraction environments. I will 
also query economic impact studies that involve mineral wealth. This leads to a 
discussion of the split estate and ownership of minerals. These descriptive and economic 
studies will then be linked to political economy analyses of resources that connect the 
energy industry and economic and political outcomes in Texas. Throughout this section, 
I will situate the various literatures to the resource curse and the objectives of this 
research.  
 
2.2 Regional Development in Extractive Economies 
Oil and gas extraction provides opportunities for rapid regional development, but 
resource-driven economic growth is associated with detrimental economic and 
institutional outcomes termed the “resource curse” (Auty 1993; Sachs and Warner 1995, 
2001; Davis 2010). Social scientists have proposed many, mechanisms through which 
resource abundance distorts the development process (Frankel 2010; Torres, Afonso, and 
Soares 2013), however this thesis summarizes its mechanisms as: 1) the emergence of 
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the Dutch Disease, whereby resource sector exports increase a country’s monetary value 
which crowds out investment and entrepreneurship in less competitive infant industries 
(Neary and Van Wijnbergen 1986; Auty 2001; Gylfason 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, 
and Trebbi 2004; Michaels 2011); 2) resource extraction degrades the physical 
environment deterring potential post-extraction growth (Gylfason 2001; Sachs and 
Warner 2001; Michaels 2011); 3) competition for resource windfalls promotes rent-
seeking and corruption, distorting the formation of social capital institutions (Ross 1999; 
Auty 2001; Torvik 2002; Isham et al. 2005; Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007; 
Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Michaels 2011); 4) rent seeking behavior causes decreasing per 
capita incomes (Torvik 2002); 5) worsening economic inequality (Sarraf and Jiwanji 
2001); and finally, 6) the influx of investment into a region causes a disruption to the 
local societal fabric (Gilmore 1976; Haslam Mckenzie 2013). As discussed in Section 1, 
this thesis will focus on the latter two: worsening economic inequality and social 
disruption. While not every resource-based economy experiences the ramifications of the 
curse (see Larsen 2006), without strong institutional oversight a country’s economic and 
social stability is largely tied to commodity prices (Ewers 2015).  
Manifestations of the resource curse can occur at different scales. For example, 
Chilean regional economies have been linked to the pricing of copper and the crowding 
out of higher-ordered economic activity (Barton, Gwynne, and Murray 2008; Rehner, 
Baeza, and Barton 2014). This could lead to potential economic stagnation if copper 
prices become negatively volatile. Closer to the study area, the historical rise of oil 
production in the U.S. South led to a displacement of agricultural jobs in favor of 
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hydrocarbon exploration and refining (Michaels 2011). Tunstall (2015a) suggests that 
the Eagle Ford could be experiencing the Dutch Disease due to the nature of south Texas 
institutions, yet his 2008-2011 income-based analysis noted that the resource curse was 
not taking place (Tunstall 2015b). These “internal peripheries” may be more exposed to 
resource curse ramifications than entire countries (Bridge 2008, 393). Weber (2014), 
based on his examination of the south-central U.S., notes that the resource curse is 
absent. He substantiates this argument by discussing that there were 1.4 jobs created for 
every resource job and that education attainment levels in the region had increased. 
However, resource curse hypotheses have been under-examined in new American 
energy geographies (Calvert 2015), one of the aims of this research. This is especially 
important as some U.S. resource extraction studies find the ramifications of the resource 
curse already present (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2007; James and Aadland 2011). 
Inspired by the work of Innis (1929), who examined Canada’s economic 
ascendance and dependency through the lens of natural resource extraction, many 
geographers have engaged with the ideas of institutionally-based resource development. 
Canadian researchers have expanded resource-based institutional development by 
offering a strong challenger against the purely quantitative models (Hayter, Barnes, and 
Bradshaw 2003). Universal quantitative models are incognizant of the geographically- 
and historically-specific experiences of economic development found in resource supply 
regions (Barnes and Hayter 2005). Staple economies are subject to a volatile lifecycle, in 
which regions attract extraction companies for employment and development purposes. 
These large firms are dependent on factors (usually) exogenous to the region, such as 
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commodity pricing and the lack of institutional oversight (Barnes, Hayter, and Hay 
2001). Inspired by this work, other investigators have examined regional institutional 
influences. For example, other research has suggested that without historical institutions 
guiding Californian resource development, the state would not be as prosperous as it is 
today (Walker 2001).  
 
2.3 Reimagining the Boomtown 
Despite the limited cross-pollination between the resource curse literature—
usually examined at a regional level—and the site-specific boomtown literature, this 
thesis offers findings in both. Indeed, one component of the resource curse, social 
disruption (Haslam Mckenzie 2013), was original to the boomtown literature (Gilmore 
1976). The spatial nature of resource extraction—with some areas better suited for 
exploration due to their surface and subsurface situation—inherently creates an uneven 
spatial landscape of mineral exploration. Therefore, cities, and not necessarily regions, 
are the sites of experiential economic failure and success. Boomtowns emerge in 
locations that are spatially proximal to the rapid development of high demand 
commodities, with their site-specific characteristics dictating the experience of mineral 
extraction. Aspects that contribute to a town’s relationship with mineral extraction 
explored in this thesis are the nature of mineral ownership, the availability of workers, 
the quantity and characteristics of accommodations, and the carrying capacity of 
preexisting infrastructure needed to transport products and employees to and from drill 
sites. While energy companies can centralize many aspects of production to distant 
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company headquarters (e.g., finance, human resources, legal expertise), firms must 
interact with boomtowns through the many aspects of mineral production that require in-
situ performances (e.g. mineral contracts signatures, the drilling of the well, logistics). 
Often, these towns are associated with higher levels of individual stress, deteriorating 
feelings of social cohesiveness, increased social issues, and greater labor turnover 
(Kassover 1981). Many boomtowns fail to materialize in the ways expected. Researchers 
find that boomtowns respond (e.g., socio-economic changes) to the resource economy 
based on site-specific characteristics such as “their commodity base, location and socio-
demographic structure” (Lawrie, Tonts, and Plummer 2011, 160). While applicable to 
shale exploration, the boomtown literature base has been criticized for failing to capture 
local, place-based eccentricities (Nord and Luloff 1993; Tonts, Plummer, and Lawrie 
2012; Jacquet 2014). This study addresses this gap by examining the place-specific 
factors that lead to positive or negative boomtown economic development outcomes.  
Gilmore (1976) provided one of the foundational modern scientific accounts of 
the boomtowns. The author traced the devolution of a fictionalized town, Pistol Shot, as 
it is overwhelmed by nearby resource development. Gilmore noted that most boomtowns 
experience four phases of development: 1) enthusiasm for the possibilities of economic 
growth; 2) uncertainty reflecting concern about missed development goals and as the 
reality of resource extraction descends on the city; 3) panic emerges as citizens find 
themselves unable to cope with the changes; and 4) adaptation to the major ramifications 
of resource extraction (see also Brasier et al. 2011). These four stages of development 
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have been accepted, adapted, and reinterpreted (Gramling and Brabant 1986; Ennis, 
Tofa, and Finlayson 2014; Cope et al. 2015).  
Additionally, Gilmore proposed a “problem triangle” that illustrated the main 
issues boomtowns encounter (Figure 2). The boom in population caused by the 
discovery of resources causes degraded quality of life, which makes it difficult to attract 
labor to the region. This, in turn, decreases productivity, causing a disruption of local 
services leading to decreased quality of life. This feedback loop, Gilmore contended, 
endures until a stasis or retrenchment of resource extraction. Interestingly, despite 
offering a more rigorous theoretical approach than his four phases of development, the 
triangle has received little attention from the boomtown scholarship scholars. Wilkinson 
et al. (1982), suggesting that resource extraction could be positive for a community, 
ignored the problem triangle but provided a scathing critique of the social disruption 
hypothesis advanced by Gilmore. He instead insisted that more quantitative research 
should be conducted to assess whether municipalities are negatively impacted by 
resource development. By the end of the decade, investigators noted that boomtowns 
likely lie somewhere between the two extremes (Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988). 
While social scientists continue to mention the problem triangle in broad-stroke 
examinations of boomtowns (Jacquet 2009, 2014; Schafft, Borlu, and Glenna 2013), 
they have not critically engaged with the triangle itself. In this thesis, I advance this 
literature by revisiting the problem triangle and reconciling it to the modern materiality 
of oil extraction. 
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Figure 2: Gilmore’s (1976, 191) Problem Triangle (Redrawn with permission from the 
American Academy of Scientists). 
 
Resource extraction leading to boomtown development disrupts municipal social 
and civic services (Gilmore 1976; England and Albrecht 1984; Weber, Geigle, and 
Barkdull 2014). This disruption to the social fabric occurs prior to the drilling of the first 
well (Brown, Geetsen, and Krannich 1989; Simonelli 2014; Crowe et al. 2015) and can 
persist for years after the completion of the final well; however, this disruption is not 
permanent (Smith, Krannich, and Hunter 2001). While boomtowns bust when 
commodity prices drop and activity retrenches, evidence suggests that after a decade the 
city eventually recovers to a state improved from the pre-boom conditions (Brown, 
Dorins, and Krannich 2005) provided that governance actors take action to help mitigate 
the negative economic development shock(s) using positive shocks (Besser, Recker, and 
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Agnitsch 2008). The literature further suggests that long-term production in oil and gas 
can have positive economic benefits, even if the immediate response is negative. Weber 
(2012) notes that income and population increases are correlated with petroleum 
extraction in Wyoming and Colorado; however, the longer a region stays specialized in 
oil and gas, the smaller the impact to income (Haggerty et al. 2014).  
The boomtown literature associated with the explosion of activity since 1999 in 
the U.S. has only started to materialize. Several studies have focused on the agency 
dynamics surrounding oil and gas development in the Barnett Shale, which supported 
economic development in North Texas. Indeed, locations experiencing energy extraction 
for a longer period of time are more likely to notice the consequences of energy 
extraction (Theodori 2012). This is especially important given that residents and 
government officials are aware of energy extraction’s social and environmental costs and 
yet still believe that it provides economic development potential (Anderson and 
Theodori 2009; Wynveen 2011; Theodori 2012). Additionally, the stakeholders 
interviewed in the Barnett Shale studies—city employees, county government officials, 
economic development leaders, and chambers of commerce personnel—mirrors this 
thesis (Anderson and Theodori 2009).  
Similar results were found on the New Albany Shale—a largely undeveloped 
play—where political leaders were excited by the economic opportunities of shale 
development (Silva and Crowe 2015). This excitement did not translate to the citizens, 
where residents were more skeptical of shale energy development, indicating a gap in 
perception between residents and local policymakers (Crowe et al. 2015). Brasier et al. 
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(2011) goes on to reiterate that, just as on the Barnett Shale demonstrated by Anderson 
and Theodori (2009), the perceived benefits and consequences associated with fracking 
are spatially diverse across the Marcellus Shale, which was similarly confirmed on the 
border between Pennsylvania and New York (Stedman et al. 2012). These spatial 
differences result from population size, proximity to metropolitan centers, amount of 
preexisting infrastructure development, and the history of extraction (Brasier et al. 2011, 
2013).  
Human capital acquisition and retrenchment in a boomtown follow a similar 
pattern among resource economies. First, exponential growth in the labor market occurs, 
followed by eventual cost cutting as exploration turns into production. The labor market 
then operates at an elevated labor supplied-demand equilibrium until resource 
exhaustion or new deposits are found (Lucas 1971). These patterns have become much 
more pronounced with the reliance on the service industry to operate mining activities—
which allows for greater acquisition of technological improvements and greater 
responsiveness to market activity—and through fly-in, fly-out (FIFO) or drive-in, drive-
out (DIDO) arrangements, which only temporarily places workers in the resource region 
(Tonts 2010; Keough 2015). This type of worker-firm arrangement limits worker-
community integration and paralyzes sustainable municipal development (Storey 2001). 
In Australia, these DIDO/FIFO arrangements largely appear in response to inadequate 
housing in mining regions, with confounding factors such as the location of the company 
headquarters and the firm’s institutional culture ultimately forcing employees to live 
hundreds or thousands of miles away from the jobsite. This form of employment is 
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averse for both the city that houses the workers, where social problems tend to emerge, 
and the municipalities that host the workers on a short-term basis (Storey 2001; Perry 
and Rowe 2015). Long distance commuting (LDC) causes a significant leakage of 
income to regions beyond the host region. In Chile, for example, LDC benefited the 
sending city (in that case, the major metropolitan regions), while the towns temporarily 
hosting the workers were disadvantaged (Aroca and Atienza 2011). While the former is 
certainly a relevant concern, the present research examines the latter, in which small 
municipalities on the Eagle Ford have become temporary hubs for short-term worker 
housing (Section 4).   
Freudenburg and Gramling (1998) studied how oil company linkages emerged in 
Louisiana from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. They note that linkages (which 
inherently lead to economic embeddedness) only developed after several decades of 
profitable oil exploration and production. Following a severe drop in oil prices, these 
linkages quickly dissolved (often more quickly than the extractive sector itself) resulting 
in a flight of qualified human capital from southern Louisiana to other regions. 
Therefore, the social linkages between an extraction firm and a boomtown are 
superficial, except in those cases where energy production can be established for a long 
period. This concept will be explored more extensively later in the thesis. 
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2.4 Mineral Interests1, Economic Impact Studies, and the Resource Curse 
While qualitative social scientists continue to grapple with resource development on 
boomtowns, economists have estimated the economic impact in resource regions 
(Jacquet 2009; Kinnaman 2011; Tunstall 2015a). These studies are useful because they 
provide citizens with simple outcomes in monetary terms; however, comparable to the 
resource curse and boomtown literature discussed earlier, the spatiality of mineral wealth 
across the play—the material basis for economic development—is not examined. While 
economic impact studies frame development in a state-specific or region-specific 
context, the effects of rapid resource development are locally experienced, because oil 
and gas extraction relies upon worker housing and amenities, dialogue between firms 
and surface owners, and numerous logistical operations. Therefore, this section 
emphasizes the gap between regional mineral wealth studies and the methodology this 
thesis employs.  
 The discursive understanding of oil and gas geographies has been developed 
mainly in regard to contexts where the state owns resources and allocates access to firms 
through contracts monitored and enforced through bureaucratic procedures, often highly 
opaque and subject to rent-seeking activity. Determining access and distribution of 
                                                
1 Throughout this thesis, I use “mineral interest” to refer to the total mineral property 
(the mineral estate) and all the associated contractual interests associated with it unless 
otherwise stated. The “royalty,” on the other hand, is the negotiated percentage that the 
mineral property owner(s) receive(s) from the vending of the extracted oil and gas 
through a mineral lease. While there are two types of royalties used in this thesis, 
personal royalties and overriding royalties, I am careful to make a distinction between 
the two whenever possible. A full description of the various forms of mineral interests 
will be presented in Section 3. 
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wealth has been key research focus, for example, in the Andes relating to hydrocarbons, 
hard-rock and alluvial mining (Perreault 2006, 2013; Bebbington and Bury 2009). In the 
U.S., however, the study of oil and gas mineral wealth is limited to analysis of royalty 
data, oftentimes in a regional context. These royalty studies are frequently part of 
broader economic impact analyses (Kinnaman 2011). There are a few investigations that 
have focused on the ownership of mineral wealth, such as one that examined the impact 
of mineral royalties on the economies of six shale production regions using a proprietary 
software package (Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber 2015). This study found that the shale 
plays generated $39 billion in 2014 in private royalties. Another from Denton, Texas, 
found that local residents are subject to environmental injustice because of the lack of 
local mineral ownership and the nature of Texas mineral tenure laws (Fry, Briggle, and 
Kincaid 2015). While some studies have been conducted of entire regions (Weber, 
Brown, and Pender 2013; Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber 2015) or of a single 
municipality (Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid 2015), analysis of an entire county’s mineral 
wealth distribution has not been conducted, one aim of the present research. 
The mapping of mineral interests and royalty income has been a major topic 
amongst developing world political ecologists (Bebbington and Bury 2009; Orta-
Martínez and Finer 2010; Bury and Bebbington 2013; Cuba et al. 2014; Finer et al. 
2015). Tracking the distribution of mineral wealth in these situations is relatively simple 
given that frequently the state owns the subterranean resources (all the wealth flows to a 
single entity and the firms developing the resource). In the U.S., however, all states 
allow for mineral (subsurface) estates to be severed from the surface properties, 
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commonly referred to as split estates (Collins and Nkansah 2015). The subsurface 
property owner then has the right to develop or lease the property for development; 
furthermore, the owner can receive bonus, rental, or royalty payments (Theriot 2012). 
Texas law, established in Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Company (1919), grants 
supremacy to the mineral estate, because failing to do so would drastically reduce the 
value of the mineral property should development opportunities arise (Gold 2014, 20–
23). Surface property owners have limited say over the placement of extraction 
infrastructure once development starts.   
Because split estates are used in the U.S., conflict between severed surface and 
mineral properties looms if the development of the mineral estate damages the surface 
estate. This especially important in low-income locations, where the surface low-income 
property owners or lessees typically do not have an interest in the mineral estate (Willow 
and Wylie 2014). This doctrine is even more relevant given the potential environmental 
justice ramifications to surface estate owners from drilling (Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid 
2015; Johnston, Werder, and Sebastian 2016). Indeed, even in situations of complete 
mineral and property ownership, social unease can develop because of differing royalty 
percentages offered to mineral owners. Based on the context of the well and contract 
negotiations, mineral owners can receive differing royalty percentages (Willow and 
Wylie 2014). This anxiety is exacerbated by reports of oil and gas firms turning 
neighbors against one another for profiteering purposes (Sawyer 2004; Willow and 
Wylie 2014).  
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This sentiment was reinforced by Weber, Brown, and Pender (2013), who 
understood that “the uneven distribution of costs and benefits could cause tensions 
between neighbors as some work ardently to limit energy development while others 
welcome it” (22). Moreover, despite royalties creating wealth (largely through increased 
property values) for many mineral holders, there is a small amount of economic change. 
For every $1 in royalty payment, $0.042 of consumption takes place, and this only 
occurs if a single owner wholly owned the mineral estate. Royalty information drawn 
from a public survey estimated that 3.4% of all farms receive royalty payments for any 
form of energy development (renewable or nonrenewable sources) (Weber, Brown, and 
Pender 2013).  
Attempts to determine the nature of royalties on the Marcellus Shale have been 
meager. Kay (2011) noted that the “extent of severed rights in particular is very difficult 
to estimate empirically because of the lack of easily accessible records” (14). To 
circumvent this issue, other researchers have used local versus absentee surface property 
ownership as a proxy for mineral tenure, estimating that 7.7% of owners lived out of 
state (Kelsey et al. 2011). While there is some overlap in the nature of tenure between 
the surface and subsurface, other methods and data explored in this thesis are able to 
better capture the spatial nature of mineral ownership.  
Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015) used mineral tax appraisal data to assess the 
amount of local Denton, Texas, mineral ownership. Individual owners accounted for less 
than 1% of total mineral interest, with the City of Denton being the largest beneficiary of 
royalties (approximately 1.6% of total mineral interest). However, the authors only 
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examined royalties and not working, overriding, or any other well lease interest. These 
other interests account for 83.7% of the total mineral interest (Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid 
2015).  
Closer to the study site, Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber (2015) estimated that 
24.5% of Eagle Ford royalty owners were local to the play. The average royalty rate was 
20.3%, generating $2.83 billion in local royalty income and $11.54 billion in total (local 
and nonlocal) royalties. Furthermore, they determined an average in-county ownership 
for mineral properties in Texas to be 21.7%. Again, the authors only focused on 
royalties. These data were based on information acquired from a private firm, 
DrillingInfo, which uses digitized courthouse records to determine ownership. This 
service requires a one-time subscription fee of $125,000 (DrillingInfo 2015). Other 
Eagle Ford studies have attempted to estimate royalties as 20% of total revenues from oil 
and gas operations, which is a simple approach that yields an estimated $6.8 billion in 
total royalties paid during 2013; however, this does not take into account other forms of 
mineral interest (Tunstall et al. 2014; Tunstall 2015a).  
 
2.5 Political Ecologies/Economies and Energy Geographies in a Texas Context 
Besides the economic impacts of energy development, this thesis will also explore some 
of the political consequences of mineral estate development. In doing so, I will 
demonstrate how social relations become reworked in a boomtown setting. Furthermore, 
I seek to understand why Texas political relations have in the past two years become 
disembodied from the local and placed into a new state-level scalar level. 
  29 
This thesis will focus on advancements in hydrocarbon specific political ecology 
literatures. Indeed, energy, in whatever form, deserves to be seen as a material object 
worthy of intense scrutiny and not necessarily as a conceptual branch of other resource 
geography studies (Huber 2015). Bridge’s (2001) demonstration of how resource 
extraction obliterates the recognition of complex social and economic relations 
demonstrates this need for energy-specific research. Indeed, when the “periphery” is 
imaginatively transformed into a setting devoid of social and political struggle and made 
only for resource extraction, locally important histories and cultures are forgotten. While 
certainly this manifests in a variety of extraction regimes besides energy, Bridge’s 
(2001) assessment of young student art showing Oklahoma as an oil producing state 
offers emotional evidence of how oil has changed not only the physical landscape 
(through the drilling of wells) but also the imaginative landscape. Parallels can easily be 
drawn between the reimagined Oklahoma and the changing south Texas environment.   
However, resource extraction does not have to be experientially negative. There 
are three possible main mechanisms by which petro-extraction catalyzes economic 
production: 1) the creation of forward (e.g., downstream petroleum processes) and 
backward (e.g., using local labor for oil and gas well construction) processes; 2) 
corporate social responsibility initiatives; and 3) tax and royalty payments (Bebbington 
2012). These forward and backward linkages can potentially be used to develop 
knowledge intensive industries if leveraged properly (Marin, Navas-Alemán, and Perez 
2015). However, in a statement akin to Emel and Roberts’ (1995) examination of west 
Texas aquifers, Bebbington (2012) is quick to argue “the effects of extraction in any 
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territory and the ways in which it is negotiated depend very much on the prior political 
economic history of that territory, as well as national political economic history” (25). 
This claim recognizes that the nature of tax and royalty benefits is largely dependent on 
the political and economic institutional culture—an aspect of hydrocarbon extraction 
that will loom large in the present thesis. 
U.S. hydrocarbon-related development should be situated relative to other 
economic endeavors. On-shore U.S. hydrocarbon development has been relegated to 
local (Fry 2013; Fry and Brannstrom 2015; Fry, Brannstrom, and Murphy 2015) and 
state governments (Davis and Hoffer 2012). This liberty to dictate policy has resulted in 
wildly different outcomes, ranging from a complete moratorium, and subsequent ban, on 
fracking in New York (Brasier et al. 2011; Klopott 2015) to Texas’s reputation as a 
“neoliberal hydrocarbon utopia” (Fry, Brannstrom, and Murphy 2015, 2591). Among 
states that support oil and gas production, policymakers focus on growth-first (Peck and 
Tickell 2002) and other pro-economic/pro-employment discourse approaches to regional 
development. This mobilizes and maximizes support for energy development (Rabe and 
Mundo 2007; Mercer, de Rijke, and Dressler 2014) and may include “race to the 
bottom” strategies (Rabe and Mundo 2007, 269) that seek decreasing regulation to retain 
local businesses or lure firms away from neighboring states. Consequently, state-level 
deregulatory policies seem to emulate competitive markets (Peck and Tickell 2002), 
something that has become readily apparent in Texas fracking discourse where energy 
“companies… enjoy considerable latitude in their pursuit of drilling opportunities with 
relatively few state-level restrictions” (Davis 2012, 184).  
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 Texas exists in a regulatory tangle in which oil and gas production is elevated 
over other economic endeavors; while Texas municipalities hold relatively more power 
than equivalents in other states, the anti-regulatory ethos inhibits substantive fracking 
regulations at either the local or state level (Rahm 2011). Furthermore, close ties 
between the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC)—the state’s oil and gas drilling 
regulatory agency—and industry complicates monitoring efforts. However, municipal 
Texas governments have had, at least until May 2015, relative success in contesting 
neoliberal practices through distance requirements between oil and gas wells and homes 
as well as through environmental regulations (Fry 2013; Fry, Brannstrom, and Murphy 
2015). This is especially important given that local residents and government officials 
are intimately aware of energy extraction’s social and environmental consequences and 
yet still believe that it provides economic development potential (Anderson and 
Theodori 2009; Theodori 2012). Nevertheless, legislation passed at the state level in 
2015, House Bill (HB) 40, prohibits (i.e., preempts) municipal governments from 
implementing regulations that are not “commercially reasonable” (Darby et al. 2015; 
Maqbool 2015); this law will be one of the foci for this investigation. 
 In Texas, energy firms prefer regulatory guidelines at the state level. This 
practice shields industry practices from the federal government (Davis and Hoffer 2012). 
As Davis and Hoffer (2012) note, this is largely driven by four factors. First, since the 
energy and the environmental regulatory bodies are typically separate at the state level, 
firms can focus lobbying efforts that align with the energy body that seeks oil and gas 
development. Second, state legislators are more accessible and easily swayed by industry 
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discourse due to the smaller constituencies. Third, industry advocates use their positions 
to demonstrate business transparency and describe economic benefits at a local level—
using inter-firm concordances and economic benefit studies respectively. And fourth, 
industry officials are able to demonstrate that they can abide by state regulations, thus 
minimizing the need federal involvement in environmental regulations. Firms are able to 
influence state-based fracking regulations through two methods: 1) propaganda and 
speech, as well as 2) redefining societal relationships to the environment (Mitchell 2006; 
Hudgins and Poole 2014). While Davis and Hoffer (2012) help understand why fracking 
regulations have been largely absent from federal intervention, they do not answer why 
industry and mineral interest holders are equally opposed to municipal and county 
regulations—something the present study will consider.   
 While not mineral based, Brannstrom et al. (2015) examined West Texas wind 
energy royalties using tax appraisal data, electricity grid utilization reports, and semi-
structured interviews, closely mirroring the methodology employed by this paper. This 
investigation of the spatial nature of mineral wealth revealed a “property advantage”—in 
which certain properties were sought for wind energy development because of the size of 
the property or its spatial characteristics (i.e., topography)—and a “royalty paradox”—in 
which there was broad support for wind energy development despite only a fraction 
(61%) of wind royalties remaining local to the region. This thesis will assess whether 
similar circumstances exist on the Eagle Ford Shale.  
 The ability for extraction firms to disrupt human-environment relationships, 
mainly through air and water quality deterioration, has been an emergent theme in 
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critical fracking research. However, longitudinal and comparative research on the 
fracking industry’s potential economic—through mixed-methods approaches—and 
social—through locally-grounded studies—consequences is needed (Lave and Lutz 
2014; Willow and Wylie 2014). This is especially important during an energy boom, 
when local governments are overwhelmed by an onslaught of development and the 
social fabric is in flux (Gilmore 1976), something this study carries out.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the regional development, boomtown, resource governance, 
mineral economics, and political ecology literatures by filling key gaps and relating 
theses gaps to the resource curse. Specifically, this thesis will explore how aspects of the 
resource curse are manifest at the county and region levels through an examination of 
concentrations of mineral wealth and the negative social disruptions to Eagle Ford pre-
boom lifestyles. These local realities are important and represent the experience of Eagle 
Ford residents.  
In fulfilling this promise of examining the local, this thesis will revisit Gilmore’s 
problem triangle and revise it for a modern oil production context. Furthermore, despite 
the fact that mineral wealth has been assessed at a variety of spatial scales, this thesis 
will examine it at the county level—a first. This study also extends beyond only 
examining personal royalties and will also determine relative mineral ownership. 
Finally, this project will examine why industry and mineral owners equally shun federal 
and municipal regulations and instead focus at the state as well as why local 
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development officials still embrace mineral development, despite most mineral 
properties having absentee owners. Using the tools presented in the next section, I will 
explore these over-generalized and underdeveloped topics and present them in a modern 
Eagle Ford Shale context.   
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES 
3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the methods and data used by this thesis. Broadly, I employ two 
main techniques: semi-structured interviews with economic development stakeholders 
across the Eagle Ford Shale (Objective 1) and an analysis of mineral wealth using public 
tax appraisal data from the Live Oak County Appraisal District (LOCAD) (Objective 2). 
The semi-structured interview protocol will be discussed first. I describe the interviewee 
selection process, describe the questions asked of stakeholders, and provide some 
context for the results. The outcomes derived from this methodology will be examined in 
Section 4 as well as give some context to the results presented in Section 5. To augment 
the data, I attended several Eagle Ford-related conferences and collected data that will be 
integrated with the semi-structured interviews. In the second half of this section, I will 
discuss the methods used to obtain, process, and analyze the publicly available LOCAD 
mineral data. These data will be used to assess mineral wealth in Section 5. The 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Number for the semi-structured interviews was 
IRB2013-0157D, and the project was funded through National Science Foundation grant 
#1265251.  
An attempt to distribute a survey to oil and gas firms regarding Eagle Ford 
employment and recruitment was not successful. After discussing the survey with energy 
officials and firm human relations personnel, the projected response rate was expected to 
be too low. Specifically, employees who would have been recruited to complete the 
survey are instructed by their firms to not respond to surveys unless they are sent by 
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their own firm or by regulatory agencies; I also learned that some of the information we 
sought to obtain would have been interpreted as proprietary and possibly offering 
competitors a market advantage. Additionally, I amalgamated data (e.g., number of 
employees, previous year’s profits, subsidiary status with other companies) on over 
Eagle Ford 400 firms, however after cross checking some of the data, there were 
inconsistencies. For example, the online business database, Hoovers, notes that Enervest 
Operating, LLC, has 125 employees (Hoover’s 2016). This differs from the company-
reported 1,200 employees (Enervest 2015). This database has served as a reference but 
will not be considered in the results.  
  
3.2 Semi-Structured Interview Protocol  
A research team comprised of two colleagues—a PhD student in the Texas A&M 
Geography Department and a PhD student from the University of Brasília—and I 
interviewed economic development officials about their perceptions of the Eagle Ford 
Shale economic development. This research targeted those individuals who were 
involved in the economic decision-making process. This included chambers of 
commerce personnel, city and county government officials, and economic development 
corporation managers. This initial contact would then indicate other local decision-
makers to co-participate in the interview. On several occasions, the researchers were 
able to carry out impromptu interviews with willing respondents.  
 Our respondents can be loosely grouped into two geographic subareas of 
the Eagle Ford Shale: the core 15 counties (n = 8) or the peripheral 11 counties (n = 7) 
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(Table 1). To better align this study with other investigations of the region, I identify 
Lavaca, DeWitt, Gonzales, Wilson, Karnes, Bee, Live Oak, Atascosa, McMullen, La 
Salle, Frio, Zavala, Dimmit, Maverick, and Webb counties as the core production area 
(Rahm et al. 2015). These counties also align with the core counties mentioned in 
Tunstall et al. (2014). Any counties that are on the Eagle Ford not identified in the 
aforementioned studies as a core county are acknowledged as periphery production 
counties.   
The research team interviewed 15 respondents in 11 unique interview sessions, 
using questions that we had selected based on our research goals and the nature of the 
literature (Appendix A). Each interview took between thirty minutes and two and a half 
hours. After establishing the credentials of the interviewee, we asked questions about the 
amount of local governance control over drilling on the Eagle Ford Shale. If a 
municipality had an oil and gas ordinance, we would query individuals about the 
motivation and the history of that ordinance and ask for any feedback they had received 
from the citizenry. Afterwards, we assessed economic development successes and 
failures. We questioned respondents about the role of industry in their jurisdictions, such 
as the accessibility of their particular office to oil and gas firms. In the second half of the 
interview, we would ask about the mobilization of the workforce. These questions 
assessed the amount of local employment and the type of training required to obtain 
permanent employment. We also queried the amount of on the job training oil and gas 
firms offered employees and the amount of mobility among oil and gas workers. Toward 
the end of the interview, respondents were asked to provide some background on 
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mineral ownership in their jurisdictions, as well as reveal whether their organization, 
municipality, or they personally owned a mineral estate. To complete the interview, we 
asked interviewees to provide some insight on the future of Eagle Ford related 
development in their jurisdictions. Respondents indicated the number of years they 
expected the Eagle Ford Shale to be active as well as the nature of short-term and long-
term employment in their municipality or county. 
 
Table 1: Interviewee respondent codes, job titles, interview date, and setting. 
Core is defined as Lavaca, DeWitt, Gonzales, Wilson, Karnes, Bee, Live Oak, Atascosa, 
McMullen, La Salle, Frio, Zavala, Dimmit, Maverick, and Webb counties (Rahm et al. 
2015).
Respondent 
Code Job Title Setting 
Interview 
Date 
EFS001 Alder Person (City Councilman), Chamber of Commerce Chair 
Town2 in Core 
Production County 8/11/14 
EFS002 Director, Chamber of Commerce Town in Core Production County 8/11/14 
EFS003 President, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in Core 
Production County 8/12/14 
EFS003 Immediate Past President, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in Core 
Production County 1/14/15 
EFS004 
Director of Operations and 
Public Affairs, Chamber of 
Commerce 
Town in Peripheral 
Production County 12/12/14 
EFS005 Director, Chamber of Commerce Town in Core Production County 1/8/15 
EFS006 City Manager Town in Core Production County 1/8/15 
EFS007 City Manager County Seat in Core Production County 1/14/15 
                                                
2 A “town” refers to a municipality that is not the county seat. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Respondent 
Code Job Title Setting 
Interview 
Date 
EFS008 Vice President, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in Core 
Production County 1/14/15 
EFS009 Director, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in Core 
Production County 1/14/15 
EFS010 Executive Director, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in 
Peripheral Production 
County 
2/6/15 
EFS011 County Commissioner Peripheral Production County 2/6/15 
EFS012 Chairman of the Board, Chamber of Commerce 
County Seat in 
Peripheral Production 
County 
2/6/15 
EFS013 Executive Director, Economic Development Corporation 
County Seat in 
Peripheral Production 
County 
2/6/15 
EFS014 County Commissioner Peripheral Production County 3/10/15 
EFS015 County Judge Peripheral Production County 3/13/15 
  
We selected a spatially diverse (i.e., respondents from all the major drilling areas 
of the Eagle Ford Shale) group of interviewees to obtain a holistic view of the drilling 
boom and its possible bust (Table 1). Furthermore, we targeted individuals from a 
diverse group of local agencies such as local and county government, economic 
development corporations (See Jarmon et al. 2012 for a detailed analysis of Texas 
economic development corporations), and business advocacy organizations (i.e., 
chambers of commerce). These interviews were executed over approximately nine 
months, with the first completed in August 2014. We resumed the interviews in 
December 2014 and continued them through March 2015. The interview sample frame 
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was purposive; the individuals selected for this study were chosen based on their 
expertise and their role in the economic development of their cities or counties. This is 
the first known scientific interview based study of the Eagle Ford Shale region, thus 
enabling comparisons between south Texas and other shale production regions, such as 
Anderson and Theodori (2009) on the Barnett Shale or Silva and Crowe (2015) on the 
New Albany Shale.  
 
3.3 Development Future on the Eagle Ford Shale 
This research captures views of economic actors regarding the future of the Eagle Ford 
Shale as West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices dropped from $92 per barrel at the 
start of the data collection to $45 per barrel by March 2015 (Figure 3). Eight respondents 
were still optimistic about oil and gas exploration in their local governments, four were 
concerned about short-term retrenchment but were still optimistic about the long-term 
viability of the play, and three offered neutral or negative statements that energy 
development would soon stall. Only one respondent was cautiously negative about the 
future of the play. Of those offering optimistic short-term or long-term perspectives on 
Eagle Ford development, the majority was in the core counties. These data will be used 
to help demonstrate how economic development perspectives shifted over the course of 
the interview period. 
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Figure 3: This graph demonstrates interviewee sentiment about the future of oil and gas 
drilling on the Eagle Ford Shale relative to the WTI price of oil. To protect the identities 
of the respondents, interview dates are approximate. Oil pricing data comes from Energy 
Information Administration (2015b). 
 
3.4 Conference Participant-Observation and Texas Eagle Ford Shale Magazine 
To better understand the discourse used by local stakeholders and energy professionals 
regarding the development of the Eagle Ford, I attended conferences that focused on 
play-related development: the 2015 Unconventional Resources Technology Conference 
(URTeC) (July 2015) and the UTSA Eagle Ford Shale Community Development 
Program (EFSCDP) Best Practices Conference (June 2015). In both cases, I engaged in 
participant observation and took field notes. The former was attended by geologists and 
geophysicists from across the world with approximately eight hours of the three-day 
conference schedule devoted specifically to Eagle Ford Shale. URTeC was very much a 
themed space devoted to oil and gas production from unconventional sources: part trade 
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show, part academic research conference. (For a detailed description of themed spaces at 
fairs, refer to Brannstrom and Brandão 2012.) In the EFSCDP conference, local 
policymakers and economic stakeholders worked with researchers from UTSA to 
workshop new ideas on how to best grapple with the development challenges on the 
Eagle Ford. The discourse at the meeting often revolved around ways to manage 
boomtown development and prepare for the imminent retrenchment in activity given the 
decrease in oil prices. Additionally, I analyzed articles from the Texas Eagle Ford Shale 
Magazine, “a monthly publication dedicated to promoting business and industry in the 
Eagle Ford Shale as well as globally” (Castillo-Swallow 2015), to gain an industry 
perspective on the growth in the region.  
 
3.5 Qualitative Data Analysis 
My research team and I transcribed interviews in the qualitative research software 
Atlas.ti, and Transcriptions—a free, downloadable transcription assistance software for 
Apple computers. I analyzed the interviews and data from the Texas Eagle Ford Shale 
Magazine using Atlas.ti. I used response-driven codes to capture the perceived regional 
and workforce development from stakeholders. These codes are found in Appendix B. 
The list of codes is standard throughout the analysis of the interviews, conferences, and 
magazine clippings. My coding methodology is founded in the grounded theory 
approach, which Creswell (2012) describes. The coded fragments from the interviews 
were then exported to Microsoft Word, where the data were refined. Afterwards, the data 
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was exported into Microsoft Excel for data presentation and to facilitate integration into 
results. In Excel, the data were color coded and interpreted to find emergent themes.  
 
3.6 Mineral Wealth Analysis 
I examined mineral wealth on the Eagle Ford Shale using publicly available county 
appraisal district data as a proxy. I used the methods established in Fry, Briggle, and 
Kincaid (2015) to assess the relative spatial concentration of Eagle Ford mineral wealth. 
To acquire this data, I contacted seven county appraisal districts (CAD) in the core of the 
play. Four CADs responded, and of those, I acquired data sets from Karnes, La Salle, 
and Live Oak counties. The nature of the data is displayed in Table 2, which shows that 
only Live Oak County provided immediately useable datasets. The other counties 
provided data in PDF format, which would have required a major time investment for 
conversion to formats that would support analysis and visualization in ArcGIS. 
Therefore, they were excluded from this analysis.   
 
Table 2: The nature and usability of the mineral appraisal data acquired. 
 Karnes County La Salle County Live Oak County 
Data Format 
PDF (2009-2010, 2014-
2015), Excel (2013), 
CSV (2011-2012) 
TXT and PDF Files CSV File 
Appraisal Years 
Available 2009-2015 2008-2015 2010-2015 
Mineral Values Yes Some Yes 
Mineral Interest 
Holder Address 
Data 
Yes Some Yes 
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Table 2: Continued 
 Karnes County La Salle County Live Oak County 
RRC Lease or 
API Number Yes Some Yes 
Types of Mineral 
Interest Present 
Some Years 
Royalty, Override, and 
Working 
Royalty, Override, 
Operator, Working,  
Royalty, 
Working, and 
Override 
Usability Partially Usable (2011-2013) 
Partially Usable 
with Significant 
Processing 
Immediately 
Usable 
  
 
 Despite my requests to the appraisal districts for non-PDF format data, county 
appraisal districts often sent summarized PDF reports that are unusable for the analyses 
required of this thesis. Text (TXT) files require considerable time, several hours per file, 
to process into comma separated values (CSV) files—a useful data format for ArcGIS 
analysis. Therefore, of the three counties for which I acquired data, Live Oak County 
was the only appraisal district that distributed data requiring minimal processing and 
could quickly be useful for the present thesis. If time permits, I will return to Karnes and 
La Salle counties. 
 
 
3.6.1 Developing a Mineral Estate and Many “Interests” 
When mineral estates are developed, the mineral owner leases the subsurface property to 
an oil and gas firm. First contact is usually made through a land(wo)man, who has 
verified the ownership of the mineral estate. This person then acts as a liaison between 
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the future well owner and the mineral owner. After contact is established, the mineral 
estate owner signs a contact leasing the estate to an oil and gas drilling company. These 
leases typically last for five years (Weber, Brown, and Pender 2013), and if production 
starts, then the lease can be renegotiated or extended.  
When the lease is established, there are a variety of interest types that are used. 
The most recognized, the royalty interest, is the fraction of the mineral value extracted 
that is paid directly to the lessor usually free of production or refinement costs. Working 
interests refer to the firm that is developing the mineral estate; in this case, the working 
interest usually assumes the largest interest stake in the well but is also responsible for 
the costs of drilling, operations, and environmental cleanup at well abandonment 
(Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber 2015). Overriding interests are the third main type and 
denote those companies that assist in the drilling of the well in service of the working 
interests. This assistance can either be financial, legal, or actual well work. Overriding 
interest is always cut from the working interest and was historically used to pay for legal 
counsel, retain key employees, and compensate another company during periods of joint 
ownership. This royalty, similar to the property owner royalty, is usually free of 
production costs (Theriot 2012).  
The typical mineral lease has a combination of royalty, working, and overriding 
interests. The final and least common mineral interest that will be examined in this thesis 
is the production payment interest, which directly uses the value of the well production 
as collateral. The owner of the payment interest is entitled to a portion of the oil and gas 
profits, free of costs, until an agreed upon threshold is met. Then, the interest reverts to 
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the working interest holder (Theriot 2012). While other types of interest exist and are 
frequently used by the oil and gas industry (e.g., wellbore interest, carried interest, net 
profit interest), they were not present in the data from LOCAD and therefore will not be 
analyzed. In order to determine the lease type, some minor data processing—the splitting 
of a unique account number—was required. 
 
3.6.2 Mineral Assessment in Live Oak County 
Capitol Appraisal Group, LLC, is the contractor that appraises mineral properties in Live 
Oak County. The tax assessor only appraises mineral properties when the estate has been 
developed (i.e., hydrocarbon production is taking place). This contractor uses an income 
approach in which the company estimates the remaining reserves of the property and the 
time through which those minerals will be extracted. This, in turn, creates a future 
income on a year-by-year basis that is discounted to present-day dollars. Those incomes 
are then aggregated to give the total appraised market value of the property (i.e., the 
value of the property if it were sold at market value on the day of appraisal). That value 
is then compared to the previous year’s actual income from the property for quality 
assurance (Capitol Appraisal Group 2012). Generally, a mineral property’s value should 
be two to five times the amount of the previous year’s income (Texas Comptroller of 
Public Accounts 2013).  
Appraised values are not precisely equal to the market mineral value; however, it 
is almost impossible to determine individual mineral incomes short of communicating 
with or surveying individual mineral estate owners about their mineral interests (Kelsey 
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et al. 2011). Appraised values, therefore, act as a proxy for total predicted income over 
the remaining life of that mineral property. These appraised values have appeared in the 
energy literature through Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid’s (2015) analysis of mineral wealth 
in Denton, Texas. Other methods exist for assessing relative mineral wealth, such as 
examining courthouse records at a cost of $125,000 for a database (Brown, Fitzgerald, 
and Weber 2015) or assuming that absentee mineral ownership is the same as surface 
mineral ownership (Kelsey et al. 2011). The public and the Texas Comptroller accept the 
methods used by LOCAD as a valid way to appraise mineral properties. Furthermore, 
these data are readily available and inexpensive compared to Brown, Fitzgerald, and 
Weber (2015). While there is likely some overlap in absentee and local surface property 
ownership versus mineral ownership, it is much more accurate to directly analyze the 
mineral estate. Appraised minerals also provide a spatial component that can determine 
the amount of absentee mineral ownership. This wealth concentration is based on the 
percentage of the mineral interest held or owned relative to the total value of the mineral 
estate.  
The validity of these data is accurate to within the tax data provided by LOCAD. 
This methodological approach is not without its shortcomings. Since LOCAD only 
appraises those mineral properties that are actively producing hydrocarbons, unexploited 
or inactive mineral estates are not assessed. Furthermore, a firm’s or person’s tax address 
may not always equate to the actual address. For individuals (non-firms), this sometimes 
implies that royalty goes to a family trust or lawyer’s office. This suggests that their tax 
address and actual address may not be the same. Companies may incorporate in multiple 
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states or countries. For example, the first oil and gas firm to frack a modern well on the 
Eagle Ford Shale, Petrohawk Energy, was subsequently acquired by BHP Billiton in 
2011, which has a U.S. regional headquarters (the tax address of their Live Oak County 
wells) in Houston, Texas, yet is globally headquartered in Melbourne, Australia. Even 
from a simple mineral ownership or leasing perspective, this dynamism creates complex 
webs of networks that entail prohibitive effort to disentangle. For a thorough 
investigation of energy industry corporate networks, refer to Bridge (2008). This 
phenomenon will become more apparent in Section 5.  
 
3.6.3 Mineral Wealth Data Workflow 
For the six datasets (one for each year, 2010 to 2015), I first separated the unique tax 
identification numbers into columns (Figure 4). This enabled me to distinguish the four 
types of interests. Using the appraisal data, I calculated relative Gini coefficients through 
free online calculators; these data were verified across multiple websites (Rosenmai 
2012; Had to Know 2016). These websites use the Lorenz curve to graph and calculate 
Gini coefficients. As per Texas law, all mineral properties that are appraised at less than 
$500 are not taxed and therefore are not incorporated into this study. LOCAD also 
provides the tax addresses of the mineral interest owners and holders. I geocoded the 
mineral interests in Live Oak County using Texas A&M University GeoServices to 
determine geographic coordinates (Goldberg 2015). As a form of consistency, duplicate 
company records—or records that are going to the same taxing entity (company or 
person) yet treated differently by LOCAD—were merged (e.g., Pioneer Natural 
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Resources and Pioneer Resources Producing) for table construction in Section 5. These 
data were then uploaded into ArcGIS where I could differentiate “local” (within Live 
Oak County) and “non-local” (outside Live Oak County) addresses. In ArcGIS, I 
assessed the relative concentration and spatiality of the mineral wealth. I acquired 
Shapefiles of the Eagle Ford Shale from the EIA (2014); this data is used to evaluate 
regional ownership of Live Oak County mineral properties. The results of the spatial 
analysis have been reported in table format and via cartographic products, which have 
been processed and visually enhanced in Inkscape—an open source graphics editor. For 
cartographic purposes, when discussing total mineral wealth, I merged an entity’s total 
mineral ownership into one address (using address and zip code). When data are 
displayed in my maps, I consistently used a quintile classification method. For total 
mineral data, I merged the data with states outside of Texas, so that the entire state’s 
mineral wealth can be assessed, thus improving readability (due to the small nature of 
the inset map).  
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Figure 4: Workflow for LOCAD mineral interest data. 
 
I also conducted spatial analyses that will provide quantitative measures of the 
concentration of mineral interests and the concentration of mineral interest holder. This 
is executed through Moran’s I Spatial Autocorrelation and Nearest Neighbor tests 
respectively. I executed the Moran’s I index using a “fixed distance band” for the 
“Characterization of the Spatial Relationship” as suggested by ESRI (2013). I tested 
Moran’s total mineral ownership as well as for the individual mineral interest types. 
Payment interests do not have enough data to execute a Moran’s test.  
 I define local mineral interests as those interests that have tax addresses within 
Live Oak County. Eagle Ford Shale mineral interests are any Live Oak mineral interests 
that have a tax address on the Eagle Ford Shale as defined by the Energy Information 
  51 
Administration (EIA) polygon. This is an important distinction, because only part of 
Live Oak County rests within the EIA boundaries of the Eagle Ford Shale. Therefore, if 
there are tax address locations in the southern part of the county, then it will be counted 
as part of Live Oak County total but not necessarily as part of the Eagle Ford Shale 
total. I define in-state mineral ownership as those addresses are found within Texas.  
Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015) analyzed mineral interests for individuals, but 
here I analyze total mineral interest data. For example, Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015) 
focused on ~16%, not analyzing ~84% of total value; moreover, they only analyzed 
minerals under the city of Denton, rather than the entire county. The present study is 
only focusing on one year’s data, 2015, on the basis that the appraised value already 
incorporates the full market value of the mineral property. Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid 
(2015) summed then averaged the wells’ valuation from 2002 to 2013.  
There are differences that would preclude this study from doing the same. In 
Denton’s case, the wells are almost all natural gas and drilled prior to 2008. Given that 
fracked wells have a steep production decline after production has commenced, the vast 
majority of wells were very mature. In Live Oak County, production peaked in 2015, so 
the majority of wells are relative new and are still producing large amounts of 
hydrocarbons. Therefore, there are a wide variety of production profiles amongst the 
wells in Live Oak County in comparison to Denton. Averaging the value would 
disadvantage newer oil drilled after the drop in oil prices in beginning in June 2014. 
Wells drilled since June 2014 could (and typically do) have higher initial production 
rates despite having a lower valuation due to decreased oil prices (EIA 2015a). Finally, 
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conversations with the authors of Denton study indicated that this aspect of their 
research was one of the most contentious aspects of their research during peer review 
and very time consuming. It required linking appraisals with RRC well locations using 
American Petroleum Institute (API) numbers. They then tracked an individual well’s 
performance over the course of their study period. LOCAD did not include the API 
numbers and instead looked at production across entire leases (not individual wells) that 
might contain multiple wells drilled at different times. Given these restrictions, I decided 
to focus on one year’s data, 2015, and analyze the 2010-2014 data relative to the 
findings from 2015; therefore, I will not average how specific lease valuations change 
over time.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This section has explained the thesis methodology. To achieve Objective 1, I used semi-
structured interviews with economic development corporation leaders, elected and 
appointed municipal government officials, elected county government officials, and 
business advocacy organization spokespersons. In doing so, I mirrored a recruiting 
methodology used by Anderson and Theodroi (2009). To augment the semi-structured 
interview data, I have incorporated data from two conferences and a monthly industry 
magazine. I have qualitatively coded these data using a grounded theory approach and 
have drawn conclusions that will be represented in Section 4.  
 To achieve Objective 2, I will mirror Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid’s (2015) 
methods. I acquired public county appraisal data, which will serve as a proxy for mineral 
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ownership and holdings. I processed then uploaded these data to ArcGIS where I 
conducted spatial analyses. These data are then used to examine distribution of mineral 
wealth. These results are reported in Section 5. In Section 6, these data will then be used 
to assess normative mineral ownership discourses reported by the academic literature as 
well as provide some context for shifting political economy using data from Section 4.  
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4. VIEWS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A BOOM-BUST MILIEU  
4.1 Introduction 
This section examines the main challenges to economic development on the Eagle Ford 
Shale. In doing so, I scrutinize how local economic development officials (described in 
Sections 2 and 3) respond to growth in their jurisdictions. I begin by describing the 
powers of Texas municipal and county economic development officials. After, I discuss 
how local officials approach economic development. I then discuss House Bill 40 as 
another way to describe how stakeholders perceive of their economic development 
landscape. I situate this section around three major negative respondent reported 
negative ramifications to economic development: road degradation, temporary housing, 
and wages. These top three consequences emerge from using a grounded approach to 
interview coding. Development officials from across the region cited these three 
hindrances that restrict being able to fully take advantage of the Eagle Ford Shale. I 
relate these findings to the problem triangle used in Gilmore (1976) (Figure 2). I link the 
social disruptions discussed in this section—roads, housing, and wages—to the resource 
curse. I conclude this section by linking the findings together to offer a renewed look at 
Gilmore’s (1976) triangle.  
The policy domains discussed in this section are described in Table 3. Roads, 
housing, and workforce/wages—will be used to help explain the latter domains. I will 
briefly discuss these here and provide a more developed description of these 
ramifications later in the section. 
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Table 3: Policy domains, descriptions, and how the boom in energy exploration has 
impacted that policy domain. 
This section will focus on the first three domains (delineated by thick line), and 
incorporating data from the other domains as relevant. 
Policy Domain Domain Description Energy Boom Ramification 
Roads Local governments build and maintain most roadways 
Degradation of local roads from 
overuse forces frequent maintenance 
and use of resources 
Housing 
Municipalities have some 
control over the type of 
housing (short versus long-
term) built in city limits 
through permitting 
Housing demand so great that 
regulations are circumvented and 
accommodations (planned and 
unplanned) built in unincorporated 
areas 
Workforce/Wage 
Local governments have 
limited capacity to increase 
wages 
Local workforce experience higher 
wages (Tunstall 2015b), enabling 
more consumption causing more tax 
revenues, but have difficulty 
attracting labor from industry 
Regulatory 
Policies 
Economic development 
officials have the 
opportunity to regulate 
growth through 
policymaking 
State advocates for resource 
economy (Rahm 2011); local 
regulatory capacity restrained 
Energy Firm-
Organization 
Partnerships 
As economic growth 
officials, must maintain 
close partnerships with 
firms 
Very close partnership might lead to 
unregulated growth and resource 
curse ramifications 
Tax Policies 
Taxes can be used as a 
policy instrument to 
regulate growth 
Communities attract certain 
industries using tax abatements; 
despite the need for local 
governance, restricted on tax 
increases 
 
 
Local governments are charged with managing the infrastructure, however in the 
midst of a boom, energy firms overuse roads causing them to deteriorate. As the most 
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discussed ramification of the energy boom determined through transcript coding, local 
economic development stakeholders were fearful that the deterioration of infrastructure 
would slow future growth and provide an unsafe environment for local residents. 
Economic policymakers are developing imaginative techniques to manage this 
ramification of boomtown growth—from repatriating lost royalties to incremental tax 
increases. 
The second most discussed negative shock determined through coding was the 
extraordinary housing demand. With the arrival of oil and gas extraction came thousands 
of workers from beyond the Eagle Ford Shale. This quickly overwhelmed the local 
housing stock, forcing an increase in real estate and leasing prices. To combat high 
demand in the housing market, economic development officials are using a variety of 
methods to manage hotel-motel development, in some cases purposefully slowing 
housing construction to ensure the long-term development goals. 
 The arrival of the oil and gas industry brought a significant demand for semi-
skilled and skilled labor, causing a corresponding spike in local wages, which was the 
third most discussed consequence of boom development as determined through 
interview coding. While potentially beneficial for official state statistics, this has 
dramatically impacted local governments that are unable to retain workers. Furthermore, 
low-skilled labor, such as non-energy construction, has been negatively impacted by the 
sharp increase in wages. Nearly every economic development official recognized how 
high wages was causing concern amongst local governments and non-energy firms. 
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4.2 Economic Development and Actors in Context 
4.2.1 Powers and Policymaking 
Local Eagle Ford economic development agencies come in a variety of forms—from 
municipal and county governments to chambers of commerce. Chambers of commerce 
advocate for pro-business policies at the local government level; they are also used as 
sites of training and preparation for running a small business (Lacho and Brockmann 
2015). Of importance to this thesis, they are also sites of business cohesion and 
cooperation during times of shock (Lacho, Bradley III, and Cusack 2006). Chambers of 
commerce are non-profit organizations that are deeply embedded into their 
representative host regions and have influential economic development outcomes 
(Schapiro Group 2012). However, the participation of firms in chambers of commerce 
involvement is voluntary, and while chambers have a direct influence on policymaking, 
they are not policymakers. In Texas, chambers of commerce are directly linked to the 
municipality or county that hosts them through a portion of tax receipts, usually from 
tourist activities (e.g., hotel-motel taxes).  
 Local economic development corporations, on the other hand, have the ability to 
implement policies. While the corporation itself is usually independent of the 
municipalities that host them, there are social and political linkages between the 
corporation and the city in that they are financed by a fraction of tax revenue. In Texas 
(depending on the structure of the development corporation), they fund job creation and 
retention programs, as well as lure and support business growth in the municipality by 
funding commercial ventures and building industrial facilities (Jarmon et al. 2012). 
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Economic development corporations lobby the municipal government to implement tax 
policies and regulations that can attract certain businesses. Given their ability to build 
business space and peripherally manage policies, they are important drivers of economic 
development in Texas and play an important role in Eagle Ford economic development. 
As one of the major agencies charged with economic development, Texas county 
governments maintain transportation infrastructure, manage the judicial system, collect 
property taxes, maintain public records, direct the public safety of the county, and 
register voters (Texas Association of Counties 2015). This regulatory authority is 
explicit; county governments must not exceed these powers and have limited ability to 
regulate oil and gas drilling. Therefore, drilling in unincorporated land must comply with 
RRC protocols and any infrastructure-related regulations that the county government has 
in place. Counties may charge a small fee (usually on the order of a few hundred dollars) 
for permits but have no control over well site, situation, or environmental regulation. 
From an economic development perspective, county governments can help manage the 
tax policies by working with municipal governments and economic development 
corporations to attract certain industries through tax abatements.  
Municipal governments, on the other hand, are given considerable liberty to 
operate free from state oversight as long as oil and gas ordinances are couched in terms 
that benefit the general health and welfare of the public (Fry 2013). This is especially 
true for population centers greater than 5,000 that have received “home-rule” status. 
These municipalities “look to the state constitution and state statutes to determine what 
[the city] may not do” (Texas Municipal League 2015, 9, emphasis in original). 
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Traditionally, municipal governments had been given considerable liberty to operate free 
from state oversight provided that regulations were couched in benefits for the general 
health and welfare of the public (Fry 2013). City officials have used this authority to 
create and implement regulations that manage oil and gas drilling in their municipalities.  
 
4.2.2 Economic Development 
To many respondents, the Eagle Ford Shale offers a development opportunity that could 
persist for decades. Several respondents were aware that oil and gas development was 
likely to slow because the play would eventually shift from exploration to production 
paradigms however, others believed that high levels of employment and development 
would remain part of the economic landscape. In fact, interviewees (n = 5) were quick to 
point out that development would likely continue for the foreseeable future because of 
the multiple layers of shale rock found in south Texas. 
 
“I think they’re going to keep on drilling. It’s the price. The price is going to 
determine what’s going to happen, but I think—like I told you—the seismograph 
crews are running up and down. It’s still going to happen. I don’t know how big 
or whatever. It’s not over. This isn’t like the first boom [on the Austin Chalk]. 
The first boom lasted 4 or 5 years. This one here is going to go on for I’d say 20 
years probably. Did y’all ever see the bumper sticker—what is it? —‘God, please 
send us one more oil boom and I promise I won’t piss this one off’? I remember 
that sticker well.” (EFS011).  
 
The above passage encapsulates how economic development officials perceive 
the shale play. They are cognizant of the potential major fluctuations in drilling activity, 
yet hopeful that drilling will persist. They also believe that the boom will endure for 
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many years, potentially decades. Yet, economic control over this multi-decadal 
development is limited, because development is dependent on the price of oil, the nature 
of the organizations under which they are working, and the geology of the subsurface. 
This quote indicates that the problem triangle still is relevant in a modern fracking 
context: it illustrates how little control policymakers have over the Eagle Ford’s 
development. Yet, the triangle does not perfectly demonstrate the Eagle Ford’s 
developmental consequences on south Texas towns. These modifications to update the 
triangle and provide it a modern, oil-based context will be examined at the end of the 
section. 
As discussed in the introduction, there are various policy domains that 
interviewees identified as important for economic development. I have amalgamated the 
main respondent-identified approaches to these policy domains. A summary of the 
responses to boomtown development is found in Table 4, with “Policy Response 1” 
demonstrating how entities more accepting of oil and gas development frame economic 
development in certain policy domains and “Policy Response 2” showing how cities and 
counties more averse to energy development frame development. These responses 
illustrate their responses to the problem triangle and how they mitigate against the 
negative externalities associated with explosive growth. 
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Table 4: Example responses to boomtown development impacts mentioned by 
respondents. 
The “Policy Impact Response 1” column is meant to describe a location that is more 
accepting of oil and gas development than the “Policy Impact Response 2” column. The 
top three policy domains were explored explicitly in this section, with the latter four 
peripherally examined through the first three. 
Policy Domain Policy Response 1 Policy Response 2 
Roads 
Degradation of local roads from overuse forces frequent 
maintenance, straining local government budgets and 
negatively impacting economic development 
Housing 
Focus on short-to-extended 
stay accommodations; 
Permanent housing also 
sought 
Focus on permanent housing 
with little attention given to 
short-to-extended stay 
accommodations 
Workforce/Wage 
Using energy-tax revenues 
to seek more employees to 
help manage drilling 
Using energy-tax revenues in 
improvement projects, not 
dramatically expanding the 
agency workforce 
Regulatory Policies 
Regulatory policies are loose 
and are not intended to slow 
energy-related growth 
Policies are meant to regulate 
energy-related growth through 
strong ordinances and 
regulations 
Energy Firm-
Organization 
Partnerships 
Strong partnerships Weak partnerships 
Tax Policies 
Willing to offer tax 
incentives to energy 
companies to relocate 
Not expressly offering tax 
incentives to energy firms—
especially upstream firms 
   
 
 
Some municipal and county governments prefer to take advantage of the current 
economic boom to build short-term accommodations house local workers and enjoy 
increased tax receipts. These tax receipts can be used to expand the economic diversity if 
invested correctly. Furthermore, this new revenue enables agency directors to hire more 
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personnel in the government and economic development corporations, which has the 
opportunity to expand economic development opportunities through the increased 
operational capacity of the organization. These actions, however, can make the 
municipality’s or county’s development susceptible to changes in petroleum prices. 
 In these circumstances, other cities and counties have preferred to abstain from 
short-term energy-related development. While restraining participation in the energy 
economy can have short-term drawbacks, economic developers have taken this 
opportunity to focus on firms that are already present. Additionally, cities and counties 
have the option to expand the agency’s physical infrastructure as opposed to hiring more 
employees that could be impacted by a retrenchment in drilling activity. This view on 
economic development allows the government agency to expand but does not 
unnecessarily expand the public workforce to an unsustainable level. Furthermore, they 
believe that they are well situated if petroleum prices drop and the drilling boom slows.  
 
4.2.3 Policymaking and Development Described through HB 40 
When Denton—a North Texas city on the Barnett Shale particularly affected by the 
negative externalities of urban gas drilling—banned fracking by popular vote within the 
city limits in November 2014 (Malewitz 2014b), local governments were concerned that 
the Texas government would reduce the regulatory power held by cities. In direct 
response to actions taken by Denton, legislation passed at the state level in May 2015, 
House Bill (HB) 40, prohibits (i.e., preempts) municipal governments from 
implementing drilling regulations that are not “commercially reasonable” (Darby et al. 
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2015; Maqbool 2015), thus eliminating a potential regulatory tool Eagle Ford officials 
could use to slow development in the region. 
Three Eagle Ford stakeholders expressed contempt towards Denton for 
instituting the ban, with one municipal official referring to them as “lunatics” and 
another calling the city “fools.” These remarks demonstrate the political culture on the 
Eagle Ford Shale: municipalities operate independently from one another and believe 
that they should have full autonomy from the actions of other cities. In relation to the 
ramifications about to be discussed in this section (roads, housing, and wages), this also 
means that local leaders in each municipality offered independent approaches to solving 
these problems. But why were the stakeholders upset about the fracking ban? According 
to the three respondents, that ridicule is couched in two main perspectives: concern 
about local regulatory control and disruption of energy-related economic development. 
First, local government officials at the time were concerned that the state would 
revoke all municipal oil and gas regulatory authority because of Denton’s perceived 
overreach of power. While the passed version of HB 40 includes provisions that might 
protect certain city regulatory authorities, there is still ambiguity as to the meaning of the 
phrase “commercially reasonable” and the amount of regulatory power local 
governments lost (Heinkel-Wolfe 2015). Either clarifying language from future 
legislative sessions or court-related decisions will frame how HB 40 changes the Texas 
regulatory landscape. Respondents feared that HB 40 was going to require their cities to 
relinquish powers to the state or rollback preexisting fracking regulations, thus forcing 
them to become increasingly passive participants to the development taking place.  
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Even if there was a public impetus to implement stronger local regulations, it is 
unclear whether stringent local ordinances could be instituted. One local official 
admitted that his small town did not “have probably the expertise to try to regulate 
[drilling]” (EFS002; emphasis added by author). This was substantiated by a respondent 
in a different municipality who noted: “What I see in the difference between metro areas 
and rural areas, is that the rural areas do not have the same resources that the metro areas 
have in order to be able to bring a good, efficient government into the community” 
(EFS007). This is an important perspective given that much of the Eagle Ford-related 
development is taking place in rural areas that had been in economic decline until the 
arrival of oil and gas drilling. In this context, many of the productive unelected 
policymakers in the region have found opportunities in larger cities. Unfortunately, this 
marginalizes smaller towns that do not have the regulatory capabilities and expertise to 
implement regulations. At a 2015 UTSA Eagle Ford stakeholder’s conference, one city 
administrator was adamant that there was a dire need for knowledge in crafting 
ordinances that can help regulate city development.  
Framed in this way, municipal oil and gas ordinance preemption by the state 
could be a long-term issue if both a willingness to create more stringent laws and an 
expertise are found. Even if south Texas towns found the expertise and political will to 
regulate oil and gas, municipalities have a small spatial footprint compared to county 
jurisdiction. Additionally, the spatial extent of any municipal regulations—even if such 
regulations were implemented in every municipality—would pale in comparison to the 
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spatial size of the resource. In these circumstances, local government actors demonstrate 
their ability to regulate business practices more effectively than to regulate drilling itself.  
Second, local economic development officials had difficulty sympathizing with 
Denton, as many saw the energy-related development central to the future growth of the 
Eagle Ford region. Those respondents who disapproved of the Denton fracking ban 
observed the city’s action to be contradictory to the pretenses under which many south 
Texas local officials were put into office: help grow a stagnant or—in many cases—
declining economy. With numerous locations in the Eagle Ford experiencing severe 
poverty leading into the boom (Tunstall 2015a), local officials were charged with 
pursuing economic growth to improve the economic vitality of their jurisdictions. This 
notion is substantiated by claims on other shale plays of governance actors noting 
economic improvements as one of the main effects of shale development (Anderson and 
Theodori 2009; Silva and Crowe 2015). 
While this perspective has been the operative paradigm since the regional 
economic decline started in the early 1900s and accelerated in the 1930s-1970s (Tunstall 
2014), local officials have been changing their opinions in light of the increasing 
volatility in the hydrocarbon markets. One respondent maintained how the oil and gas 
industry is able to take care of itself, and that it is much more prudent for the economy to 
diversify than expend resources attempting to attract energy companies to her town 
(EFS013). Similarly, at a UTSA stakeholder’s conference local government officials 
mentioned how they were now focusing on the citizens and businesses already in their 
city as opposed to attracting new energy-related businesses. As of 2015, economic 
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development policymakers are targeting citizenry and businesses that are already in 
those jurisdictions than at any time previous in the boom.  
While local governance actors perceive that they have some control over the 
development of their municipality, in the absence of a strong local regulatory regime, 
interviewees understand energy-related development to be inevitable. When asked 
whether the city ordinance he helped craft and implement were motivated by 
encouraging mineral production, one respondent chuckled and said, “Let me tell you: 
encourage mineral production, we can toss that out, because it was going to take place 
[regardless of the ordinance]” (EFS006). Other respondents (n = 3) discussed how their 
cities might have been too responsive to the energy-related growth demand in their 
towns and perhaps should have worked harder to resist energy-related growth. This is 
especially pronounced for towns that have permitted short to medium stay housing—
such as hotels, motels, and extended stay accommodations—that is popular with the oil 
and gas industry: “I think that our town is growing with the oilfield here, but I’m hoping 
we will be able to sustain all the restaurants and hotels and everything like that… twenty 
years down the road” (EFS009). Some cities, such as Cotulla, Pearsall, and Kenedy, 
have specialized and take pride in building hotel capacity for the Eagle Ford Shale (Fox 
San Antonio 2014; Malewitz 2014a; Buchele 2015). All respondents mentioned the oil 
and gas industry’s tendency to use hotels and motels while drilling a well and how that is 
positively influencing local tax receipts. 
Finally, four stakeholders noted that their localities were well known among 
energy professionals for intentionally having few regulations: “As a matter of fact, we 
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use that as part of our sales pitch down here: That we don't have nearly the rules and 
regulations” (EFS003). It is unknown whether this persuasion has been effective; 
however, these actions raise questions of inadequate regulatory oversight and the 
possible implications of such growth, including the resource curse. EFS003’s quote adds 
to previously mentioned accounts of the possible lack of expertise to craft impactful 
regulations. While it is difficult to determine whether the resource curse is taking place 
through purely anecdotal accounts, such reports should be taken seriously as this lack of 
institutional guidance can distort present developmental gains into future public 
liabilities. While not every resource economy experiences the ramifications of the curse 
(Larsen 2006), without strong institutional oversight a country’s—or in this case, a 
region’s or even a town’s—economic and social stability is largely tied to commodity 
prices (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Michaels 2011; Ewers 2015; Tunstall 2015b). 
Given the volatility in oil prices, it is expected that parts of the Eagle Ford Shale region, 
poorly equipped to handle to major withdrawal of investment activity, could suffer. 
 Respondents (n = 8) were equally aware that economic development outcomes 
were closely tied to a commodity that is known for its drastic swings in price outside of 
their control. This was reflected in comments including  “It’s the price. The price is 
going to determine what’s going to happen…” (EFS011) and  “It all depends on the 
price of oil!” (EFS004). This is not the first account of government officials in 
hydrocarbon production regions being aware of price volatility and its role in shaping 
economic development outcomes. Indeed, Wilson (2004) notes how company mining 
towns are responsive to commodity prices in the same way that roller coaster is 
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responsive to its own tracks. Similar parallels exist on the Eagle Ford in which many 
municipalities and counties—while not necessarily burdened with being responsive to 
the variability of a single firm—are nevertheless responsive to the volatile, roller coaster 
changes in the oil and gas markets (Murphy 2015a). 
Despite the decrease in drilling activity associated with diminished oil prices, 
respondents were not concerned with the fact that economic development was tied to oil 
prices. Rather, many embraced the idea of their local governments having persistent 
economic ties to petroleum and were aware of the economic potential of those oil 
reserves: “The reserves are here; it’s mainly a matter related to the price, as soon the 
price adjusts itself to whatever level they want, then the drilling will commence full 
speed ahead again” (EFS006). Even those respondents (n = 7) who made passing 
references to Lucas’s (1971) model of employment in a resource extraction regime were 
unconcerned by the drop in oil prices: "And although there is some diminishing on the 
exploration part [of drilling], the production side of it is still very active, no matter where 
the price of oil in the global markets is" (EFS007). All interviewees who mentioned oil 
and gas framed it in a way that inherently associated development with the price. The 
price, they always recognized, was outside of their control, yet it was just as essential to 
delivering positive economic development outcomes as any other policy (or otherwise) 
instrument. This is not to state that officials were ambivalent to the prices. Indeed, a few 
economic development stakeholders were attempting to insulate their jurisdictions from 
oil and gas price volatility by controlling the boom-related development in their 
communities. 
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This boom in activity is not the first time several Eagle Ford cities and counties 
have been impacted by oil and gas development. As discussed in Section 1, previous oil 
and gas drilling on the Austin Chalk centered in northern La Salle County, southern Frio 
County, along with Lee, Burleson, Fayette, and Brazos counties, which spurred strong 
energy-related development in the 1970s and 1980s. Economic development experts are 
taking the knowledge gleaned from these experiences and leveraging it to the current 
development on the Eagle Ford Shale. For example, one stakeholder whose town was 
strongly associated with the Austin Chalk noted, “In the first boom, we missed a lot of 
things, because we didn’t know what to expect and we didn’t know what was going to 
happen! And so as the second [(current)] boom comes along, they’ve [(local 
policymakers)] been a lot more cognizant of what do we need to do to make sure these 
companies—if they’re all going to be here—what can we do to make them stay longer” 
(EFS010). This point about using the past to inform present conditions was mentioned 
multiple times during that interview and reiterated by other respondents from the region. 
While this is certainly the case on the Eagle Ford Shale, local actors may not implement 
lessons from the past. Moreover, experts do not necessarily retain knowledge from 
previous resource booms (Halseth and Sullivan 2004).  
Economic stakeholders also mentioned how they use concurrent energy-
development booms and busts occurring across the U.S. to inform their decisions. 
Whether that is researching Denton’s developmental setting on the Barnett Shale or 
examining progress on the Bakken Shale, respondents were aware of other shale plays 
and were incorporating that knowledge into their decision making. For example, one 
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respondent’s travels revealed a fate he did not want for his county: “I went to a 
conference out in Midland, Odessa, or out somewhere out there. And there was nothing! 
Big warehouses everywhere. I went, ‘Oh man, that’s horrible’” (EFS011). Respondents 
also inquired about my findings from the Barnett Shale and how those investigations 
could complement the preexisting local knowledge of energy-related development.  
Some additional communication was taking place at the regional level. 
Interviewees were cognizant of decisions in other regions of the Eagle Ford Shale. 
Sometimes these inter-agency connections were cemented into working groups such as 
through advisory boards, consortia, networks amongst chambers of commerce, 
conventions, and industry-sponsored arrangements. Frequently, respondents noted 
personal relationships with other policymakers in their jurisdictions and across the Eagle 
Ford Shale. This included both horizontal bonds—relationships amongst individuals of 
the same type of organization—and vertical relationships—rapports amongst individuals 
of differing levels of agencies. As noted in the interviews, these connections not only 
disseminate knowledge about the shale boom quickly but also facilitate interactions 
between individuals or businesses and the government: “I think what happens is that 
when [oil and gas companies] came in to talk and usually they hit our office… all of the 
entities, the county and the city, are vertically aligned in the same trajectory” (EFS007). 
This is important for economic development for a variety of reasons, not the least of 
which is for tax abatements and permit filing. Depending on the regulatory structure of 
the local government, city, county, and other economic development officials can work 
together to entice companies to a particular location through property tax abatements. 
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This development instrument arose frequently in interviews as an effective way to entice 
targeted industries.  
As noted by respondents (n = 5), the second advantage to having strong inter-
government communication is to help potential business owners navigate through the 
local government bureaucracy. Depending on the nature and location of the business and 
the preexisting regulations of the city or county, there may be certain applications and 
permits that are required to a business beginning operation. Economic development 
corporations and/or chambers of commerce often work as facilitators between 
government and local businesses; however, economic development and chamber 
officials noted that it is much easier to assist newly formed businesses if all the major 
government entities communicate with each other.  
The final method stakeholders have been using to inform decisions about the 
Eagle Ford Shale is through reading scientific studies and establishing networks with 
research institutions. The University of Texas at San Antonio, Texas State University, 
Texas A&M University, and Texas A&M University-Kingsville have a strong presence 
in the region and work with local stakeholders to inform them of best practices. 
Researchers at these universities also conduct on-demand economic analyses and act as 
nodes of information as energy development changes on a day-to-day basis. Many 
respondents made mention to at least one of these universities during the interviews.  
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4.3 Roads: “A Bunch of Straight Running Idiots” 
Substantiating a claim made by Rahm, Fields, and Farmer (2015), a common narrative 
that arose in every discussion with economic development actors was the degradation of 
infrastructure from increased truck traffic and heavy loads over weight-limited sections 
of roadway. The main difference between Rahm, Fields, and Farmer’s (2015) and the 
present study is the manner of data acquisition. The Rahm et al. (2015) study used a set 
of surveys distributed to municipal and county policymakers. Additionally, they did not 
query economic development organizations. They also focused on the core of the play, 
whereas my study incorporates findings from the core and the periphery. 
 According to a study conducted by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute, 
approximately 1,272 trucks-trips are required to drill and frack an oil and gas well on the 
Barnett Shale with an additional 88 truck-trips required per year for the life of the well to 
maintain the well and withdraw saltwater and flowback. If oil and gas company decides 
to refrack the well, another 997 trucks are required (Quiroga, Fernando, and Oh 2012). 
As a reminder, there are over 10,000 wells in the Eagle Ford basin (Railroad 
Commission 2015a) and that well-site conditions are similar between the Eagle Ford and 
the Barnett. Examples of the trucks that service wells can be seen in Figure 5. Quiroga et 
al (2015) found a direct correlation between the number of wells drilled on the Eagle 
Ford Shale and the degradation of local roads. This relationship was present despite 
maintenance spending on a per mile basis on Eagle Ford highways increasing by over 
100% between the yearly averages of 2006-2009 and 2010-2013.  
 
  73 
 
Figure 5: These truck trailers are used to transport water to the drill site for fracking. 
After fracking is complete, these trucks often carry “produced water” (also referred to as 
“saltwater”) to injection wells or treatment sites. On average, seven to ten barrels of 
water are brought to the surface for every barrel of oil extracted (Guerra, Dahm, and 
Dundorf 2011). Each of these trailers can transport approximately 190 barrels of liquid 
per trip. (Photo courtesy of the author.) 
 
 
In addition to the sheer number of trucks present on the roads, many times the 
wells are located in secluded areas of the county, where road conditions were already 
unmaintained reflecting the low-amount of expected traffic. This requires that truck 
drivers frequently drive over roads incapable of handling heavy loads. In doing so, the 
roads frequently deteriorate under the stress of the heavy vehicles, causing the 
emergence of dangerous potholes, damaged culverts, and weakened road edges.  
Many respondents across the core Eagle Ford counties noted how the road 
situation has been impacting daily life. This issue was manifested from a local 
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development perspective, local governance perspective, as well as a general safety 
perspective:  
 
“His [the county judge’s] biggest headache of this whole thing is roads. In these 
small cities and small counties, that's what gets the citizens most excited, and I 
think he would know.... And I think he's addressed it two or three times with the 
state to try and get more monies into these counties. Cause, the money we're 
getting... it's not possible to use the roads.” (EFS002). 
 
This consequence is not exclusive to the core production counties. Indeed, these 
problems extend into the peripheral counties—those counties that have only in the past 
four years started to experience Eagle Ford oil and gas drilling. “That’s the one thing 
that the oil industry has brought here is getting our roads slapped up, and we only have 
‘x’ number of dollars to put into our roads” (EFS014). 
Local governments are relying on the state to provide increased funding to 
heavily impacted areas. Local lobbying efforts at the state level to fix the roads have had 
mixed results. The 2013 Texas Legislative Session passed a bill disbursing $225 million 
(Rahm, Fields, and Farmer [2015] cites this value as $450 million, but every source I 
found stated it was approximately $225 million.) to county governments to alleviate 
traffic concerns through County Energy Transportation Reinvestment Zones (CETRZ) 
managed by the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) (Batheja 2013; Texas 
House of Representatives House Research Organization 2013). CETRZ funds were 
meant for Eagle Ford counties that were most distressed by the shale trucking industry. 
However, in practice, the money was widely distributed to nearly any county that filed 
an application for the funds (Miller 2015). Analysis of the 2013 program found that 70% 
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of the CETRZ funding went to the Eagle Ford (Hiller 2014). While helpful for cash-
strapped county budgets, the amount was insufficient to properly repair damaged roads 
according to respondents. In several interviews, respondents indicated frustration with 
the CETRZ program. One respondent was particularly riled by the policy, believing that 
because his county had been one of the largest oil and gas producers in the region, it 
should be compensated accordingly to repair its roads. In essence, he sees his county 
sacrificing for the development of the region and the state:  
 
“The biggest thing is when the legislature appropriated $225 million last year 
[(2013)] for road repairs and it was supposed to be earmarked for the Eagle Ford 
Counties: the ones that were mainly affected, the ones that are donating, putting a 
lot of money into the Rainy Day Funds. We're producing a lot of money for the 
state too. Anyways, they setup a set of rules to apply for the money funding to 
build roads, country roads looked like that…When it came down to this first of 
the year in appropriations, they gave the money out to 191 counties instead of the 
15 or 20 that they were supposed to” (EFS003).  
 
The CETRZ program was mentioned in five interviews, always in a negative 
light. This discontent was expressed not only through the way in which money was 
distributed to all the counties but also how the amount was insufficient to properly 
manage the destroyed county roads buckling under weights of the trucks. Several 
respondents found the amounts doled out to their city coffers to be unreasonable given 
the degradation of the roads. “Last legislature, they gave us a couple hundred thousand 
dollars. It wasn't much. You can see what they appropriated for roads and shales, and if 
you spread it over the whole shale and the whole need, you might as well not have 
received anything really” (EFS001).  
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The CETRZ program was immediately followed up by a constitutional 
amendment passed by popular referendum allowing for the utilization of funds from the 
Economic Stabilization Fund (also referred to as the Rainy Day Fund) for transportation 
issues. It was anticipated that approximately $879 million would be immediately 
available for public statewide highways by September 2014. As drilling increased across 
the state and more tax receipts were brought in from oil and gas production, the money 
diverted from the Rainy Day Fund was expected to increase to $1.1 billion by September 
2017. The majority of these funds are destined for state highways in urban areas and not 
the rural county roads that have been most destroyed by the drilling. Even if that money 
is disbursed to all the impacted roads, several respondents were suspicious of giving 
more money to TXDOT because of the perceived misallocation of CETRZ funds. One 
respondent went so far to call TXDOT as “a bunch of straight running idiots” (EFS003). 
Of the eight respondents indicating some form on tension between state and local 
governmental organizations, seven of them were relevant to road funding.  
Beyond state investment programs, local governments have been looking for 
creative ways to help supplement road funds and bring more money to coffers without 
raising taxes. It is illegal in the state of Texas for counties to create an impact fee for 
road usage, but several respondents noted that they had approached oil and gas 
companies about making donations to the county to help with mitigating the damage 
costs. This topic was explored briefly in Tunstall (2015) and has been used by energy 
companies in other resource extraction zones. Haslam McKenzie (2013) discusses an 
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Australian example. Many times, however, the requested donation is nominal (only on 
the order of a few thousand dollars) in comparison to the damage to the roads:  
 
“The oil companies have been very good about working with the county for 
[donating] some [road] material. We have come up with an option for the oil 
companies that all oil companies… have taken up. Basically, they make an 
$8,000 donation towards the roads per well. It ain’t much. They’re doing 
$100,000 worth of damage” (EFS015). 
 
This is seen as a stopgap measure to ensure that the government has enough 
money to repair the roads in the midst of the boom without raising taxes, especially 
considering there is a lag between the actual drilling of the well and the moment the 
county starts to receive tax receipts from that drilling. For instance, according to one 
respondent: “Even if it’s completed in December 2015, then it’s January-December 2016 
that the evaluation is calculated upon. So then it’s 2017 that you actually would begin to 
see the revenues” (EFS015). That lag time is more significant if the well is drilled at the 
beginning of a new year. 
While small, one-time donations may help, as noted by the respondent, the 
damage to roads is generally far greater than donations may cover. For example, an 
analysis conducted by DeWitt County found that approximately $133,000 per well is 
required to upgrade and maintain the county road system that enables both energy 
industry and general public uses (Naismith Engineering, Inc. 2015). Nevertheless, 
donations are not the only method by which local governments are able to capture 
revenues for rebuilding roads. Due to an obscure 1960 opinion by then-Texas Attorney 
General William Wilson, all royalties gained from minerals interests under county roads 
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and right of ways are conveyed to the state general revenue fund (Blanchard 2014). One 
county official admitted to working with other local officials across the Eagle Ford Shale 
to lobby the Texas legislature to modify the law. These efforts were successful, and in 
June 2015 Governor Greg Abbott signed HB 2521, which forces any county road lease 
royalties to go into a special fund that is then disbursed back to the counties until 
September 2017. After 2017, any oil and gas leases that involve county road mineral 
property must be directly negotiated with county officials and the resulting revenues 
going directly into the county coffers (Coleman et al. 2015).   
This issue is not just specific to the counties. Depending on the strength of the 
local ordinance structure, cities can impose drilling fees on wells drilled within the 
municipal limits (Fry 2013). These fees are intended to offset some of the negative 
ramifications of the well, such as increased supervising of drilling activity, restoration of 
the site after the well is plugged and abandoned, and repair of local roads. Typically, 
these fees are between $5,000 and $25,000 (Murphy 2014). 
Several respondents also noted how the quality of the roads was not the only 
problem. Additional concerns (n = 4) rested with the quality of the drivers. One 
respondent lamented how the high demand for licensed truck drivers has impacted the 
safety of local roads: “We have a bunch of trucking companies, and they will hire you, 
get your [commercial driver’s license], and then you have a guy that has been driving an 
18-wheeler for three months, who thinks he’s been driving it for 30 years. And he’s 
going 90 miles per hour down the highway with a full load” (EFS009). Compared with 
2006-2009, there has been a 61% increase in crashes involving commercial vehicles on 
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the Eagle Ford Shale during 2010-2013 (Quiroga and Tsapakis 2015). One respondent 
was fearful how his child was going to cope with the oilfield traffic when she became of 
age to start driving. Four respondents expressed how rampant and available drugs are in 
south Texas, which has impacted the hiring practices of Eagle Ford truck driving 
companies. It is unknown whether drug use has been complicit in truck accidents. How 
drug use adversely affects local hiring practices will be explored in greater detail later in 
the section as an Eagle Ford workforce challenges.  
Respondents were quick to note that these drivers are frequently overworked. 
Driver fatigue presents its own challenges, especially on relatively small country roads 
with significant traffic. This problem is exacerbated by the 24-hour nature of the oil and 
gas industry, in which the drilling then the subsequent fracking of a well rarely stops 
until its completion, unless dictated by municipal law or the unavailability of equipment 
or labor. Truck drivers are expected to be available to haul materials to and from the 
worksite. Trucking companies can counteract this fatigue through shift work distributed 
amongst employees. However, sole contractors must be on-call and prepared to haul 
materials at a moment’s notice. Furthermore, according to respondents, drivers are paid 
based on the amount transported between locations and the time it takes to carry that 
load. Therefore, truck drivers frequently maximize or exceed the legal limits of their 
loads, while traveling at high speeds down roads and bridges that are incapable of 
handling their trucks. This was discussed in a NPR story that found 69% of trucks in 
Dimmit County were overweight (Fehling 2012).  This presents a problem not only for 
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the condition of the roads but also for residents. The arrival of oil and gas activity has 
significantly increased the traffic to levels that residents find uncomfortable.  
This section has examined the main infrastructure ramifications to boomtown 
development in south Texas. The boom, while brining economic development in the 
form of increased traffic, has also complicated regional development outcomes. Indeed, 
respondents indicated that budgets are consumed by infrastructure-related needs, thus 
limiting the amount of resources that can be spent on economic development incentives. 
Moreover, the increased traffic and road degradation has resulted in more traffic 
accidents. Finally, while there have been attempts to remedy the situation at the local 
and state level, respondents were adamant that not enough was being done, and that they 
were still experiencing negative economic development outcomes with the increased 
traffic. The degradation of the physical infrastructure and the inability for municipal and 
county governments to effectively manage road use has led to a social disruption: 
citizens are afraid to use the roads.  
 
4.4 Housing: “There Is Nowhere to House the Family Here” 
Many respondents mentioned how housing—both too much and too little—was (n = 5) 
the main inhibitor for future growth in their cities. In fact, after degradation of local 
roads, housing was the most mentioned development-related consequence of oil and gas 
exploration. Every respondent discussed housing unprompted, with many concerned 
about the lack of long-term housing or the over-abundance of short-to-medium stay 
accommodations. Equally important, most respondents cited possible tax and financial 
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benefits of allowing hotel-motel accommodations in the city and the secondary 
businesses, such as restaurants and shopping centers, that workers support.  
Drive-in, drive-out (DIDO)—a method of long distance commuting (LDC)—
appears to be one of the normative forms of labor management on the Eagle Ford Shale. 
This form of LDC is not a requisite of boomtown development: “Rapid population 
growth is a function of both the size and composition of the in-migrant workforce, but 
also the size of the population of the host community” (Jacquet 2014, 8323). In the 
DIDO mode of labor production, workers arrive and work in the shale play for a period 
of consecutive days or weeks, then return back to their homes—typically outside the 
play. In the case of the Eagle Ford Shale, many of these workers are likely driving from 
large Texas metropolitan centers (e.g., Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio) or 
from the Permian Basin, which has historically been the epicenter of on-shore oil and 
gas drilling in the state. Interestingly, there is a dearth of literature on DIDO in the U.S., 
despite the increasing usage of such labor schemes in developing shale plays. Often the 
perceived growth in boomtowns (see Jacquet 2014; Tunstall 2015a) is overshadowed by 
the large numbers of workers in the region only temporarily. However, much of the 
research on DIDO (and fly-in, fly-out) is focused on the mining sector in Australia 
where workers are either driven or flown to worksites at the company’s expense (Storey 
2001; Perry and Rowe 2015).  
Similar to the Australian experience, Eagle Ford energy workers, who live 
outside the shale play, are unable to move into Eagle Ford region because of insufficient 
housing (Murphy 2015b). High demand for homes, properties, and mineral estates has 
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caused land values to spike across the Eagle Ford as workers rushed to the region in 
2010-2014. With nowhere to go, workers were forced to find alternative 
accommodations in short and extended-stay housing. However, those resources were 
quickly exhausted. Cotulla, a town of 3,000 people to the southwest of San Antonio, has 
famously grown from three hotels in 2008 to 26 hotels, motels, and extended-stays 
today, with several more still under construction or consideration (Buchele 2015). While 
the Cotulla example is extreme, this activity is not unusual across the Eagle Ford, 
especially in the core production counties where small ranching and farming towns were 
unprepared for the onslaught of energy workers moving into the region.  
This is not to say that short-to-medium stay accommodations have been the only 
way these towns are attempting to accommodate that growth. Towns have been trying to 
bring RV parks and unconventional accommodations that can decrease the pressure on 
the local housing market. Self-described “man camps” are popular in oil and gas 
boomtowns (White 2012). Man camps can take a variety of forms from little more than a 
RV park (Figure 6) to more substantial modular, quasi-permanent structures (Figure 7).   
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Figure 6: This is a lower quality example of a man camp found in Big Wells (2010 
census population: 697 people), Texas. 
(Photo courtesy of the author.) 
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Figure 7: This is a higher quality example of man camp just outside of Three Rivers 
(2010 census population: 1,848), Texas. 
This particular man camp boasts amenities such as complementary breakfasts, a fitness 
room, and a small convenience store. (Photo courtesy of the author.) 
 
Housing and attracting workers to the region, who optimally would stay for an 
extended period of time, was a topic of frequent conversation with respondents. One 
respondent noted, “the reason why these people aren’t brining their families here is 
because there is nowhere to house the family here. Or it is so expensive” (EFS005). 
Another mentioned: “[I]f you try to recruit people from outside the area, the biggest 
complaint is that, ‘We can't afford to live there’…. You could have rented a house here 
for $250, $350 a month six or seven years ago. The same house today, if they'll rent it to 
you, will lease… for $1,200, $1,400” (EFS002). This was reiterated even on the 
periphery of the play: “That’s our biggest weakness: …[we have] the lowest 
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unemployment rate and no housing to go with that” (EFS010). Furthermore, municipal 
leaders have the ability to influence this development. As mentioned earlier, cities have 
the ability to implement regulations to help slow development through zoning laws 
(EFS007), or, alternatively, they can help streamline the permit and construction 
process: “On the hotel, motel business, apartments, and single family housing… the city 
has had to work with some of those developers on some issues” (EFS006).  
 Furthermore, economic development officials have attempted to entice 
permanent housing developers to the region, many times to no avail, because the “initial 
costs of land are high so it drives the square footage costs to build and then [developers 
have to] import materials and import the labor” (EFS003). All of this is to state that 
property values in the midst of the boom were high. To demonstrate this, in 2010 bonus 
payments were between $1,000 and $4,000 an acre, which “in many cases outpac[ed] the 
surface value of the land” (Hiller 2010). By 2013, small surface properties were being 
sold for $7,159 per acre on average (Armijo 2014). A respondent corroborated this: 
“When you go to buy housing here in [EFS010’s town], it’s so high because [they think,] 
‘we have a potential oil well under here!’” (EFS010). To help combat this high demand 
for housing, some Eagle Ford municipalities sought to redevelop areas in the center of 
town that could help capture some population growth. For example, loft apartments were 
being offered in a converted movie theater in Kenedy—a small town of 3,000 people to 
the southeast of San Antonio (Figure 8). During interviews, officials at two 
municipalities discussed redeveloping or building new apartments: “[Local developers 
are] building a new apartment complex, which we haven’t had apartments built since the 
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80’s probably” (EFS009). “[The apartments] were probably built in the first oil boom” 
(Office manager of EFS009).  This was reiterated by: “These oilfield guys they get tired 
of living in those mobile units. They want something little more permanent. So, the 
apartments complexes are important to them too” (EFS008).  
  
 
Figure 8: A movie theater in Kenedy (2010 census population: 3,296), Texas, 
constructed between the 1930s and 1950s. 
In 2014, it was converted into loft apartments ranging in price from $1,000 (1 bedroom, 
1 bath) to $2,800 (2 bedrooms, 2 baths) per month (Baker 2014). (Photo courtesy of the 
author.) 
 
High housing demand was an equally strong point of contention during previous 
energy booms. During the 1970s and 80s, entrepreneurs converted unused oil storage 
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tanks into small, single bedroom homes in Giddings (Hurt III 1981; Pirtle 2011) while 
Cotulla’s leaders pushed for hotel construction (Buchele 2015). Similar stories from 
previous oil booms filled my conversations with certain stakeholders, who were eager to 
share how their towns responded to the surge in demand for housing. A respondent in 
different city noted that housing was especially tight: “in 1980 … people lived in tank 
cars” (EFS011). EFS010 added, “People slept on the parks, on the streets.”  
 The short to extended-stay boom in housing has manifested itself in certain 
benefits for the municipality. Even in the midst of the bust in petroleum prices, many 
hotel-motel owners have been able to fill their rooms and make hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in the first quarter of 2015 (EFS012). Several of the strategically positioned 
larger hotels on the Eagle Ford Shale have made over $1.2 million based on tax receipts 
during this same time frame (Chapa 2015).  
 Municipalities receive hotel-motel occupancy taxes, which are usually shared 
between the city and any economic development agencies in the city. “The business [the 
energy industry has] brought to town just in motel-hotel taxes, which [our organization] 
gets a portion of… the city distributed, however they feel like they want to and we 
receive our fair share. Hotel-motel taxes have gone from 100 thousand dollars to over a 
million dollars!” (EFS008). Depending on the regulations in place to monitor and 
disburse the tax revenue, this money can be used by both the city and the economic 
development organizations to improve municipal services and the visibility of economic 
development in the city. Municipal economic development agencies use this money to 
attract new development to the city—typically through advertisements—however at least 
  88 
two surveyed municipalities were using the money to build industrial parks. In a meeting 
in August 2014, a group of civic leaders on the western portion of the play discussed 
how to use this money. Ideas that were considered included a new electronic billboard to 
attract interstate travelers to downtown, the construction of a municipal golf course, 
improving the city landscaping, increasing the city’s internet connectivity, and attracting 
new events (e.g., rodeo, firearms shows, motocross). In fall 2015, a newly constructed 
electronic billboard was enticing travelers to visit the city’s historic downtown.  
 Although the short to extended-stay attraction of workers to the region is a boom 
for hotel owners and municipal economic development agencies, many officials wished 
to discuss how the increased sales tax influenced their economic development. The 
presence of these workers brings opportunities for increased sales tax revenue. While 
this revenue can come from a variety of locations, local government officials (n = 9) 
were quick to point out the perceived correlation between housing more industry 
workers and increasing sales tax revenue. This sales tax revenue is not restricted to the 
municipalities: “In the past [the counties] were lucky to have sales tax returns of $40,000 
or $45,000 a month. Well, now they are over $500,000” (EFS006). This sentiment was 
reiterated frequently: “We also get a very small percentage of sales tax—so the more 
people that you have in here that are dealing with oil and gas activities, the more things 
they’re buying, the more groceries, the more gas, and the more of everything else” 
(EFS014). This injection into the local economy proved to be a boom for local 
organizations. That money can be used to help mitigate some of the negative 
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ramifications of the energy development such as infrastructure degradation and 
insufficient law enforcement capacities in light of population increases.  
 While it is easy to couch the housing development of a region in purely positive 
terms, the reality is much more complex, according to economic development officials. 
Reasons for not sanctioning the construction of hotel and motels and not realizing 
potential tax revenues are complex. For example, two respondents reported that they 
were fearful of overbuilding: “We have also been reluctant to overbuild because it does, 
it’s great while it lasts, but when they all pull out and there’s no end, you don’t know 
where end date is going to be” (EFS010). Several decades ago, Cotulla capitalized on a 
nearby resource boom and built a few hotels to accommodate energy workers. Many of 
those original-boom hotel-motel properties are now reporter-described bat houses 
(Buchele 2015).  
Local governments—municipalities in particular—choose whether to take 
advantage of oil and gas related development and build short-to-medium stay housing 
through the permitting process. As mentioned previously, this type of development has 
inherent risks, not the least of which is the possibility of abandonment in the event of a 
bust in commodity prices. While such conversation would have been unheard of in the 
summer of 2014, municipalities are, as of early 2015, becoming increasingly concerned 
about the potential hurdles associated with keeping energy-related development housing 
in these municipalities.  
 While the fears of overdevelopment are present among respondents, they were 
also aware that every worker who is forced into short-to-extended stay housing is a lost 
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potential permanent resident. Indeed, economic development actors knew that without 
permanent housing, workers were more likely to leave the region once drilling had 
concluded. Seven respondents believed that if there was more permanent housing, then 
workers were more likely to bring their families and become permanent residents of the 
region—even if there was a significant cutback in energy prices: “They’re [(oil and gas 
well maintenance workers)] going be our long-term families! And again, it goes back to 
the housing. More houses isn’t [sic] going to be built until maybe the price of land 
drops—the square footage cost—because it’s too high right now” (EFS003).  
 Beyond the lost opportunities for cities and potential residents, high housing 
costs adversely affects families already in the area—especially those on fixed or limited 
incomes. Economic development officials were cognizant that increasing housing costs 
were straining families who rented from property owners. Those families who find 
themselves in an unaffordable rent situation must either negotiate with the owner or 
abandon the property. One respondent in the core of the play best described the problem: 
“It’s [the] rental rates; rent rates for housing have gone up significantly! And that does 
create a problem for people who have rented the house for a number of years; all of a 
sudden the rates have gone up” (EFS006). These now-homeless are unable to afford to 
live in the region and must seek employment and residency elsewhere. Weber et al. 
(2014) found a similar situation on the Bakken Shale, where social services are strained 
to track the constant flux of homeless individuals into and out of the region as the oil and 
gas boom develops.  
 The exceptionally high cost of housing is also a strain on businesses that find it 
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impossible to retain employees. Businesses typically have some capacity to raise 
employee’s salaries or provide company housing to ensure that there is appropriate 
staffing. Alternatively, government agencies need employees to continue to operate yet 
do not have the financial capacity to sufficiently increase wages to offset sudden 
increases in the cost of living. Schools were of particular concern for respondents. 
Already under pressure from increased enrollment, schools were unable to retain 
teachers and staff, according to respondents. This problem is especially acute because 
formerly cash-strapped schools are flush with oil-related tax revenue yet are unable to 
spend it. Texas operates under the “Robin Hood” school funding system, which forces 
schools with budget surpluses to send money to the state that then disburses those funds 
to financially disadvantaged districts (Smith 2011). Many school districts that were once 
recipients of the Robin Hood Plan in south Texas have found their newfound wealth 
being recaptured by the state. For example, an Eagle Ford school district, once a 
recipient of Robin Hood funds, sent $51 million to the state and was only able to retain 
$19 million, according to the superintendent at a chamber of commerce meeting in 
August of 2014.  
 It is within this institutional setting that many schools find themselves unable to 
pay new employees enough to find housing in the region. “We need a place to put school 
teachers. I mean we've got money to hire good teachers, but you've got to have a place 
for them to live…. [The superintendent] had a lady that came down and signed up and 
resigned the next day, two or three days later, cause she couldn't find a place to live” 
(EFS003). EFS003 gave similar accounts that the United States Border Patrol and even 
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fast food establishments were having difficulty retaining workers due to the shortage of 
available housing. According to conversations with school district leadership, the 
problem has grown so severe that a portion of a 2014 $50 million bond package for the 
Cotulla Independent School District (ISD) was allocated to build housing for faculty and 
staff. Similar bond proposals, with allocated money for faculty and staff housing, were 
passed in 2014 in nearby Three Rivers ISD (Three Rivers Independent School District 
2014) and McMullen County ISD (McMullen County Independent School District 
2014).  
 While previous wage studies have indicated that counties that have oil and gas 
production are likely to have an increase in nominal wages (Weber 2012; Haggerty et al. 
2014; Tunstall et al. 2014; Tunstall 2015b), the reality is much more complex, especially 
if there is no housing to capture new workers to the region. The lack of permanent 
housing, therefore, becomes one of the integral aspects of the problem triangle. Without 
adequate permanent housing to accommodate oil and gas workers, they fail to integrate 
into the communities and disrupt the sense of community (i.e., the quality of life) 
experienced by locals.   
 
4.5 Workforce and Wages: “You've Got to Pay Them to Retain Them” 
In addition to road impacts and a shortage of housing, Eagle Ford respondents also 
discussed the disruption of the traditional wage profile of the region. The explosion of 
energy-related activity has resulted in over $2.7 billion in estimated wages paid to oil 
and gas employees who work on the Eagle Ford Shale in 2013 alone; energy extraction 
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further resulted in $1.5 billion in wages paid to employees indirectly associated with the 
oil and gas industry (Tunstall et al. 2014). With workers and labor in high demand 
during the height of the Eagle Ford Shale boom, many oil and gas companies were 
forced to raise wages to levels well beyond previous regional norms. This is especially 
important when put in the context of regional economic decline leading into the boom 
(Tunstall 2015a). Many individuals adversely affected by the 2008 Great Recession 
found work in the oil and gas industry (Phillips and Cañas 2011). However, as the boom 
overtook the region, wages rose as the demand for workers increased: “The problem is 
retaining people…. If you've got somebody good, you've got to pay them to retain them, 
otherwise they'll go work for oil and gas or associated industry” (EFS003). Several 
respondents (n = 7) in the core of the play noted that the minimum wage had naturally 
risen in their regions to over $12 per hour, with many firms still struggling to find 
enough workers: “The biggest impact probably is that obviously the businesses we have 
in town all have the same complaint: They can't get enough employees” (EFS002). 
Previous wage studies have indicated that counties that have oil and gas production are 
likely to have an increase in nominal wages (Weber 2012); however, the reality is much 
more complex, especially if there is no housing to capture them. Local government 
agencies, whose functionality is dependent on having adequate employment, are most 
negatively affected by the disruption of wages.    
Many of the Eagle Ford energy jobs, despite being physically demanding, do not 
require post-high school education. When asked about education, nine respondents noted 
that the majority of Eagle Ford energy careers only require a high school education. 
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There was one anecdote of a pipeline company hiring “a bunch of the high school kids 
for the summer to go out and work as helpers, welder’s helpers. And I think they were 
paying them $17.50 an hour” (EFS002). Hardly unique, compensation for individuals 
with a high school degree during the midst of the boom could easily exceed $20 an hour 
with opportunities to receive performance-based (and market-based) bonuses according 
to respondents: “Anyone who can sling a sledgehammer can make $15-$25 an hour, 
literally” (EFS010).   
High demand for employment has forced the oil and gas industry to seek labor 
from beyond the Eagle Ford Shale. Often, work on the play is organized through DIDO 
arrangements. When asked, many respondents assumed that energy companies were 
hiring from a variety of locations, both locally and beyond the play:  
 
“[Oil and gas firms] are hiring a lot of the locals—giving locals jobs—but as well 
is a lot of this oil field companies are not just located in [the respondent’s 
municipality]. So they’re having the people that work in their main offices come 
down, train the people maybe from throughout here in the area, and then they’ll 
go back and they’ll have it under control here” (EFS005).  
 
Even with a sizable population coming from outside the region, many 
respondents were quick to suggest that oil and gas development, or more specifically, the 
labor, was not an important driver of economic development. Despite workers using 
local hotel-motel accommodations, one respondent likened the oil and gas industry to a 
military base, where the workers largely live independent of the municipality that is 
hosting them (EFS013). Another interviewee noted that in his city, “There’s 8,500 
[people] before the Eagle Ford [boom] and they all had jobs” (EFS009). This finding 
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relates to work conducted on the New Albany Shale in which local policymakers 
responding to a survey were concerned that the decreasing population would deter 
energy companies from moving to the region (Crowe et al. 2015). In the Eagle Ford, 
however, energy firms were still eager to take advantage of the resource, even if that 
meant bringing in their own workers from beyond the shale play.  
Adding to the complex nature of the labor on the Eagle Ford is the high mobility. 
Three respondents said that oil and gas workers would “jump [from one firm to another] 
for 50 cents [per hour pay increase].” Economic development officials complained that 
they were unable to retain labor: “we lost three or four deputies [in the county police 
force] to the oil industry, because it paid so much better. And so, when you only have 12 
deputies, that’s 25% of your law enforcement workforce” (EFS015). Similar accounts 
came from both the core and the peripheral areas of the play, where local government 
and civic organizations lacked the financial means to attract labor away from the oil and 
gas industry. This has resulted in shortages of police, road workers, public health 
officials, teachers, coaches, just to name a few.  
Higher wages, however, have not been experienced evenly across the shale play. 
Indeed, there are certain sectors of the workforce that have been unable to obtain higher 
wages because of the social circumstances of the region: 
 
“[The energy companies] hire anybody that pass in a drug test! And that 
becomes a problem, because we live in a community that has been economically 
distressed for many years…. I’m talking about somebody that’s in high school or 
lower who can’t really envision some future endeavor for them to participate in 
or to have an opportunity to build a future—generally falls into the realm of 
somebody that has no direction, and they are most susceptible to getting involved 
  96 
to drugs or to things that impact their lives in the future. They have no idea that 
these things are going to affect them at the time that they do them” (EFS007). 
 
Here EFS007 is touching on a subject that has been well documented in the 
scientific literature. Youth in rural settings are statistically more likely to partake in 
drugs compared to their urban counterparts (Lambert, Gale, and Hartley 2008; Pruitt 
2008; Coomber et al. 2011). If that individual is caught, drug use can have consequences 
for future employment opportunities and can restrict their ability to participate in the 
energy economy. Relevant to this discussion, these decisions can result in significantly 
lower wages. Without being prompted, four respondents discussed the south Texas drug 
culture—both how the region is a major gateway for illicit drugs and how it was 
impacting the hiring practices of energy firms. EFS007 went on to demonstrate the 
severity of this issue:  
 
“This [energy firm recruiter] told me that they interviewed—I don’t know how 
many people. 100 didn’t pass. In the end they eliminated, I want to say, like 70 
guys on the drug test. So, they only had 30 guys left. 30% of the work force was 
available. So, they ended up moving closer to San Antonio where they had a 
larger pool [of workers to select from]” (EFS007).  
 
While I will not delve into the Eagle Ford substance abuse dynamics from a 
public health perspective, it is important to recognize the economic development 
implications. If firms do not locate in the region because the workforce is already 
strained by strong demand, substance abuse may limit employment. Regional 
development driven by DIDO regimes do not have the same positive magnitude of 
economic impact as more traditional development (Storey 2001). Consequently, every 
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potential local worker removed from the workforce is another worker that must be 
brought from beyond the shale play who has a smaller economic development 
influences. 
 The nature of workforce challenges creates particular constraints on use of public 
resources. Economic development agencies, in the beginning of the boom, were 
overwhelmed with responsibilities. Furthermore, many offices were understaffed 
because of the financial structure of government institutions on the shale play discussed 
earlier. Many agencies decided to use the resources by hiring employees—even at 
exceptionally high salaries. While perhaps this is a requisite response given the demands 
on municipal and county agencies, the newly created positions are only sustainable 
insofar as energy prices remain elevated and the regional development does not slow. 
One respondent summarized it best:  
 
“Some of our brethren in south Texas decided they’d put a bunch of people to 
work, but these mineral taxes are cyclical, and so, none of them are permanent. 
The value of the well today first drilled is as high as it will ever be. It will only 
go down from there and eventually die to zero” (EFS015).  
 
Alternatively, respondents discussed using money derived from energy 
development to invest in improvement projects or to save for when the boom in 
development starts to decline. These projects can come in the form of new equipment for 
government offices, new facilities (i.e., capital projects), or temporarily decreasing the 
tax rate.  
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“In anticipation of using [oil and gas mineral estate taxes], you want to be 
responsible with them. And so, that’s one of the things we’re doing with the 
capital project…. That was one thing that we made sure of is that the revenue 
streams that we have today would cover the note for that, because it is being 
financed” (EFS015).  
 
Similar capital improvement projects, such as courthouse expansion or renovation, are 
taking place in the core of the play in Karnes County (Fisher Heck Architects 2015) and 
Live Oak County (Naber 2013).  
 In this way, wages are an integral aspect of the Gilmore (1976) problem triangle 
and social disruption hypothesis. Admittedly higher wages are generally perceived to be 
a good ramification of Eagle Ford development. These higher wages—while potentially 
beneficial for individuals who were ready to work in the oil and gas industry—were a 
major hindrance for firms that did not have the capacity to raise wages. If the 
government and non-energy businesses are unable to retain workers, higher wages leads 
to a disruption in local services, which then results in a disrupted quality of life. This 
connection will be described in greater detail in Section 4.7.  
 
4.6 Mineral Wealth: “Everybody Wants an Oil Well” 
The final section of the interview instrument queried the perceived amount of absentee 
versus local mineral ownership. Economic development stakeholders were divided 
whether mineral ownership is more local or absentee. As one respondents said, “I think 
everybody wants an oil well in their backyard, and if they could attract that, then they 
would” (EFS010), suggesting that surface ownership entailed mineral ownership. Other 
interviewees were skeptical whether mineral owners resided in the county. One 
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respondent said, “I think some people sold land recently who [also] sold their mineral 
rights, and said: ‘Yeah, give me a hundred dollars more and I’ll sell you the mineral 
rights….’ [The Eagle Ford Shale boom] happens a year later, and you go, ‘Oh shit’” 
(EFS007).  
Many respondents were aware that mineral estates have become increasingly 
fractional, giving some explanation as to why there are so many small mineral royalty 
holders. This happens in a variety of avenues: selling a division of the mineral estate 
during the sale of the surface property to attract a buyer, retaining the mineral estate 
while selling the surface property and it fragmenting through generations of ownership, 
mineral owners selling part of their estate to property acquisition companies to shore up 
personal finances, and other ways. Even prior to the start of the boom, property sellers 
rarely sold the mineral estate. As one real estate agent put it: “I haven’t sold a property 
with mineral rights really since before [2003]” (EFS003).  
This issue becomes more complicated when landowners sell their subsurface 
water rights. As with mineral rights, water rights can be severed and exercised. As one 
official puts it, this creates an awkward situation in which “land speculators came in; 
they bought the land with all the rights, stripped all of [rights] from under it, and sold the 
dirt [i.e., the surface property]” (EFS015). Even in these situations, the mineral estate 
still holds supremacy, and through Texas law, the mineral owner can use as much water 
as is necessary for the drilling of the well (i.e., while the drilling rig is in place). 
However, in order to frack a well, the rig must be moved, and in these cases, the mineral 
owner or lessee must negotiate a contract directly with the water rights owner (EFS015).  
  100 
 
4.7 Reconciling Gilmore to Modern Hydrocarbon Drilling 
Complex economic development paradigms in the Eagle Ford Shale emerge in response 
to the three major ramifications of the play: 1) infrastructure management, 2) deficient 
housing, and 3) workforce/wage failures. This complexity is temporal and spatial with 
many objectives shifting over time as the play has also developed. Broad conclusions 
can be made about the typologies of economic development styles on the Eagle Ford 
(Table 4) and the amount to which locals have been able to retain their mineral rights. 
The pursuit of economic development goals does not occur in a vacuum. 
Municipal and county governments react to the shifting paradigm based on perceived 
needs and objectives. Economic stakeholders were quick to establish how their 
municipality’s economic development style was different than a nearby city. 
Municipalities and counties communicate and coexist, yet are also in inter-jurisdictional 
competition with neighboring local governments for investments, labor, and tax revenue. 
For a review of inter-jurisdictional competition, refer to Harrison (1997). 
 
4.7.1 Why a New Triangle? 
Gilmore’s (1976) problem triangle predicted how the negative ramifications of boom 
development influence economic development (Figure 2). Gilmore believed that towns 
were most disrupted when boom conditions ensued and local services fall short of need. 
This decrease in social services is what causes an unstable labor supply. This unstable 
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labor supply forces old industries to consider leaving and potential new industries to 
reconsider moving to the area. This, in turn, creates a degraded quality of life. 
Gilmore’s 40 years old triangle can be reconciled to a modern context to 
encapsulate the issues that present-day development officials confront. The problem 
triangle is still relevant; however the dynamics of resource extraction have changed and 
updates are needed to the triangle. Furthermore, the materiality of oil and its associated 
capital markets are markedly different from the hard rock mining that Gilmore discusses 
requiring that the triangle be updated from its present form. Like hard rock mining, a 
very large workforce is required when a hydrocarbon well is first drilled. However, 
unlike hard rock mining or even tar sand oil extraction (Pasqualetti 2009; Keough 2015), 
shale petroleum production only requires a large number of workers be at the site for 
three to four weeks per well and a minimal workforce to maintain the well. This 
materiality, in turn, makes the shock of drilling resource mobilization to a play more 
dramatic. Yet, once the drilling of new wells slows, the region witnesses a major exodus 
of men and materials from the play. Long term linkages between a locality and the oil 
and gas industry takes decades to develop and is most concretized when downstream 
processing plants are built in a community (Freudenburg and Gramling 1998). 
Otherwise, any linkage is likely to be tenuous. Additionally, lower capital costs and 
surmountable barriers to market entry allow for quicker project initiation (Bridge 2008) 
relative to Gilmore’s hard rock mining industries. Finally, while hard rock mining 
remains an important component of the U.S. economy, oil and natural gas production—
in lieu of coal production—has been targeted by policymakers as important for the 
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United States energy economy and will likely be pursued for the foreseeable future. 
Therefore, it is time for the triangle to be updated to the modern realities of oil and gas 
drilling.  
 
4.7.2 A New Problem Triangle 
In my new version of the Gilmore triangle, I note that increased resource extraction first 
leads to a strain of the local labor market (Figure 9). Once the local labor market is 
exhausted, which occurred within the starting years on the Eagle Ford, labor is brought 
in from beyond the region in DIDO arrangements, especially in those locations with 
limited housing. The high demand on the labor market and straining wages make it 
difficult for non-energy businesses and government services to be fully staffed, leading 
to a decrease in productivity. For municipal and county governments, this problem is 
compounded by the lag between the time services are demanded and the time taxes are 
assessed (Section 4.3). In this way, municipal and county governments as well as 
business services fall short together, leading to inadequate goods and services for local 
residents and temporary workers. This leads to a disruption to the quality of life of 
residents. As long as the resource extraction increases, the triangle will continue, 
however if resource extraction slows, then the problems will slowly ameliorate through 
the boom-bust-recovery process (Brown, Dorins, and Krannich 2005). 
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Figure 9: The Gilmore (1976) problem triangle envisioned in a modern context.  
My changes are in italics. 
 
I have made the following modifications to the Gilmore (1976) problem triangle 
to bring it into a modern context. First, I added the stimulus that causes the triangle: 
increasing resource extraction. Second, I changed the numbering to reflect how 
productivity is negatively impacted first, not quality of life. Third, I noted that the 
inadequacies associated with the labor supply are largely local and lead to increased 
LDC, as noted by the literature (Storey 2001; Aroca and Atienza 2011). Fourth, I note 
that local (what I term as “organic”) industrial productivity begins to decline due to an 
inadequate local labor supply. Because of the demand on local labor, local non-energy 
firms have difficulty competing with the energy industry because of the increasing 
wages. Fifth, Gilmore wrote that there are inadequate public revenues; however, my 
conversations with economic development officials indicate that there is a lag in public 
revenues that may take several years to correct. Finally, given that there is a lag in public 
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revenues, local services temporarily fall short of demand. This leads to a disrupted 
quality of life, not a permanently degraded quality of life as implied by the Gilmore 
triangle.  
Based on the literature discussed in Section 2 and the sentiment of hydrocarbon 
development discussed by respondents, the present triangle is meant to be less 
pessimistic than Gilmore’s triangle. Gilmore also indicated that this situation was more 
or less permanent. The boomtown literature instead argues that resource towns go 
through boom, busts, and recovery after a certain amount of time (Smith, Krannich, and 
Hunter 2001; Brown, Dorins, and Krannich 2005). Consequently, whereas resource 
extraction has positive and negative consequences on the economic stability of a city, it 
does not permanently alter it—even if most energy firms are only present for the 
duration of the boom. Economic development officials noted that the rapid and ongoing 
development of resource extraction is the major inhibitor to economic development, not 
necessarily the failing of local organizations as indicated in Gilmore’s triangle. This is a 
product of the materiality of oil and gas extraction versus hard rock mining. Hard rock 
mining requires a long-term workforce to stay local to the mining site. Oil and gas, on 
the other hand, only requires a minimal workforce after the well has been drilled.  
These changes are not meant to be a fundamental shift to Gilmore’s triangle; 
rather I am reconciling it with the modern realities of oil and gas drilling. There is no 
doubt that today’s oil and gas extraction is intrinsically different from the Colorado hard 
rock mining Gilmore studied 40 years ago. We have more data about boomtown 
governments and how they react to the arrival resource extraction. We have more data 
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about economic outcomes in boomtowns. We have more data about the nature of 
resource extraction firms, how they operate, and how they are financed. Therefore, it is 
important to reconcile the theoretical foundation of boomtowns to their modern realities, 
especially considering the possibility for more boomtowns with the shale revolution. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This section has discussed the major policy domains that boomtown economic officials 
operate within when mitigating the negative externalities associated with explosive 
development. I offered two approaches to mitigating the negative externalities associated 
with boomtown development. As determined through a grounded approach to coding of 
interview transcripts, local policymakers were most upset about road degradation, a 
mismatch in housing availability, and skyrocketing wages paralyzing local, non-energy 
businesses as well as municipal and county governments. Additionally, I have 
demonstrated how stakeholders perceive of absentee versus local mineral ownership. 
Finally, I have updated Gilmore’s (1976) problem triangle using the literature published 
in the 40 years since Gilmore published his Science article and reconciling it to the 
modern realities of oil and gas development, which is very different from the hard rock 
mining Gilmore studied in the 1970s. This triangle has explanatory power that can be 
used in other situation of resource development as well as a pedagogical tool to help 
describe how boomtowns respond to the pressures of oil and gas development.  
Finally, it is worth reiterating that a small number of economic leaders resolve 
the development style of a local agency. Municipal policymakers determine the 
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governance style of an organization for small spatial subsets of the Eagle Ford Shale, 
especially relative the size of the resource. These decisions are also potentially small in 
temporal scale, with many policymakers only remaining in power a set term or series of 
terms, while the life of the hydrocarbon play will be several decades. Notwithstanding 
the limitations, these policy decisions may have profound shock of the fabric of a 
government agency and how that municipality’s or county’s leaders negotiate boom-
related ramifications. As economic development policymakers become aware and react 
to the consequences of the hydrocarbon-based development, they tailor policies to their 
jurisdictions that then manifest as different governance styles (demonstrated in Table 4).  
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5. LIVE OAK COUNTY MINERAL WEALTH CONCENTRATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, I analyze publically available Live Oak County Appraisal District 
(LOCAD) data to determine the spatial variability of mineral interest holdings, the main 
beneficiaries of assessed wealth, and the relative concentration of mineral wealth. I use 
the appraised value of mineral interest ownership and holdings as a proxy for relative 
mineral wealth. As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, mineral estates have established 
ownership regimes that can operate independently from the surface estate. These estates 
can be bought and sold in a similar fashion to surface estates; however unlike surface 
estates, large amounts of labor and capital are required for the estate to become 
productive especially in unconventional plays.  
From an appraisal perspective, it is very difficult to assess the value of a mineral 
estate prior to the initiation of production. Therefore, mineral estates are only taxed once 
well production is established and reported to the RRC. The amount of mineral wealth 
that is taxed is debatable, because it is difficult to know with absolute certainty how an 
oil or gas well will perform over several years or decades. However, the methodology 
used by LOCAD and other appraisal districts is consistent, and the aim of this study to 
examine the relative spatial and non-spatial concentrations in wealth. The absolute 
amounts of mineral wealth are not as important and may vary depending on the market 
price of oil. These appraised values are essential to the financial health of oil and gas 
companies, especially upstream operators whose company valuations are derived from 
  108 
the leased mineral estates. These leased mineral estates also serve as collateral for loans 
to commence drilling wells.  
I use the methods established in Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015) and 
Brannstrom, et al. (2015). To summarize, I processed the LOCAD data then uploaded 
the data into ArcGIS to examine the relative spatial variability and concentration of 
appraised mineral wealth. This is demonstrated via several statistical tests, the results of 
which will be shown in the latter half of the section. While I focus on data from 2015 
(see Section 3 for reasoning), I also examine some of the chronological aspects of these 
data. Finally, I offer some concluding thoughts on the data. 
 
5.2 Overview of Live Oak County Mineral Wealth 
Live Oak County is in the southern portion of the play (Figure 10) and is a 
representative county in terms of hydrocarbon production. According to the EIA, the 
Eagle Ford only extends through the northern and central part of the county; 
nevertheless, oil and gas production takes place over much of the county (Figure 11). Oil 
was first discovered in Live Oak County in 1930. Annual production reached nearly 
400,000 barrels by the end of 1940 (Hester 1996). By the 1950s, ranching started to 
supplant farming as the main economic driver of the county and the excess labor went 
into uranium mining and the oil and gas industry. In 1984, annual oil production was 
nearly 4,000,000 barrels. As oil, gas, and uranium production diminished through the 
1990s because of decreasing reserves, the population fluctuated around 9,500 people 
(Hester 1996). Since the 1990s, the county has experienced modest growth, and today 
has about 11,500 people. In June 2015, 26,600 barrels of oil and 322,440 mcf (thousand 
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cubic feet) of gas were produced in the county per day (Texas Drilling 2015). The 
county has two incorporated cities, Three Rivers (2010 population, 1,848) and George 
West, the county seat (2010 population, 2,445).  
 
 
Figure 10: Overview Eagle Ford map with Live Oak County outlined. 
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Figure 11: Map of Live Oak County indicating the location of the two major cities and 
the locations of oil and gas wells drilled since 2008. 
(Well data provided by Railroad Commission 2015a and the Texas A&M Geography 
Department.) 
 
Live Oak County sits on the southern edge of the Eagle Ford Shale yet is still considered 
a core production county by Tunstall et al. (2014) and Rahm et al. (2015). Scientists at 
UTSA have calculated the 2013 economic output of the county at $6.95 billion (Tunstall 
et al. 2014). Using the methods described earlier, summing all forms of appraised 
  111 
mineral interests, there is $1.362 billion in total appraised mineral value (Table 5).  
Mineral wealth distribution is strongly negative skewed (Figure 12).  
 
 
Table 5: Economic statistics about Live Oak County. 
Live Oak County 
Hydrocarbon Materiality Condensates and Dry Gas 
Number of Wells 752 
UTSA Estimated 2013 County Economic Output $6.95 Billion 
Total 2015 Appraised Value of Minerals $1,362,631,225 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The frequency distribution of 2015 Live Oak County mineral wealth.  
Note: the y-axis is logarithmic. 
 
 
 
  112 
5.3 Mineral Wealth Examined on an Interest-by-Interest Basis 
Working interests—which represent the firms that have the largest interest stake in the 
well but are also responsible for the costs of drilling, operations, and environmental 
cleanup at well abandonment—account for 69.73% ($950,103,353) of the total mineral 
interests in Live Oak County. Royalty interests, defined as the mineral value extracted 
that is paid directly to the lessor usually free of production or refinement costs symbolize 
26.94% ($367,062,225). Overriding royalty interests, 3.28% ($44,654,248), are those 
companies that assist in the drilling of the well in service of the working interests. 
Finally, 0.06% ($811,369) are payment interests, which act as loans that are repaid 
through production from the working interest to a firm or individual. In sum, $1.362 
billion in mineral wealth are held by 11,348 mineral accounts, which are linked to 758 
leases, the majority of which are in the northern part of the county. The average royalty 
percentage is 20.83%, while the average working interest is 79.54% (Table 6).  
In each interest category, the mean is considerably higher than the median and 
the standard deviation is larger than the mean, indicating that that the vast majority of 
mineral interest holders have relatively small appraised properties (Table 7). Several 
entities have much larger interests than the mean, skewing the data as demonstrated by 
the Gini coefficients. Especially for the working interest, the Gini coefficient reveals that 
there is close to perfect inequality, while payment, royalty, and override interests also 
have high levels of inequality amongst all mineral owners.  
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Table 6: Interest types relative to the number of that type, their average percentages in a 
mineral leases (if present in that lease), the total amount of that type of interest, and a 
types’ interest relative to all the other interests 
Interest Type Number of Interests 
Average 
Percentage3 
Total Amount 
($) 
Percentage of 
Total Interests 
(%) 
Override Interest 1,702 5.31% $44,654,248 3.28% 
Payment Interest 13 3.92% $811,369 0.06% 
Royalty Interest 8,841 20.83% $367,062,255 26.94% 
Working Interest 792 79.54% $950,103,353 69.73% 
 
 
Table 7: Interest types relative to their means, medians, standard deviations and Gini 
coefficients. 
Interest Type Mean Median Range Standard Deviation 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Override Interest $26,236 $4,523 $505-$1,852,368 $79,684 
0.60 
Payment Interest $62,413 $47,480 $843-$279,006 $75,581 
0.58 
Royalty Interest $41,518 $5,712 $500-$14,589,218 $226,186 
0.58 
Working Interest $1,199,625 $135,235 $575-$50,139,964 $3,213,708 
0.94 
 
 
The five working interest companies with the most lease wealth collectively hold 
64.4% of the total mineral capital in Live Oak County. This expressed numerically by a 
Gini coefficient of 0.94, indicating a high concentration of wealth relative to a Live Oak 
County Gini coefficient of 0.42 (Batt 2014). Three of the five companies have their tax 
address in Houston and none demonstrates a tax address in the county (Table 8). In fact, 
                                                
3 Values do not add to 100%, because not every lease has all four forms of interest.  
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of all the working interest, only $299,000 are linked to a tax address in the county, 
mostly going to a small oil and gas exploration company located in Three Rivers. The 
other 99.97% is held by firms located outside Live Oak and outside the Eagle Ford Shale 
(Table 9). This is demonstrated in Figure 13, in which working interests are spatially 
concentrated in Houston, San Antonio, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Corpus Christi addresses.   
 
Table 8: Top five working interests. 
Entity Total Working Interest Value 
Percentage of Total 
Working Interests  
Percentage of 
All Minerals  Tax City 
Burlington 
Resources and 
Natural Gas1 
$411,100,230 43.26% 30.16% Houston, Texas 
Pioneer Natural 
Resources2 $338,020,674 35.57% 24.80% 
Midland, 
Texas 
BHP Billiton3 $60,832,360 6.40% 4.46% Houston, Texas 
Marathon Oil $56,970,523 5.99% 4.18% 
San 
Antonio, 
Texas 
Newfield 
Exploration 
Company 
$10,655,995 1.12% 0.78% Houston, Texas 
Notes to Table 8: 
1: Burlington Resources is a subsidiary of ConocoPhillips based in Houston, Texas. 
2: Pioneer Natural Resources is based in Irving, Texas, however the tax address is in Midland. 
3: BHP Billiton is globally based in Melbourne, Australia, however the tax address for LOCAD 
data is in Houston. 
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Table 9: Destinations of Live Oak mineral interest wealth. 
Remaining in Live Oak County Amount Percentage of All Minerals 
Override Interest $379,856 0.03% 
Payment Interest $53,869 0.00% 
Royalty Interest $25,882,225 1.90% 
Working Interest $299,000 0.02% 
TOTAL $26,614,950  1.95% 
 
Remaining in Eagle Ford Shale Amount Percentage of All Minerals 
Override Interest $13,128 0.00% 
Payment Interest $471,343 0.03% 
Royalty Interest $45,525,713 3.34% 
Working Interest $16,913 0.00% 
TOTAL $46,027,097  3.38% 
 
Remaining in Texas Amount Percentage of All Minerals 
Override Interest $40,416,248 2.97% 
Payment Interest $810,526 0.06% 
Royalty Interest $321,242,816 23.58% 
Working Interest $941,275,229 69.08% 
TOTAL $1,303,744,819  95.68% 
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Figure 13: Spatial distribution of the 2015 total working interest in Live Oak County 
across Texas and the continental U.S. 
 
The top five royalty interest receiving entities collectively hold 5.6% of the total 
mineral wealth in Live Oak County, but all their tax addresses are outside the county 
(Table 10). In fact, of all the royalty interests, only 7.05% ($25,882,225) have tax 
addresses in the county. One of the major recipients of royalties, Mobil Production 
Properties, is a subsidiary of ExxonMobil, indicating that a large multinational owns a 
sizable portion (2.07%) of the producing mineral estate in Live Oak County. As further 
evidenced by the nature of royalty interest ownership, 12.48% (nearly $46,000,000) of 
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the value is held by entities outside of the state. Royalties are spatially concentrated in in 
the major metropolitan regions in Texas and across the U.S. (Figure 14).  
 
Table 10: Top five royalty interests. 
Entity Total Royalty Interest Value 
Percentage of 
Total Royalty 
Interests  
Percentage of 
All Minerals Tax City 
Sinor Ranch, Ltd $24,496,047 6.67% 1.79% Deer Park, Texas 
BBB Oil and Gas, Ltd $20,708,085 5.64% 1.51% Kerrville, Texas 
Plomero Ranches, Ltd $13,052,593 3.55% 0.95% 
Fair Oaks 
Ranch, 
Texas 
1893 Oil and Gas, Ltd $11,138,642 3.03% 0.81% 
San 
Antonio, 
Texas 
Mobil Production 
Texas & New Mexico, 
Inc1 
$7,621,343 2.07% 0.56% Dallas, Texas 
Notes to Table 10: 
1: Mobil Production is a subsidiary of ExxonMobil based in Irving, Texas—a Dallas 
suburb. 
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Figure 14: The 2015 total royalty interest spatial distribution across Texas and the 
continental U.S. 
 
 
Of the total override interests, 75.3% of the mineral interests are concentrated 
amongst the top five companies and account for 2.5% of total mineral wealth (Table 11). 
Three of the largest five have tax addresses in Houston, and none has an address in Live 
Oak County. Additionally, the largest override interest holder, Amber Harvest 
Corporation, is a subsidiary of Texas Crude Energy of Houston, Texas. In fact, only 
0.85% ($379,856) of all override interests remain within the county with an equally 
small amount staying local to the Eagle Ford Shale. Overriding interest shares are 
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distributed mostly in Houston, San Antonio, and the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex 
(Figure 16) 
 
Table 11: Top five override interests. 
Entity Total Override Interest Value 
Percentage of Total 
Override Interests  
Percentage of 
All Minerals  Tax City 
Amber Harvest 
Corporation1 $24,793,897 55.52% 1.81% 
Fort 
Worth, 
Texas 
Eagle Ford 
Austin Interests, 
LP 
$5,152,439 11.53% 0.37% Houston, Texas 
Nine Canyon 
Interests, LP $1,853,565 4.15% 0.13% 
Houston, 
Texas 
Carlson Oil and 
Gas, Inc $935,931 2.09% 0.068% 
Edmond, 
Oklahoma 
Weathers, 
Adriana $920,463 2.06% 0.067% 
Houston, 
Texas 
Note to Table 11: 
1: Amber Harvest Corporation is a subsidiary of Texas Crude Energy based in Houston, 
Texas 
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Figure 15: The 2015 total overriding interest spatial distribution across Texas and the 
continental U.S. 
 
Payment interests account for the smallest amount of mineral interest, but they 
also have marked differences. About 88% of the payment mineral interest wealth is 
concentrated in the top five out of 13 mineral holders (Table 12). Of those mineral 
holders, one has a tax address in Three Rivers, while four out of the five have tax 
addresses on the Eagle Ford Shale. In fact, 58% ($471,343) of the payment interest 
mineral wealth has an Eagle Ford address. Furthermore, most payment mineral wealth 
that is not on the Eagle Ford is concentrated in nearby areas (e.g., San Antonio, Corpus 
Christi) (Figure 17). Amongst the various forms of mineral interests, payment interests 
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are, overwhelmingly, the most “local.” However the relatively modest total value, 0.06% 
($811,369) of the $1.4 billion total mineral value, diminishes the potential economic 
benefits. 
 
Table 12: Top five payment interests. 
Entity Total Payment Interest Value 
Percentage of Total 
Payment Interests  
Percentage 
All Minerals Tax City 
Ruhmann, James 
Russell $327,925 40.41% 0.024% 
Cotulla, 
Texas 
Baker Family 
Trust $143,418 17.67% 0.0105% 
Kenedy, 
Texas 
JLJ Ranch, Ltd $141,668 17.46% 0.0103% 
San 
Antonio, 
Texas 
Dobie Ranch $53,026 6.53% 0.0038% 
Three 
Rivers, 
Texas 
Legato Mineral 
Properties, Ltd $46,040 5.67% 0.0033% 
Universal 
City, Texas 
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Figure 16: The 2015 total payment interest spatial distribution across Texas and the 
continental U.S. 
 
5.4 Concentrations in Wealth and Space 
Live Oak County mineral ownership is highly concentrated in terms of the Gini 
coefficient and spatial concentration. This is manifest through the top ten destinations for 
mineral wealth (Table 13). The top five of those cities have a strong historical 
connection to the oil and gas industry with Houston being a global hub for energy 
industry knowledge (Bridge and Wood 2005). More than 77% of Live Oak County’s 
mineral wealth is held by entities with addresses in the top five cities, with 40% of the 
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mineral interests in Live Oak County held by entities in Houston alone.4 Three Rivers—
the only Live Oak County city on the list—is ranked ninth, the tax address of 1% of the 
total mineral wealth in the county.  
This is visible in Figure 18, which shows that mineral wealth is highly 
concentrated in the major Texas urban cores. Outside of Texas, mineral wealth is 
concentrated in places where there is significant drilling today: Colorado, home to the 
Niobrara Shale; Pennsylvania, home to the Marcellus Shale; Oklahoma, home to the 
Woodford Shale; and Louisiana, the epicenter of offshore U.S. oil and gas exploration 
and production (Table 14). Mineral wealth in Live Oak County is spatially concentrated 
in the two main municipalities—Three Rivers and George West—as well as several 
unincorporated villages, such as Pernitas Point is the southeastern part of the county and 
Whitsett to the northwest (Figure 18). 
 
Table 13: Top ten tax addresses of firms holding mineral wealth of Live Oak County. 
Ranking Tax Address City Amount  Percentage of All Minerals 
1 Houston, Texas $546,333,480 40.09% 
2 Midland, Texas1 $340,965,904 25.02% 
3 San Antonio, Texas $104,270,194 7.65% 
4 Corpus Christi, Texas $33,224,676 2.43% 
5 Fort Worth, Texas $27,178,286 1.99% 
6 Deer Park, Texas $24,533,545 1.80% 
 
 
                                                
4 These values refer to the city being queried only. If surrounding communities were 
included in the analysis (e.g., adding Deer Park’s Live Oak County mineral wealth to the 
Houston mineral wealth or Fair Oak Ranch’s to San Antonio), these values would be 
substantially higher.  
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Table 13: Continued 
Ranking Tax Address City Amount  Percentage of All Minerals 
7 Kerrville, Texas $23,284,499 1.71% 
8 Denver, Colorado $13,803,693 1.01% 
9 Three Rivers, Texas $13,392,302 0.98% 
10 Fair Oaks Ranch, Texas $13,101,687 0.96% 
TOTAL $1,140,088,266  83.64% 
Note to Table 13: 
1: A substantial portion of the Live Oak mineral wealth ($338,020,674) linked to Midland 
addresses are attributed to Pioneer Resources, a company that is based in Irving, Texas, 
yet uses a Midland tax address. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: The 2015 total mineral wealth distribution. 
As discussed in Section 3, locations with multiple mineral interests have been condensed 
into one point. Data in the inset map have been aggregated to the state level for legibility 
purposes.  
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Table 14: Non-Texas 2015 Live Oak County mineral wealth aggregated at the state 
level. 
Ranking State 2015 Total Live Oak Mineral Wealth 
1 Colorado $14,468,479 
2 Pennsylvania $7,401,693 
3 Oklahoma $5,553,561 
4 Louisiana $4,340,989 
5 Washington $3,915,409 
6 Florida $3,597,639 
7 California $1,417,990 
8 New York $1,198,280 
9 Delaware $1,049,598 
10 Arizona $502,711 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The 2015 total mineral wealth distribution in Live Oak County. 
Locations with multiple mineral interests have been condensed into one point.  
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Spatial analysis tools offered in ArcGIS, specifically nearest neighbor analysis 
and several Moran’s I analyses, yielded quantitative indicators of concentration. The 
results of the Average Nearest Neighbor test yielded an exceptionally low z score of -
199.38 and a p value of 0, indicating that the distribution of mineral interest holders is 
not random. Rather, there is very strong evidence to suggest that mineral holders are 
concentrated (Figure 19) in certain regions. This data relates to Table 13, which 
establishes that mineral holders appear to be concentrated in several cities. 
Moran’s I is used to measure spatial autocorrelation (whether a variable and a 
location are spatially correlated) and is a preexisting tool in ArcGIS. In this case, I am 
using Moran’s to assess whether mineral wealth is concentrated or dispersed. This test 
has been applied to three of the four mineral interest types and the total of the mineral 
interests. The results indicate that overriding royalties are spatially dispersed across the 
landscape and not due to chance (Table 15). Royalty, on the other hand, is statistically 
significantly clustered. Working interests are random. Across all forms of mineral 
ownership, mineral wealth is clustered in certain locations. 
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Figure 19: Average Nearest Neighbor summary indicating that mineral owners are 
spatially clustered. 
 
 
Table 15: Moran’s I values for the mineral interest types. 
Payment interest could not be calculated, because there are not enough data points. 
Interest Type Moran's I z-score p-value Autocorrelation 
Overriding -0.0021 -9.0242 0 Dispersed 
Royalty 0.0006 4.3546 0 Clustered 
Working -0.0012 0.0111 0.9911 Random 
Payment Insufficient data  
All Mineral Interests 0.0113 68.1437 0 Clustered 
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5.5 Mineral Wealth over Time 
As mentioned previously, I did not aggregate multiple years of assessed minerals, as was 
done in Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015), because summing then averaging appraisal 
values would disadvantage newer wells that were drilled during times of lower oil 
prices. Additionally, the LOCAD dataset lacked the API numbers that would be required 
to track a producing well across multiple years. However, there are still historical trends 
in the data that can be used to examine whether mineral wealth has shifted and whether 
those changes have been spatial.  
 From a historical perspective, the 2015 total mineral value decreased from 
previous years (Figure 20). This is not due to decreased production. In fact, Live Oak 
County oil production peaked in late 2014-early 2015 (Texas Drilling 2015), which 
should have caused the mineral property value to be substantially higher than the 2014 
value. Mineral property values, however, incorporate the price of oil, and between 
January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2015, the price of oil plummeted by more than 50% from 
$99 per barrel to $47 per barrel. It should be noted that working interests are the majority 
of mineral interest totals every year. 
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Figure 20: The relative amounts of mineral ownership from 2010 to present. 
 
 
In addition to the changing mineral interest values, the relative amount of “local” 
mineral ownership has also been changing. This is demonstrated in Figure 21, in which 
nearly every form of mineral holdings or ownership has shown a decrease since their 
relative peaks in 2011. This is most pronounced for royalty interests. In 2011, Live Oak 
County tax held 2.92% of the total mineral interests in royalties. This has since slipped 
to 1.9%. Local working interests equally once held 0.79% of total mineral properties, but 
that has since decreased to 0.02%. The potential significant ramifications of these two 
findings will be discussed in Section 6.  
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Figure 21: Historical mineral ownership/holdings relative to the total mineral ownership 
for that year, 2010-2015.  
As mentioned previously, “local” is defined as those entities that have a Live Oak 
County tax address. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 Using Live Oak County appraisal data as a proxy for mineral wealth and methods 
described by Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid (2015), this section has examined the extent to 
which mineral interests are both concentrated by owner and spatially concentrated. I 
accomplish this through an examination of the relative mineral wealth and using spatial 
statistics. I have also examined the shifts in mineral ownership from 2010 to present. 
 Live Oak County has over $1.3 billion in appraised mineral properties, but only a 
small portion (1.95%) is held by individuals or firms with tax addresses in the county. 
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Moreover, this category has halved since 2011 (3.99%). The largest mineral interest, the 
working interest, exhibits the greatest amount of wealth concentration with a Gini 
coefficient of 0.94 and 43% of the total working interest owned by one company. This 
relatively high Gini coefficient demonstrates that wealth is concentrated amongst a few 
wealth holders. While less concentrated (as described by the Gini coefficient), royalty 
interests are still mostly owned by entities with tax addresses outside Live Oak County. 
Of the top five override interests holders, three have tax addresses in Houston; however 
according to Moran’s I statistic, this interest type is spatially dispersed. Payment 
interests, the most “local” of all mineral interest types, are relatively insignificant in total 
value compared to other forms of assessed minerals interests.  
 Live Oak mineral interests in Texas are spatially clustered in Houston, Midland, 
San Antonio, and Corpus Christi. Mineral interests outside the state are clustered in 
Colorado, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. All of these cities and states have 
established histories of oil and gas production. Furthermore, evidence suggests that Live 
Oak County has been experiencing decreased local mineral ownership and holdings 
since 2011. The implications of this and the other findings in this section will be 
discussed in Section 6. It should be noted, however, that this study has not determined 
the manner by which two firms have accumulated the mineral holdings. Additionally, 
this thesis has not explored the manner by which surface and subsurface estates were 
severed. Given that mineral estates are bought and sold in a similar manner to surface 
estates, it would require substantial effort to determine how this historical process 
occurred for every mineral property.  
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
This section integrates the findings from the two results sections (Sections 4 and 5) into 
a discussion that relates findings to the relevant literatures. Mineral ownership data help 
provide additional insight into the three main themes that respondents highlighted 
(roads; housing; wages) relating to oil and gas exploration in south Texas. The high rate 
of Live Oak County absentee mineral ownership supports what respondents argued 
about mineral ownership; more broadly, absentee tenure is potentially changing scalar 
politics and political economy relations between Texas metropolitan regions and Live 
Oak County. Finally, I attempt to answer the research question: Does a resource curse 
exist on the Eagle Ford Shale? 
 
6.2 Unequal Wealth Distribution 
The Section 5 results indicate that the mineral estate tenure in Live Oak County is 
produced through absentee ownership. Live Oak data indicate that potentially enormous 
monetary benefits accrue outside Eagle Ford counties to other regions of Texas and 
beyond. This finding challenges economic models demonstrating vast amounts of 
mineral wealth remaining local to extraction sites (Tunstall et al. 2014).	Even the royalty 
wealth, a staple amongst shale energy economic impact analyses, is modest, as only 7% 
is “local” to the county and 12.4% remaining local to the Eagle Ford Shale region. This 
result contradicts previous royalty studies of the Eagle Ford that estimated in-county 
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ownership in Texas at 21.7% and Eagle Ford royalty ownership at 24.5% (Brown, 
Fitzgerald, and Weber 2015).  
The discrepancy has possible explanations. Live Oak County could be unique in 
that surface properties were frequently sold but mineral properties were withheld from 
the sale—more so than in other Eagle Ford counties—but I am not aware of different 
land-sale conditions in Live Oak compared to other counties. Courthouse records used 
by Brown, Fitzgerald, and Weber (2015) may not have the most updated address 
information for mineral estate owners. Different mineral estate tenure may exist among 
producing mineral properties as opposed to all mineral properties.  
The methodological approach taken in this study is supports different results. The 
approach offers a contrast, primarily in the detail of the mineral holdings, to the claim 
that royalties are “estimated at 20% of the total revenues from oil and gas operations” 
(Tunstall et al. 2014, 84) or using the dubious assumption that absentee surface 
ownership as a proxy for absentee mineral ownership (Kelsey et al. 2011). The present 
methodology provides a manner to accurately determine relative mineral ownership 
holdings and to estimate how ownership may be leveraged into positive economic 
impact, which is one of the main shortcomings of fracking economic impact studies 
(Rousu, Ramsaran, and Furlano 2015). As a reminder though, only completely intact 
local mineral estates have a tangible effect on the local economy (Weber, Brown, and 
Pender 2013). Additionally, the present methods offer a way to estimate the influence 
that firms have in a resource extraction milieu and the nature of that extraction—for 
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example, the working interest holder might have a greater economic impression at the 
site of extraction than an override interest holder. 
The results indicate that Live Oak County mineral interests are locked into a 
traditional core-periphery relationship in which mineral wealth is concentrated outside 
the county. In this case, the major Texan metropolitan centers are playing the role of the 
core, while Live Oak County is the resource periphery. This paradigm provides an 
example of a process that seems so prevalent in developing countries: hydrocarbons are 
extracted from the periphery in exchange for increasing wealth and power to established 
core regions (Peluso and Watts 2001; Watts 2005), a lose-lose situation for local 
residents who do not own a producing mineral estate. While there may be some direct 
benefits to Live Oak County in such a system—such as through the mineral interest 
holders who reside in the county—the majority of the benefits concentrate to the core 
metropolitan regions, where tax addresses of the majority of mineral interests are 
located. County residents who are not direct recipients of mineral wealth face the 
negative environmental externalities associated with shale fracking (Fry, Briggle, and 
Kincaid 2015), as well as the externalities associated with explosive boomtown 
development—such as degraded roads, a limited housing supply, and workforce 
complications (Section 4). Furthermore, the longer such resource extraction ensues, the 
more likely the region will be reimagined as a resource production region—“ghost 
acreage” composed of “disembodied nature of commodity spaces as shapeless, people-
less forms without histories or geographies” (Catton 1982; Bridge 2001, 2154). 
However, to state that this wealth distribution is permanent in space and time would be 
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incorrect. Indeed, oil and gas firms are frequently bought and sold, possibly creating new 
spatial distribution of mineral wealth.  
For example, the first oil and gas firm to frack a well on the Eagle Ford Shale, 
Petrohawk Energy, had tax address in Houston, Texas. In August 2011, Petrohawk was 
acquired by BHP Billiton, which owns 4.46% of total Live Oak mineral wealth, and has 
a U.S. headquarters in Houston (the tax address of their Live Oak County wells) but a 
global headquarters in Melbourne, Australia. This dynamism creates complex webs of 
networks that entail prohibitive effort to disentangle as described in Bridge (2008). 
Furthermore, especially in an active play like the Eagle Ford Shale, mineral interests are 
frequently bought and sold among the firms that are producing them, as well as amid 
mineral estate holders. Those interests can grow or shrink in size depending on the 
circumstances of the transfer. While state law requires that taxes be levied on the correct 
entity, it is difficult to track how a particular mineral estate changes ownership over 
time.  
Relating to the research question, the concentration in wealth amongst the few 
resulting in increasing economic inequality is one of the tenants of the resource curse 
(Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001). With a Gini coefficients over 0.5 for all the mineral interests 
and working interest with a Gini of over 0.9, wealth appears to be concentrated. These 
values contrast with the estimated Gini coefficient for the county at 0.42 (Batt 2014). 
The findings, therefore, indicate that mineral wealth is more concentrated than nominal 
income wealth at the county level. Furthermore, these concentrations of wealth are 
distant from Live Oak County and clustered in metropolitan cities across the state. While 
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I will discuss this in greater detail later in this section, the results indicate that this tenant 
of the resource curse is potentially present in Live Oak County, and provided wealth 
conditions are similar across the region—which I have no reason to assume differently—
the concentrating wealth is an indicator of the resource curse’s present across the Eagle 
Ford Shale. 
 
6.3 Mineral Wealth in Live Oak County versus Denton, Texas 
This section of my thesis discusses the parallels and differences between Denton, Texas, 
the study site of the only other appraisal district mineral wealth study (Fry, Briggle, and 
Kincaid 2015), and Live Oak County. While there are many mineral interest holders, the 
majority handles relative small interests and a small number of interest holders hold the 
majority of interests. The top five interests in each category collectively hold 72% of the 
total mineral wealth. Of the top twenty firms and individuals, only one is local to Live 
Oak County, with 0.0038% of total mineral wealth. Even among royalty interests—the 
interest that is touted by oil and gas companies to bring wealth to locals—the largest 
receiver holds 1.79% of total mineral wealth; Sinor Ranch Ltd, which is based in 
Houston and run by an individual who had familial ties to the area. More significantly, 
oil and gas firms appear to own significant portions of mineral properties as indicated by 
the presence of a ConocoPhillips subsidiary, Burlington Resources, and Mobil 
Production, an ExxonMobil subsidiary.  
In a stark contrast to the Denton study (Fry, Briggle, and Kincaid 2015), Three 
Rivers and George West do not own producing mineral properties. Three Rivers 
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Independent School District (ISD) has several mineral properties collectively valued at 
$58,310 and George West ISD has a property valued at $519, barely above the minimum 
required for taxation. The county government does not have active mineral producing 
properties, but the Texas state government holds $218,451 in appraised mineral estates. 
It is unknown whether these properties are actually owned by the Texas state 
government or are county roadway easements whose associated mineral properties will 
soon be devolved back down to the county (Section 4.3). All of this is to note that there 
are marked differences between the nature of mineral property ownership in the city of 
Denton on the Barnett Shale and the dynamics in Live Oak County.  
 
6.4 How Mineral Wealth Became Absentee 
While the quantitative evidence suggests that mineral ownership is largely absentee, 
economic development stakeholders were divided whether mineral ownership is more 
local or absentee. As discussed in Section 4.6, interview respondents offered diverse 
opinions on the amount of local mineral ownership, yet the quantitative findings from 
Section 5 demonstrate that a very small portion of the mineral wealth remains in Live 
Oak County. This happens in a variety of avenues: selling a division of the mineral 
estate during the sale of the surface property to attract a buyer, retaining the mineral 
estate while selling the surface property and it fragmenting through generations of 
ownership, mineral owners selling part of their estate to property acquisition companies 
to shore up personal finances.  
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Another option is that the surface estate owner still holds the mineral rights, but 
has left the county. Transitional land use patterns in Live Oak County may contribute to 
the absenteeism of combined surface and mineral property. As mentioned previously, the 
county transitioned from farming to ranching (Hester 1996) in the mid-20th century. 
Recently however, the county has transitioned more towards hunting leases as indicated 
through qualitative evidence from this study:  
 
“We still have our hunting industry. We lost all our farming. I mean lot of the 
ranches … a lot of it has gone to hunting…. We’re in the Golden Triangle for all 
the people who want to come white tail deer hunting and started everybody 
putting up deer-proof fence, started managing their hunts and managing their 
deer herds. So, until oil came along, that was the only industry” (EFS003).  
 
Studies have indicated that potentially more money can be gained through the 
creation of hunting leases than through cattle ranching (Livengood 1983; Pope 1985). 
According to a 2006 economic study, hunters paid approximately $301,000,000 for 
hunting leases across the state (Southwick and Southwick 2007). These hunting leases 
can be managed from afar and do not require the landowner to remain local to the 
region. As a result, the landowner has the option to move away from the county. In many 
circumstances hunting and ranching land uses are not necessarily in conflict with one 
another, and the landowner can continue to ranch the property using local land managers 
who also oversee hunting leases. This study did not examine whether surface property 
owners are also absentee or the level to which surface ownership correlates to mineral 
ownership.  
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Additionally, this study did not examine how firms acquired mineral wealth. As 
mentioned previously, the oil and gas industry milieu is dynamic as firms are frequently 
bought and sold (Bridge 2008), leading to new concentrations of mineral wealth. It is 
close to impossible to examine how these concentrations have changed for every mineral 
owner in Live Oak County. Furthermore, it is unknown how energy firms came to own 
oil and gas wealth. Mineral owners may sell their minerals during times of financial 
hardship or to provide a boost to their personal finances; how this money is spent is up to 
the previous mineral owner and could lead to even greater wealth than if he or she had 
held onto the mineral rights. That stated, it is uncertain whether these were the 
motivating reasons for company ownership of mineral wealth. 
 
6.5 An Eagle Ford Royalty Paradox 
 Why are economic development officials still supportive of oil and gas development if 
they 1) have to manage overused infrastructure with insufficient budgets; 2) consider the 
construction of short-term housing that may not translate to long term residents; 3) 
supervise governance structures that are unable to retain workers due to inflated wages; 
and 4) oversee a boom in which mineral wealth is largely absentee?  
 I hypothesize three responses to this question. While the majority of economic 
development officials were aware that there was a combination of local and absentee 
mineral ownership, they may overestimate the amount of local ownership. This could 
lead them to have a positive view of mineral ownership in their municipalities and 
counties despite the actual local ownership amount being much lower. 
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The second possibility is that respondents are aware of the true amount of 
mineral ownership yet still support energy development. As demonstrated in Brannstrom 
et al. (2015), a royalty paradox exists in those situations in which “a tiny fraction of the 
overall rural population receives royalties” (1183) yet the energy development is 
embraced. Local economic officials were proponents of oil and gas development; 
nevertheless many were equally aware that mineral ownership in their jurisdictions was 
immensely complex. This is likely because stakeholders perceive of the economic 
benefits beyond direct access to shale, in the form of increased tax revenues, increased 
hotel occupancy, increased use of local businesses by DIDO oil and gas workers, and 
occasional corporate volunteerism. Additionally, the pro-oil and gas ethos of the state 
(Rahm 2011) likely contributes to positive economic feelings towards upstream 
petroleum development. Finally, there are other ways surface owners may receive 
benefits from mineral extraction even if they do not own the mineral rights. While oil 
and gas companies are not required to do so, they can pay surface owners for damages to 
property (Railroad Commission 2015b). Furthermore, respondents across the shale play 
mentioned how exploration companies would use excess materials from the drill site to 
install new pasture roads and fences as a form of goodwill.  
The third possibility is that despite local ownership being a relative small amount 
of the overall total wealth, the amount that is flowing to communities is important given 
the historic context. Leading into the boom, south Texas was one of the poorest regions 
of Texas (Tunstall 2015a). Resource extraction, therefore, has brought money into a 
region starved of capital for decades. This is reflected in popular media accounts that 
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support increasing cash deposits relative to loans at Eagle Ford banks (Malewitz 2014a). 
However, a Houston Chronicle article noted that one Eagle Ford bank had increasing 
loans relative to the number of deposits: South Trust Bank in the Live Oak County city 
of George West. This one bank accounted for 35% of the total amount of loans made on 
the Eagle Ford Shale (Danner 2015). According to the newspaper article, the CEO 
attributed the high number of loans to a new Houston branch and not necessarily to Live 
Oak County specific circumstances. In summary, while the amount of direct mineral 
wealth being generated for locals from Live Oak County is small, the small amount 
might be having a larger impact, because the region was capital scarce.  
 
6.6 The Migration of Political Power 
Resource benefits located outside Live Oak County create dynamic and complicated 
political relations that, as of 2014 and 2015, have potentially morphed the Texas political 
landscape. Traditionally, municipal governments had been given considerable liberty to 
operate free from state oversight provided that regulations were couched in benefits for 
the general health and welfare of the public (Riley 2007; Fry 2013). City officials have 
used this authority to create and implement regulations that manage oil and gas drilling 
in their towns. This was most apparent when Denton—a municipality particularly 
affected by the negative externalities of urban gas drilling—banned fracking by popular 
vote within the city limits in November 2014. (Refer to Section 4.2.3 for economic 
development officials’ responses to Denton.) In a reaction to Denton, legislation passed 
at the state level in May 2015, House Bill (HB) 40, prohibits (i.e., preempts) municipal 
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governments from implementing drilling regulations that are not “commercially 
reasonable” (Darby et al. 2015; Maqbool 2015), thus eliminating a potential regulatory 
tool Eagle Ford economic development officials could use to slow development in the 
region. This bill was strongly supported by the Texas Oil and Gas Association 
(TXOGA), the Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Texas Independent Producers and 
Royalty Owners Association, and the Texas Land and Mineral Owners Association 
(TLMA), and many other pro-hydrocarbon related organizations (Texas Legislature 
Online 2015). These bodies opposed the developing “patchwork of inconsistent 
regulations that undermines safe and efficient production of oil and natural gas” 
(TXOGA 2015). The argument that a “patchwork effect of local ordinances [creates] 
inconsistent regulations” for the oil and gas industry (Way 2015) was a major theme 
supporting HB 40.  
Davis and Hoffer (2012) make a strong case for why oil and gas companies and 
mineral interests prefer to have regulations at the state level; however, they do not 
explain why energy firms object to municipal or county regulations. Undoubtedly, the 
consistency of laws was an important driver for the changing scales of hydrocarbon 
governance for firms, but why would mineral owners so negatively react to the Denton 
ban? The reality is that Texas has always had this municipal patchwork of laws due to 
the large amount of regulatory power given to city governments. Rather, I propose that 
the changing nature of mineral ownership is a more significant, yet neglected, impetus.  
Economic development officials discussed this point in interviews: local 
landowners, at some point in the past, owned much more of the mineral estate than they 
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do today. When asked whether local property owners retained their mineral rights when 
they sold the surface estate, one interviewee responded, “They do now….There’s a lot of 
land that’s been bought and sold without the minerals in the past 20, 30 years” 
(EFS014). This is corroborated by the changing history of mineral ownership in Live 
Oak County with mineral royalties increasingly going to absentee owners (Section 5.5). 
However, this trend is not only with royalties; local working and overriding interest 
holders had decreasing ownership between 2011 and 2015 compared to absentee entities. 
While unlikely cause of this process is unknown, the ramifications are apparent. As 
absentee mineral ownership and holdings increase, there are fewer mineral owners who 
are able to participate in local elections. This is because residents are only able to vote in 
those elections that are pertinent to their residence (Texas Constitution and Statutes 
1986). As a result, absentee mineral owners no longer have the ability to represent 
themselves at the local level of their mineral estate. This may help explain why mineral 
owners are adamant about changing the scale of regulation from municipal to state level. 
Consequently, local government drilling regulatory powers are being preempted by the 
state legislature and advanced into a different political sphere—a sphere that engages in 
active neoliberal, “race to the bottom” competition in terms of hydrocarbon regulations 
(Rabe and Mundo 2007, 269; Davis 2012). This relocation of power could disrupt local 
political networks that, at one time, had stronger dependence on local representation. As 
the mineral estate dynamics change, the nature of the hydrocarbon politics will react, 
causing shifting social relations at the local level.  
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6.7 Gilmore’s Assumption and the Industry-Civic Relationship 
Gilmore believed that the approaches energy firms were using to offset the negative 
boomtown-related development were blurring the lines between the public and private 
sector, as industry officials worked with civic organizations, municipalities, and counties 
by volunteering time and money (Schmidt 1981). But how well does the Gilmore model 
predict industry involvement today? A few Eagle Ford Shale economic development 
officials lamented that oil and gas companies did very little to help their jurisdictions: 
“In the first boom [in the 1970s-80s]…the companies took more interest in the 
community. [They] sponsored stuff, but now they don’t have much interest” (EFS011). 
The feeling that oil and gas companies seemed to shirk civic involvement was much 
more prevalent on the periphery of the play than in the core. However, even in the core, 
there was at least one respondent who questioned some of the motivations by oil and gas 
companies: “These operators of big cities… think they’re going to come down here and 
pull the wool over these people [(locals residents)]… It’s been a hard scrabble for years 
and years, trying to make ends meet. Before this [oil and gas boom] happened, we were 
one of the 20 poorest counties in the whole U.S.” (EFS003).  
This respondent demonstrated what the quantitative aspect of my research shows: 
that mineral operators are coming from afar and may potentially not know the local 
circumstances. He makes a strong distinction between the townspeople and them (“these 
operators of big cities”). In doing so, he speaks to a literature that is aware of the ability 
of outside firms to disrupt lifestyles (Willow and Wylie 2014). This is not to state that all 
firms diminish economic development outcomes by not participating in civic 
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volunteerism. Local firms, or even non-local companies that were strongly embedded 
into the municipality, were cited as harbingers of good business practices: “the 
partnerships or the good relationships that we have are the oil field companies that have 
been here for a long time” (EFS010).  
Given that the quantitative Live Oak County evidence suggests that local firms 
are participating less in Live Oak County drilling activities relative to non-local firms, it 
can only be assumed that there will be decreasing corporate involvement in civic, non-
regulatory affairs. Gilmore noted that there was a need “for industry-wide…willingness 
to cooperate as the states create new institutions, taxes, and implementation programs for 
dealing with the problems created by western energy resource development” (Gilmore 
1976, 540). It is unknown whether oil and gas companies would accept such an 
imposition today any more than they would have in the 1970s. 
 
6.8 Answering the Research Question: The South Texas Resource Curse 
Does a resource curse exist on the Eagle Ford Shale?  Social scientists have proposed 
many, often disparate, mechanisms through which resource abundance distorts the 
development process (Frankel 2010; Torres, Afonso, and Soares 2013), however this 
thesis summarizes its mechanisms as: 1) the emergence of the Dutch Disease, whereby 
resource sector exports increase a country’s monetary value, which crowds out 
investment and entrepreneurship in less competitive infant industries (Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen 1986; Auty 2001; Gylfason 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; 
Michaels 2011); 2) resource extraction degrades the physical environment deterring 
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potential post-extraction economic growth (Gylfason 2001; Sachs and Warner 2001; 
Michaels 2011); 3) competition for resource windfalls promotes rent-seeking and 
corruption, distorting the formation of social capital institutions (Ross 1999; Auty 2001; 
Torvik 2002; Isham et al. 2005; Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 
2009; Michaels 2011); 4) this rent seeking behavior causes decreasing per capita 
incomes (Torvik 2002); 5) worsening economic inequality (Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001); 
and 6) the influx of investment into a region causes a disruption to the local societal 
fabric (Gilmore 1976; Haslam Mckenzie 2013). Typically, the resource curse is applied 
to entire countries; however, it is not uncommon for investigators to apply it to sub-
national regions (Haggerty et al. 2014; Weber 2014; Tunstall 2015b). The evidence 
presented in this thesis indicates parallels between the economic development outcomes 
in south Texas and the negative ramifications of the resource curse. While my thesis 
directly assess the resource curse’ latter two characteristics—worsening economic 
inequality and social disruption—I will use the remainder of this section to situate my 
findings in relation to all the resource curse mechanisms. 
 
6.8.1 Dutch Disease  
Traditionally, the Dutch Disease represented how increased resource extraction and 
export leads to appreciating exchange rates of the host country. This causes 
manufactured goods destined for export to be more expensive outside the country, 
inherently leading to resource extraction displacing manufacturing (Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen 1986; Larsen 2006). However, recent explanations of the Dutch Disease 
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frame it simply as “the level of oil’s share of economic activity” (Larsen 2006, 618) 
relative to the other sectors. If oil’s share is increasing at the expense of other sectors, 
then the Dutch Disease is present. Since south Texas does not have its own currency 
market, this subsection will examine the Dutch Disease via the second Larsen (2006) 
definition.  
While there is limited quantitative evidence to suggest that mineral extraction is 
supplanting local businesses, local economic development officials noted how it had 
become increasingly difficult for their organizations to hire and retain the necessary 
workforce. This problem, at least according to some, had extended into the service 
industry, where local eateries, gas stations, and even truck dealerships were unable to 
retain workers because the oil and gas industry offered higher wages. It is unknown 
whether the downturn in oil prices and drilling activity since 2014 will influence the 
local labor and industry regimes. While oil and gas can have a positive influence on 
establishing linkages to the local economy (Bebbington 2012, 17), that does not appear 
to be taking place with regard to Live Oak County. The best quantitative evidence is that 
local working and overriding interests, the two interest types that would most likely be 
associated with firm embeddedness and linkages, only account for 0.05% of the total 
2015 mineral wealth. More concerning is the fact that two firms, Burlington Resources 
and Pioneer Natural Resources, hold ~55% of the total mineral wealth in Live Oak 
County.  
Additionally, local working and overriding interests have been contributing less 
to total mineral wealth since 2011. As described by the literature, a firm’s linkage to the 
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local economy, which may ameliorate some of the negative ramifications of resource 
extraction, can take decades to establish (Cumbers 1995; Freudenburg and Gramling 
1998), and so far there is little evidence of that taking place in Live Oak County through 
quantitative data or regionally through qualitative data. Even if these linkages do 
develop, specialization in the oil and gas sector, at least as described in the U.S. 
Mountain West, leads to decreased economic performance in the long term compared to 
other economic endeavors (Haggerty et al. 2014). Finally, Tunstall (2015a) hinted that 
the Dutch Disease may be present on the Eagle Ford, but he offered no evidence to 
support this claim. 
 
6.8.2 Environmental Degradation 
 Economic development officials rarely mentioned environmental degradation, and when 
they did, it was relevant to the amount of water required to frack a well, as well as the 
possible contamination that broken well casings can have on underground aquifers. This 
is an important concern to economic development officials, especially those on the 
western part of the play where there is less precipitation. As one respondent stated:  
 
“We don't know the contamination effects, where the industry obviously says one 
thing and the environmentalist obviously says another. We're using a lot of water, 
and at some point, you're going to pay the piper. We're in the middle of a drought 
right now. Our lake is 30% below [normal levels]. You can't drink oil. Water is a 
big issue.” (EFS002).  
 
From an economic development perspective, water holds importance to that 
particular municipality because of the fishing tourism of the nearby lake. Besides water, 
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research suggests that air pollution from the flaring of excess natural gas on the Eagle 
Ford Shale could be having negative impacts on the local and regional air quality 
(Schade and Roest 2015), however locals were more skeptical: “And they came out 
about [it in the] San Antonio Express saying that ‘Eagle Ford Responsible for San 
Antonio’s Non-Attainment of Air Quality.’ And I was at the conference and I said: ‘You 
know this is B.S.!’” (EFS007). It should be reiterated that changes in environmental 
quality are having an unknown impact on Eagle Ford economic development.  
 
6.8.3 Rent Seeking Behavior 
My research did not examine whether the boom on the Eagle Ford Shale is leading to 
increasing rent seeking behavior, nor am I aware of any research or popular media 
accounts that have indicated rent seeking is taking place on the Eagle Ford.  
 
6.8.4 Decreasing per Capita Incomes 
One prior investigation of the Eagle Ford suggests that the resource curse is not taking 
place. As discussed in Tunstall (2015b), “completed wells have a direct, positive impact 
on per-capita income” (88) between 2008 and 2011. Tunstall, therefore, rejects the 
resource curse for the core of the Eagle Ford Shale. While his methodology is sound, the 
evidence presented here indicates that the resource curse rejection may have been 
premature. In the years succeeding the timeframe of Tunstall’s study, petroleum prices 
increased, leading to enhanced drilling across the region until 2014. After a peak in June 
2014, oil prices have since fallen to decadal lows. This has resulted in significant 
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regional economic retrenchment and decreased drilling. It is not known whether this 
slowdown in activity has corresponded to a decrease in per capita wealth. Additionally, 
Tunstall has limited his definition of the resource curse to one mechanism, decreases in 
per capita incomes, while the resource curse actually includes many of mechanisms.  
 
6.8.5 Worsening Economic Inequality 
The results from Section 5 imply that mineral wealth is concentrating outside of Live 
Oak County potentially leading to worsening economic inequality. This was determined 
through public tax records as a proxy for total mineral wealth. Of all mineral interests, 
only 1.95% is staying local to Live Oak County and 3.38% is staying local to the Eagle 
Ford Shale. The high Gini coefficients—0.6 for override interest, 0.58 for payment 
interest, 0.58 for royalty interest, and 0.94 for working interest—indicate that wealth is 
concentrated with relatively few owners and holders. Furthermore, this wealth is 
spatially concentrated to the metropolitan regions of Texas as determined through tax 
addresses, with addresses in Houston, Midland, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi 
collectively owning or holding ~78%. All of these cities have strong historic ties to the 
oil and gas industry.  
 Furthermore, the amount of local relative mineral wealth in Live Oak County has 
been decreasing since 2011. In 2011, 3.99% of the total mineral interest was held and 
owned by in-county entities. By 2015, this amount had slipped to 1.95%, demonstrating 
that mineral wealth from the county is being accumulated outside of the county.  
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 Therefore, as demonstrated through LOCAD data, mineral wealth is concentrated 
outside the county; the amount of absentee mineral ownership and holdings has been 
increasing relative to the county’s increasing mineral wealth. This research, therefore, 
proposes that worsening economic inequality in terms of mineral wealth is present on the 
Eagle Ford Shale. 
 
6.8.6 Social Disruption 
The updated Gilmore (1976) problem triangle (Section 4.7) implies that social disruption 
is taking place. As municipal and county officials grapple with overused infrastructure, a 
mismatch in desired housing construction and what is actually built, and high wages 
leading to ineffective governance, the problem triangle demonstrates that as long as 
resource extraction takes place, residents will have to contend with a decreased quality 
of life. 
Increased absentee ownership of mineral wealth also contributes to a change in 
political relations because owners of minerals may seek to interact more with state 
government than municipal government, which is compounded by the passage of HB40 
(Section 6.5). Furthermore, the arrival of DIDO oil and gas workers may also affect 
interpersonal relationships, as one respondent indicated: “I swear, you would walk into a 
restaurant and know everybody. And now you walk and you don’t know anybody!” 
(EFS005). This degraded sentiment of community may be heightened in locations where 
residents receive few direct benefits, such as the case of Live Oak County or where 
environmental injustices arise due to the siting of disposal wells in neighborhoods of 
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color (Johnston, Werder, and Sebastian 2016). Furthermore, weak regulation at the state 
level (Davis 2012) and decreasing regulatory authority at the municipal level lead to 
decreasing institutional power to regulate oil and gas drilling and increasing partiality 
towards the oil and gas industry, approaches that exacerbate the resource curse (Kolstad 
and Wiig 2009).   
In these circumstances, communities on the Eagle Ford Shale appear to suffer 
from the ramifications of social disruption. The presence of this mechanism indicates 
that the Eagle Ford is probably experiencing the resource curse through social 
disruption.  
 
6.8.7 Resource Curse Presence? 
To summarize, is the resource curse present on the Eagle Ford Shale? Two mechanisms, 
concentration of capital in the form of mineral wealth and social disruption, appear to be 
present. While qualitative—and to some extent, the quantitative—data indicate that the 
Dutch Disease could be present, future researchers would have to assess south Texas 
economic sectorial changes. The interview respondents rarely mentioned environmental 
damage as a ramification of growth; however, a recent air quality study demonstrated 
that poor air quality over the shale could be contributing to poor air quality in San 
Antonio (Schade and Roest 2015). Other studies should be conducted to determine 
whether environmental degradation extends beyond air quality and whether that 
environmental damage is having an economic ramification. There is no research to 
suggest that rent-seeking behavior is (or is not) present on the Eagle Ford Shale. Finally, 
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Tunstall (2015b) examined whether the resource curse was present via decreasing per 
capita income. His study conducted from 2008-2011 demonstrated that particular 
mechanism is not present. Oil prices have since fallen to decadal lows. This resulted in 
regional economic retrenchment and decreased drilling. It is not known whether this 
slow in activity has corresponded to a decrease in per capita wealth. Given these 
circumstances, it is unlikely that municipal and county economic development officials 
will have the power to regulate Eagle Ford development adding further evidence of a 
potential resource curse for the region. As one respondent put it so poignantly: “[Oil and 
gas development] depends on the price of oil!” (EFS004) and not the actions of local 
policymakers. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This section has merged the results from the semi-structured interviews discussed in 
Section 4 and the Live Oak County mineral interests data discussed in Section 5. I have 
discussed the power of mineral assessment data, the winners in mineral extraction 
described in through a traditional core-periphery model, whether mineral ownership 
conforms to econometric perspectives of the nature of mineral holdings, how mineral 
holding patterns could be causing changes in the state’s political economy, and whether 
the Eagle Ford Shale is experiencing a resource curse.  
 Some political and economic processes in the Eagle Ford Shale deserve greater 
attention, such as the extent to which the resource curse is taking place or the linkage 
between shifts in scalar politics and corresponding scalar changes in mineral ownership. 
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I question the veracity of previous economic impact studies that assume all mineral 
wealth is “local” to the county, region, or even to the state. I also note that Live Oak 
County appears to be locked into a traditional core-periphery relationship in which direct 
benefits of hydrocarbons are located outside the Eagle Ford Shale, in Texas metropolitan 
regions. Furthermore, the most significant winners in energy extraction in Live Oak 
County appear to be a small subset of companies that have large mineral holdings (and, 
in some cases, actual ownership of estates). Economic development stakeholders appear 
to be aware of this, and yet still largely support oil and gas extraction in their 
municipalities through the royalty paradox. Low local mineral ownership may lead to 
substantive political changes in the form of shifts in scalar politics and in social relations 
between energy firms and municipalities, locals, and each other. I challenge assertions 
that south Texas has avoided resource curse ramifications by demonstrating that there 
has been worsening economic inequality, as determined through mineral wealth studies, 
and a social disruption, spurred by boomtown conditions.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
This thesis asked one question: Does a resource curse exist on the Eagle Ford Shale? 
While it is difficult to unequivocally confirm the resource curse on the Eagle Ford, there 
are indications that it is present. This answer is derived from the results of my two 
objectives: 1) determining the normative economic development narratives to energy 
development present on the Eagle Ford Shale in comparison to the foundational piece on 
boomtown development, Gilmore (1976); and 2) determining the relative spatial 
distribution of mineral wealth in Live Oak County.  
 To accomplish those two objectives, first I had to examine those investigations of 
energy geographies that have already been accomplished. I traced how social scientists 
analyze regional development in a resource extraction environment. I offered a synthesis 
of studies of boomtown development, many of which find grounding in Gilmore’s 
(1976) problem triangle that demonstrates how explosive resource extraction leads to a 
disruption in municipal economic development. I noted how mineral extraction takes 
place in non-United States contexts and those lessons that can be applied to the Eagle 
Ford Shale. I also summarized studies on mineral interests and offered reasons why 
geographers have, thus far, failed to use mineral appraisal data to quantitatively analyze 
economic development outcomes.  
 I used two main methods to accomplish my objectives. First, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with 15 economic development officials from the Eagle Ford 
Shale. The questions directly queried economic development, industry labor practices, 
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and royalty distribution. These interviews were coded using a grounded approach 
finding emergent themes. I additionally used data acquired from two participant-
observation conferences to augment my data on economic development practices. 
Second, I used 2010-2015 mineral interest assessments for property tax purposes as a 
proxy for relative Live Oak County mineral ownership. After data processing, I 
conducted spatial analyses and visualizations in ArcGIS. By focusing on one year’s data 
(2015), I could examine relative mineral wealth concentration among individuals and 
firms as well as the spatial concentration of mineral wealth. 
 The semi-structured interviews indicate that Eagle Ford economic development 
officials are most concerned over the deterioration of local roads, the lack of permanent 
housing, the glut of short to extended stay lodgings, and how skyrocketing wages are 
negatively influencing the workforce. Respondents also examined how other policy 
domains—such as tax policy, economic development goals, and the nature of firm-local 
government partnerships—are manifest in the three primary economic development 
ramifications. I also noted how respondents perceived of split estates in their 
jurisdictions. I concluded that section by reconciling the Gilmore (1976) problem 
triangle into a modern context that can be applicable to other boomtown settings as well 
as provide an explanatory tool for what social scientists see on the landscape.  
 The results from the analysis of mineral wealth seem to imply that mineral 
owners, defined by their tax address, are spatially concentrated in a few key locations as 
described by statistical tests. Furthermore, wealth is spatially concentrated in a few 
major cities—mostly major Texas urban areas. This wealth is further concentrated in a 
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few key oil and gas firms that hold vast sums of mineral wealth as demonstrated by 
relatively high Gini coefficients. One company in particular, Burlington Resources, 
holds more than 30% of the total mineral wealth of the county. Additionally, temporal 
analyses reveal that local mineral interest owners and holders have decreasing relative 
amounts of mineral wealth since 2011. Despite increased petroleum production from 
Live Oak County, the total mineral wealth has decreased significantly due to diminished 
oil prices. 
 I link the mineral wealth analysis and interpretation of semi-structured interviews 
together through several theoretical angles. First, the mineral wealth analysis offers a 
fresh angle on fracking economic impact studies. The findings suggest a changing 
relationship between core Texas metropolitan regions and the peripheral Eagle Ford 
Shale. The concentration of mineral wealth into the hands of a few absentee owners and 
holders means that previous studies of mineral wealth may have exaggerated the amount 
of local ownership. I also investigate how stakeholders in the Eagle Ford Shale perceive 
mineral wealth through the royalty paradox. This leads me to suggest how political and 
social relationships may be changing with absentee mineral ownership. Finally, I counter 
claims that oil and gas extraction in the Eagle Ford has avoided a resource curse 
scenario.  
 
7.2 Future Studies 
The social and economic ramifications of modern fracking are still poorly known, but 
this thesis has indicated that mineral wealth appraisal data offers the potential to 
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contribute to longstanding debates on the resource curse; moreover, qualitative 
interviews with municipal and county officials can potentially advance Gilmore’s 
problem triangle. Given fracking’s ability to transform the physical and human 
landscape, a broad research agenda is a requisite for future studies. Geographers have 
methodological tools that merge qualitative and quantitative approaches, which can 
contribute to fruitful discussions of modern boomtown resource extraction. In this way, 
geographers offer the spatial research findings that can refine existing approaches put 
forth by other social and physical scientists (Lave and Lutz 2014; Willow and Wylie 
2014; Calvert 2015). For example, important boomtown econometric estimates could be 
enhanced if it incorporated findings on the amount of local mineral ownership or the 
consequences to municipalities that is only gained through interviews with economic 
development officials. These multi-faceted approaches to boomtown research gain 
importance given the nature of tight-lipped oil and gas firms. Cross-disciplinary 
collaboration will be key, and I encourage the use of unconventional data, such as public 
mineral appraisal wealth or using qualitative data to interrogate resource curse 
mechanisms.  
Using the themes I have developed in this thesis, there are still many 
opportunities for future research. First, the influence of oil prices on stakeholder views is 
worth considering. Given the precipitous drop in oil prices, 65% (as of December 2015) 
below the June 2014 value, economic development stakeholder views may have shifted. 
Are they still as optimistic about the economic ramifications of resource development? 
Are they concerned that they may have overspecialized in energy? What are the steps 
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being taken to insulate their jurisdictions from the negative shocks of the oil and gas 
industry retrenchment?  
Future investigations of mineral ownership data should examine why there is 
such a significant disparity between the present study and other royalty studies of the 
Eagle Ford Shale and beyond. Is Live Oak County unique or is the methodology 
employed by other studies flawed? To engage with mineral ownership more rigorously, 
a regional investigation using several county appraisal districts should be undertaken. 
Unfortunately, there is no consistency in how these data are reported by appraisal 
districts (Section 3.6), so researchers would face significant obstacles in data processing. 
In spite of this issue, future fracking impact studies could use this publicly available 
appraisal data, which is a major improvement on estimations based on local surface 
estate ownership or a percentage of total oil and gas production.  
 
7.3 Final Thoughts 
The Eagle Ford Shale region has been transformed since the Dora Maria and STS-241 
were first drilled in October 2008, which launched one of the largest onshore oil 
discoveries in 21st century North America. As oil prices have decreased since June 2014, 
so has the amount of drilling taking place on the Eagle Ford. Yet, economic 
development leaders were excited by the promising shale plays geologically underneath 
the Eagle Ford. Additionally, the Eagle Ford may gain importance as the U.S. begins to 
export oil and gas to non-free trade countries for the first time in 40 years as per federal 
legislation passed in December 2015 (Blum 2015). Additionally, a liquefied natural gas 
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(LNG) export facility in Corpus Christi is slated to open in 2018. Given that most 
petroleum firms have been targeting the liquids in the play (oils and condensates), 
significant reserves of natural gas remain and have yet to be exploited. New market 
accessibility could spur local demand for Eagle Ford natural gas and breathe new life 
into a slowed boom. The Eagle Ford Shale will continue to play an important role in 
U.S.—and soon global—energy markets for decades, resulting in a dynamic future for 
south Texas economic development.  
This is why it is important for scientists continue to examine the ramifications of 
fracking through conversations with economic development officials and the 
incorporation of mineral wealth studies. While this thesis has noted that elements of the 
resource curse are potentially present in the Eagle Ford, future investigations are needed. 
Researchers should link qualitative findings from these conversations with quantitative 
results, such as the distribution of mineral ownership, as another way to examine 
resource extraction. This research can help frame where economic benefits accrue and 
whether localities are truly the sites of long term economic uplift that oil and gas firms 
purport. These critical and collaborative approaches are a necessity as fracking 
technologies augment hydrocarbon yields from previously neglected shales. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Framework: Eagle Ford Shale Public Policies and Economic 
Development 
Interviews will begin after reading, signing, and discussing the Informed Consent Form.  
Question five in the consent form asks: What will I be asked to do in this study? 
Begin by following up on that question. 
 
Respondent Code: EFS - ________ 
 
A. Respondent Background 
 
Obtain professional credentials of respondent: 
Elected or career official?  Head of organization? 
Expertise or credentials [degree; training; experience]?   
How long in current position [years or months]? How long in this 
community [years or months]?  
 Does your office (eg Chamber of Commerce, Planning Department) have plans 
for expansion? 
  à be specific: workers, space, activities?...in response to ….? 
 Is there a “culture” in this community regarding oil and gas development? 
-Related to past oil production? 
-Related to mineral rights ownership? 
 
What is/was your role in economic development, policy, or relations with oil and 
gas production in your community? 
[Allow for respondent to discuss this answer in his/her own terms] 
 
Who are/were the key figures involved in economic development, policy, or 
relations with oil and gas production in your city/town/county?  When (years, 
months)?  [prompts: municipal officials; elected officials; industry representatives; 
prominent citizens; external figures] 
 
 
B. County, City or Town Ordinances 
Are you familiar with ordinances that regulate some aspect of oil and gas development 
(eg roads, water disposal, setback distances, housing, zoning, etc.)  
 
 Year established__________ by whom____________ year revised 
____________ by whom__________ 
 Key aspects:  
 
Outside Consultants: Were outside consultants involved in helping establish 
these ordinances?  
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  Who? ….. Role?.... 
 
If policy created, then: Use these cards to rank the importance of the 
following objectives as they were raised during the establishment and/or 
amendment of policies regarding oil and gas:  
______Prevent noise complaints (___)  
______Preserve home property values (___) 
______Protect public safety (___)   
______Protect public health (___) 
______Encourage mineral production (___) 
______Reduce exposure to regulatory takings lawsuit (___) 
 
Ordinance outcomes:  
After the implementation of the ordinances, were there lawsuits, conflicts, or 
litigation?   
Have there been complaints about oil/gas production or related activities?   
 What was the nature of the complaints?   
 Were these before or after the adoption of the ordinances? 
 
C. Partnerships 
Describe partnerships between your community, office or organization with oil and 
gas firms 
à define “partnerships” as relationship, agreement, affiliation, etc., for 
workforce training, housing, logistical, social, etc. 
à ask for specific examples, for example, Have oil and gas companies provided 
any support (financial, volunteer, or otherwise) to the community?  How would 
you describe your relations with the companies? 
Which oil and gas companies are most prevalent in your community in terms of 
partnerships with public officials?   
D. Economic Development 
Please list and rank the 3-5 most important aspects of oil and gas-related economic 
development for your community 
 
Rank Aspect of oil/gas economic 
development 
Rationale 
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E. Workforce 
Do oil and gas firms (upstream and midstream) hire local or outside labor? (ask 
respondent to define “local”) 
 
What types of education are desired or required for jobs in your community? 
 
Which sector of oil and gas development presents the greatest challenges for 
obtaining workers?  
 
Are there locations/times that EFS management and workers in multiple firms 
share their experiences and discuss the happenings in their companies? (Perhaps 
at a conference or bar?) 
 
Do EFS companies prefer to talk with you [city official] directly or is there a 
preference towards other communication mediums (i.e. phone, email, text, 
physical mail)? 
 
Do workers move frequently between firms? Or between up and mid-stream 
sectors? Do firms have difficulty with retention of workers? 
 
In your community, could you provide examples oil/gas affecting upward 
mobility (social and occupational)?  Do workers leave your community for 
upward mobility? 
 
Where is most worker training carried out? [job site, at a branch location on the 
EFS, or at other locations?]  
 
For what type of jobs are local laborers trained? Do these workers supply pre-
oil/gas demands, such as work on farms and ranches? 
F. Future of Eagle Ford Shale 
Describe your view of the future of oil and gas-related development for your 
community 
à why does respondent holds these views?  How do they define “future”?  How 
do they define “development”? 
à which obstacles might impede future development? 
 
G. Conclusion [remind respondents that all questions are voluntary and they may 
opt out of any question] 
Do you have mineral interests in the Eagle Ford Shale?  
Did most landowners in this community retain their mineral rights? 
Are there particular individuals within the companies with whom you routinely 
communicate? Would you recommend us contacting them? 
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Earlier, we asked about worker retention. How long do you think oil/gas 
companies and their workers will remain in your community?  
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APPENDIX B 
Code List used in Atlas.ti 
Social Disruption 
Future Development/Future Workforce 
Workforce Education 
Royalty/Tax Acceptance (Institution) 
Growth (Institutionally Guided) 
Industry Civic Involvement and Relations 
Industry Leaders-No Analysis Needed 
Residential Royalties 
Workforce Training 
Regulations 
Workforce Inadequate 
Workforce Transient 
Interviewee Background-Incorporated in Spreadsheet 
Inter-Institutional Network 
Workforce Mobility 
Growth (Unguided Institutionally) 
Historical Drilling 
Workforce Origins 
Workforce Upward Mobility-Not strong enough responses to do analysis 
Inter-Institution Tension 
Reliance on Oil Price 
Inter-Firm Network 
Development Ranking 
Recommended Contact 
Royalty Utilization (Institution) 
Infrastructure Improvement 
 
